1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:07,870 --> 00:00:09,870 Good afternoon everyone . I'm major 3 00:00:09,870 --> 00:00:12,037 john moore with centcom Public affairs 4 00:00:12,037 --> 00:00:14,259 joining me are Miss Skylar more . She's 5 00:00:14,259 --> 00:00:16,426 the Central Command . Chief technology 6 00:00:16,426 --> 00:00:18,426 officer . This is a new position at 7 00:00:18,426 --> 00:00:20,592 centcom . She formerly worked at Naval 8 00:00:20,592 --> 00:00:22,759 Forces Command's Task Force 59 focused 9 00:00:22,759 --> 00:00:24,926 on unmanned systems and ai integration 10 00:00:24,926 --> 00:00:27,092 into the fleet . She has tech industry 11 00:00:27,092 --> 00:00:28,926 experience , having written tech 12 00:00:28,926 --> 00:00:30,870 legislature on the hill . Sergeant 13 00:00:30,870 --> 00:00:32,870 Micky Reeves , the inaugural winner 14 00:00:32,870 --> 00:00:32,750 from the massachusetts Army National 15 00:00:32,750 --> 00:00:34,694 Guard . He's currently deployed to 16 00:00:34,694 --> 00:00:36,972 Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia . 17 00:00:37,420 --> 00:00:39,587 He developed a counter unmanned aerial 18 00:00:39,587 --> 00:00:41,642 system training software system from 19 00:00:41,642 --> 00:00:43,587 scratch . So go through the ground 20 00:00:43,587 --> 00:00:45,753 rules real quick . We'll have about 30 21 00:00:45,753 --> 00:00:45,280 minutes for this . We start a little 22 00:00:45,280 --> 00:00:47,447 late so we'll end a little bit after . 23 00:00:47,447 --> 00:00:49,910 To the focus of this is on innovation . 24 00:00:49,910 --> 00:00:51,799 Central Command is a war fighting 25 00:00:51,799 --> 00:00:53,910 command becoming the hub for military 26 00:00:53,910 --> 00:00:56,132 innovation . Please tell your questions 27 00:00:56,132 --> 00:00:57,966 accordingly . Uh Miss moore will 28 00:00:57,966 --> 00:01:00,132 provide some opening comments followed 29 00:01:00,132 --> 00:01:02,299 by Sergeant reeve . After . We'll open 30 00:01:02,299 --> 00:01:04,243 questions to the room and then the 31 00:01:04,243 --> 00:01:06,299 phone after we finished the rep from 32 00:01:06,299 --> 00:01:05,750 Central Command . Public affairs is 33 00:01:05,750 --> 00:01:07,972 happy to follow up with you as needed , 34 00:01:07,972 --> 00:01:10,590 Miss More . Absolutely thanks folks for 35 00:01:10,590 --> 00:01:12,757 showing up today . We're as noted here 36 00:01:12,757 --> 00:01:14,979 to talk about technology and innovation 37 00:01:14,979 --> 00:01:16,757 at Central Command and also the 38 00:01:16,757 --> 00:01:18,979 opportunities that that creates for the 39 00:01:18,979 --> 00:01:20,979 rest of the department . Um I think 40 00:01:20,979 --> 00:01:20,920 that the problem set is something that 41 00:01:20,920 --> 00:01:22,920 everyone in here is fairly familiar 42 00:01:22,920 --> 00:01:24,864 with rapidly evolving threats at a 43 00:01:24,864 --> 00:01:26,920 speed that frankly moves beyond what 44 00:01:26,920 --> 00:01:28,920 traditional systems are built to go 45 00:01:28,920 --> 00:01:31,200 after . But then the opportunity space 46 00:01:31,200 --> 00:01:33,311 is really that there are technologies 47 00:01:33,311 --> 00:01:35,589 that have matured either through D . O . 48 00:01:35,589 --> 00:01:37,589 D or through commercial sector that 49 00:01:37,589 --> 00:01:39,700 really can get after problems today , 50 00:01:39,700 --> 00:01:41,700 not years from now , not five years 51 00:01:41,700 --> 00:01:43,756 from now , but today . And so what I 52 00:01:43,756 --> 00:01:45,589 view my role as Chief technology 53 00:01:45,589 --> 00:01:47,811 Officer is is very simple , which is to 54 00:01:47,811 --> 00:01:49,867 get the best tech available into the 55 00:01:49,867 --> 00:01:51,811 hands of the people who need it as 56 00:01:51,811 --> 00:01:53,922 quickly as possible , full stop . The 57 00:01:53,922 --> 00:01:55,811 the tech can come from commercial 58 00:01:55,811 --> 00:01:58,033 sector , it can come from D O . D . The 59 00:01:58,033 --> 00:02:00,033 idea can come from a sergeant . The 60 00:02:00,033 --> 00:02:00,030 idea can come from a general , the 61 00:02:00,030 --> 00:02:02,197 point is to get the best tech into the 62 00:02:02,197 --> 00:02:04,308 hands of the people who need it . And 63 00:02:04,308 --> 00:02:06,308 so what that means from a combatant 64 00:02:06,308 --> 00:02:08,530 command is that we're really focused on 65 00:02:08,530 --> 00:02:10,530 technology experimentation and what 66 00:02:10,530 --> 00:02:12,752 that can look like to create capability 67 00:02:12,752 --> 00:02:14,974 and we believe that a combatant command 68 00:02:14,974 --> 00:02:17,141 is the right place for that because it 69 00:02:17,141 --> 00:02:18,697 is so critical to get these 70 00:02:18,697 --> 00:02:20,641 technologies into the hands of the 71 00:02:20,641 --> 00:02:22,752 person that uses it in the place that 72 00:02:22,752 --> 00:02:24,586 they will use it and against the 73 00:02:24,586 --> 00:02:26,641 threats that it will actually face . 74 00:02:26,641 --> 00:02:28,697 And commercial sector knows this , I 75 00:02:28,697 --> 00:02:30,752 mean it would be unheard of to field 76 00:02:30,752 --> 00:02:32,974 any sort of technology without the user 77 00:02:32,974 --> 00:02:32,937 having their hands on it at some point . 78 00:02:32,997 --> 00:02:34,886 But it's something that we at the 79 00:02:34,886 --> 00:02:37,053 department really need to lean forward 80 00:02:37,053 --> 00:02:39,108 into and the combatant command at at 81 00:02:39,108 --> 00:02:41,330 centcom is particularly well suited for 82 00:02:41,330 --> 00:02:43,386 that for a couple of reasons . So of 83 00:02:43,386 --> 00:02:45,441 course as with all the other command 84 00:02:45,441 --> 00:02:47,497 commands , we have a robust operator 85 00:02:47,497 --> 00:02:49,554 base but we also have an environment 86 00:02:49,554 --> 00:02:51,665 that is uniquely challenging . Why is 87 00:02:51,665 --> 00:02:54,414 that ? It is incredibly hot , sandy , 88 00:02:54,414 --> 00:02:56,470 salty , windy in ways that will push 89 00:02:56,470 --> 00:02:58,644 from a physical perspective a lot of 90 00:02:58,644 --> 00:03:00,866 this kit that it might not otherwise if 91 00:03:00,866 --> 00:03:02,866 you just try to Conus and so for us 92 00:03:02,866 --> 00:03:05,088 it's so important for us to pressure it 93 00:03:05,088 --> 00:03:07,144 in those extreme environments and we 94 00:03:07,144 --> 00:03:09,255 believe that other combatant commands 95 00:03:09,255 --> 00:03:11,255 can benefit from that as well . And 96 00:03:11,255 --> 00:03:13,477 then also we have a environment that is 97 00:03:13,477 --> 00:03:15,644 active in ways that frankly others may 98 00:03:15,644 --> 00:03:17,644 not face . The diversity of threats 99 00:03:17,644 --> 00:03:19,644 that we do . We can have everything 100 00:03:19,644 --> 00:03:21,755 from counter piracy all the way up to 101 00:03:21,755 --> 00:03:23,922 state led weapons smuggling and direct 102 00:03:23,922 --> 00:03:25,977 threats against other states that is 103 00:03:25,977 --> 00:03:27,977 required to push this technology in 104 00:03:27,977 --> 00:03:30,144 order to integrate it . The reality is 105 00:03:30,144 --> 00:03:32,311 that all of those friction points that 106 00:03:32,311 --> 00:03:31,911 you do not want to face while you're in 107 00:03:31,911 --> 00:03:33,967 the middle of a firefight is what we 108 00:03:33,967 --> 00:03:36,022 would like to work through right now 109 00:03:36,022 --> 00:03:38,189 before it becomes critical , a perfect 110 00:03:38,189 --> 00:03:40,300 example of of how important this is . 111 00:03:40,300 --> 00:03:42,522 In my previous experience at Task Force 112 00:03:42,522 --> 00:03:44,744 59 we had this wonderful piece of kit . 113 00:03:44,744 --> 00:03:44,270 We were really excited to get it off 114 00:03:44,270 --> 00:03:46,540 the pier . We talked to the engineers , 115 00:03:46,540 --> 00:03:48,651 they hadn't put it out into the field 116 00:03:48,651 --> 00:03:50,873 yet . And right before we were about to 117 00:03:50,873 --> 00:03:53,096 go the Director of operations turned to 118 00:03:53,096 --> 00:03:54,818 the engineers and said this is 119 00:03:54,818 --> 00:03:56,429 waterproof . Right ? And the 120 00:03:56,429 --> 00:03:58,651 engineering team was silent and that is 121 00:03:58,651 --> 00:04:00,940 okay when we're doing an exercise in a 122 00:04:00,940 --> 00:04:03,162 bounded circumstance , that is not okay 123 00:04:03,162 --> 00:04:05,384 if we're in the middle of a firefight . 124 00:04:05,384 --> 00:04:07,440 And so we need to work through these 125 00:04:07,440 --> 00:04:09,607 friction points . Now , the technology 126 00:04:09,607 --> 00:04:08,940 needs to be put into the folks that 127 00:04:08,940 --> 00:04:11,107 hands who are going to use it now . Um 128 00:04:11,107 --> 00:04:12,940 that's what's going to build our 129 00:04:12,940 --> 00:04:15,107 capability . So how are we going about 130 00:04:15,107 --> 00:04:17,051 that as a command command ? We are 131 00:04:17,051 --> 00:04:19,218 making sure that we're going after our 132 00:04:19,218 --> 00:04:21,218 exercises in a very targeted way to 133 00:04:21,218 --> 00:04:23,218 push these technologies , but we're 134 00:04:23,218 --> 00:04:23,170 also expanding the vision of what 135 00:04:23,170 --> 00:04:25,392 exercises usually look like . Sometimes 136 00:04:25,392 --> 00:04:27,448 they're sort of bounded , not really 137 00:04:27,448 --> 00:04:29,614 followed up by consistent iterations . 138 00:04:29,614 --> 00:04:31,810 We look at exercises as sprints , we 139 00:04:31,810 --> 00:04:33,866 are going to push technology once we 140 00:04:33,866 --> 00:04:35,866 will go 90 days and iterate on that 141 00:04:35,866 --> 00:04:37,977 technology based on that experience , 142 00:04:37,977 --> 00:04:37,843 we will push it again at the next 143 00:04:37,843 --> 00:04:39,843 exercise and we will continue to do 144 00:04:39,843 --> 00:04:41,787 that . Digital Horizon is going on 145 00:04:41,787 --> 00:04:43,843 right now . Task Force 59 is leading 146 00:04:43,843 --> 00:04:45,787 that in bahrain , Scarlet Dragon . 147 00:04:45,787 --> 00:04:47,899 Oasis is the next big centcom led one 148 00:04:47,899 --> 00:04:50,121 at the end of january . These are going 149 00:04:50,121 --> 00:04:52,287 to anchor a lot of our efforts . We're 150 00:04:52,287 --> 00:04:54,454 also setting up organizations that are 151 00:04:54,454 --> 00:04:53,883 focused on this . We're all very busy . 152 00:04:53,883 --> 00:04:55,883 If you don't have people focused on 153 00:04:55,883 --> 00:04:58,050 this . If you don't have teams focused 154 00:04:58,050 --> 00:05:00,272 on this . Sometimes it can be difficult 155 00:05:00,272 --> 00:05:02,272 to make progress . My role as chief 156 00:05:02,272 --> 00:05:04,383 technology officer is this is my full 157 00:05:04,383 --> 00:05:06,550 time job . This is all I think about . 158 00:05:06,550 --> 00:05:08,661 And in addition to that you have Task 159 00:05:08,661 --> 00:05:10,772 force 39 for the army , Task Force 59 160 00:05:10,772 --> 00:05:12,939 for the Navy and Task Force 99 for the 161 00:05:12,939 --> 00:05:12,716 Air Force that have been stood up 162 00:05:12,726 --> 00:05:15,156 inside centcom to be explicitly focused 163 00:05:15,156 --> 00:05:17,440 on tech experimentation . And so 164 00:05:17,450 --> 00:05:19,561 finally , we're working on grassroots 165 00:05:19,561 --> 00:05:21,783 efforts and making sure that folks like 166 00:05:21,783 --> 00:05:23,894 Sergeant Reeve and the effort that he 167 00:05:23,894 --> 00:05:26,061 will talk about are having their ideas 168 00:05:26,061 --> 00:05:28,117 elevated because the people who know 169 00:05:28,117 --> 00:05:30,228 the problem best and who may have the 170 00:05:30,228 --> 00:05:30,190 best sense of what the solution is . 171 00:05:30,200 --> 00:05:32,367 Are the folks that are closest to it . 172 00:05:32,367 --> 00:05:34,640 Like Sergeant Reeve out in Saudi Arabia 173 00:05:34,650 --> 00:05:36,950 facing the counter US threat in a way 174 00:05:36,950 --> 00:05:38,980 where he can see exactly what the 175 00:05:38,980 --> 00:05:40,813 solution might be . And he built 176 00:05:40,813 --> 00:05:43,040 something that really we're excited to 177 00:05:43,040 --> 00:05:45,350 build with him . And so that's a quick 178 00:05:45,350 --> 00:05:47,517 summary of what we're working on , why 179 00:05:47,517 --> 00:05:49,461 we think this is important for the 180 00:05:49,461 --> 00:05:49,210 combat command . Looking forward to 181 00:05:49,210 --> 00:05:51,432 your questions . But first and foremost 182 00:05:51,432 --> 00:05:53,377 over to sergeant , we have to talk 183 00:05:53,377 --> 00:05:55,654 about his effort . Thank you miss more . 184 00:05:55,654 --> 00:05:57,877 Good afternoon everybody I'm here today 185 00:05:57,877 --> 00:06:00,154 because while deployed to Saudi Arabia , 186 00:06:00,154 --> 00:06:02,377 I used my free time in my spare time to 187 00:06:02,377 --> 00:06:04,654 develop a counter US training software . 188 00:06:04,654 --> 00:06:06,710 Um while part of the counter us team 189 00:06:06,710 --> 00:06:08,821 over in Saudi Arabia , I noticed that 190 00:06:08,821 --> 00:06:10,932 there was a way to bridge many of our 191 00:06:10,932 --> 00:06:12,766 multiple proprietary independent 192 00:06:12,766 --> 00:06:14,932 counter US systems that form our layer 193 00:06:14,932 --> 00:06:16,988 defense together to provide a common 194 00:06:16,988 --> 00:06:19,210 operating picture for training and with 195 00:06:19,210 --> 00:06:21,321 this , what I was able to do is I was 196 00:06:21,321 --> 00:06:23,154 able to build a sandbox tool for 197 00:06:23,154 --> 00:06:25,210 operators and teams to train against 198 00:06:25,210 --> 00:06:27,380 any scenario , any US threat and any 199 00:06:27,380 --> 00:06:29,770 environment and really to push the 200 00:06:29,770 --> 00:06:31,881 envelope of what our training is able 201 00:06:31,881 --> 00:06:33,992 to provide to our operators to really 202 00:06:33,992 --> 00:06:35,992 get those good , consistent quality 203 00:06:35,992 --> 00:06:38,103 repetitions in . Um with that then as 204 00:06:38,103 --> 00:06:40,270 well , this is a tool that I built out 205 00:06:40,270 --> 00:06:42,381 to be completely agnostic to any sort 206 00:06:42,381 --> 00:06:44,326 of counter US system . So that way 207 00:06:44,326 --> 00:06:43,670 there it can be used with current and 208 00:06:43,670 --> 00:06:46,620 future systems um what this what this 209 00:06:46,620 --> 00:06:48,880 tool is intending to do is to provide 210 00:06:48,890 --> 00:06:51,420 the opportunity for the boots on the 211 00:06:51,420 --> 00:06:53,531 ground that are closest to the threat 212 00:06:53,531 --> 00:06:55,364 and closest to their operational 213 00:06:55,364 --> 00:06:57,476 environment to mimic that environment 214 00:06:57,476 --> 00:06:59,476 as accurately as possible and to as 215 00:06:59,476 --> 00:07:01,642 well deploy threats against their base 216 00:07:01,642 --> 00:07:03,753 and to train against threats on their 217 00:07:03,753 --> 00:07:05,587 base that they see and that they 218 00:07:05,587 --> 00:07:07,587 interact with um sometimes daily so 219 00:07:07,587 --> 00:07:10,190 with that what I've observed with 220 00:07:10,190 --> 00:07:12,220 centcom is that they're standing up 221 00:07:12,220 --> 00:07:14,220 initiatives right now to bridge the 222 00:07:14,220 --> 00:07:16,331 subject matter experts were too often 223 00:07:16,331 --> 00:07:18,276 times your junior enlisted in your 224 00:07:18,276 --> 00:07:20,498 junior officers that have that job that 225 00:07:20,498 --> 00:07:22,331 they do daily um with the senior 226 00:07:22,331 --> 00:07:24,553 leadership that can put their solutions 227 00:07:24,553 --> 00:07:26,609 that they provide into effect across 228 00:07:26,609 --> 00:07:28,720 the organization . My experience with 229 00:07:28,720 --> 00:07:31,380 counter U . A . S has led to which 230 00:07:31,390 --> 00:07:34,040 provided a catalyst for me to build out 231 00:07:34,040 --> 00:07:36,540 this solution um with which was very 232 00:07:36,540 --> 00:07:38,707 much my domain that I was working with 233 00:07:38,707 --> 00:07:40,818 with my team here um and I am not the 234 00:07:40,818 --> 00:07:43,040 exception everywhere that I go and I've 235 00:07:43,040 --> 00:07:45,280 been able to know influence and talk to 236 00:07:45,290 --> 00:07:47,850 members of centcom across our area of 237 00:07:47,850 --> 00:07:49,930 responsibility to promote innovation 238 00:07:49,930 --> 00:07:51,819 and everywhere I go right now I'm 239 00:07:51,819 --> 00:07:53,986 seeing that there are talented service 240 00:07:53,986 --> 00:07:56,208 members out there with the solutions to 241 00:07:56,208 --> 00:07:58,263 the problems that are facing most of 242 00:07:58,263 --> 00:08:00,374 our operators today in this , in this 243 00:08:00,374 --> 00:08:02,541 environment . So with that it's really 244 00:08:02,541 --> 00:08:04,597 exciting that centcom is standing up 245 00:08:04,597 --> 00:08:06,541 these initiatives to bring forward 246 00:08:06,541 --> 00:08:08,541 these ideas and bring forward these 247 00:08:08,541 --> 00:08:10,763 solutions and to also inform our senior 248 00:08:10,763 --> 00:08:12,708 leaders about the issues facing um 249 00:08:12,708 --> 00:08:14,763 sometimes the people that are seeing 250 00:08:14,763 --> 00:08:16,930 experiencing them daily with that I'll 251 00:08:16,930 --> 00:08:18,986 turn it over to major more so we can 252 00:08:18,986 --> 00:08:21,041 start feeling some questions . Thank 253 00:08:21,041 --> 00:08:24,320 you . Hi ma'am , good to see you 254 00:08:24,320 --> 00:08:26,320 sergeant , thank you guys for doing 255 00:08:26,320 --> 00:08:28,487 this today . I just wanted you guys to 256 00:08:28,487 --> 00:08:30,709 talk a little bit more about Task force 257 00:08:30,709 --> 00:08:30,170 39 we haven't heard too much about that 258 00:08:30,170 --> 00:08:32,392 yet , that'll be my first question . Um 259 00:08:32,392 --> 00:08:34,559 and I'm just wondering um miss more if 260 00:08:34,559 --> 00:08:36,690 you could follow up possibly on what 261 00:08:36,690 --> 00:08:38,412 new authorities centcom or the 262 00:08:38,412 --> 00:08:40,579 subordinate commands have been granted 263 00:08:40,579 --> 00:08:44,010 for task force is 59 detachment 99 . 264 00:08:44,570 --> 00:08:47,150 Um and task Force 39 do you see this as 265 00:08:47,150 --> 00:08:49,550 a model for a wider implementation for 266 00:08:49,550 --> 00:08:51,717 the department . Thanks . Absolutely . 267 00:08:51,717 --> 00:08:54,370 So for task Force 39 again for folks 268 00:08:54,370 --> 00:08:56,592 that's the army's components focused on 269 00:08:56,592 --> 00:08:58,759 experimental technologies were already 270 00:08:58,759 --> 00:09:00,870 off often running with them . So they 271 00:09:00,870 --> 00:09:02,926 are actually going to be involved in 272 00:09:02,926 --> 00:09:04,870 our build out of sergeant Reeves , 273 00:09:04,870 --> 00:09:06,981 counter us trainer . So we're working 274 00:09:06,981 --> 00:09:06,250 with them , we're working with armory 275 00:09:06,250 --> 00:09:08,840 software factory right now to build out 276 00:09:08,840 --> 00:09:10,840 that initial minimum viable product 277 00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:13,007 that Sergeant reed had . Um and ensure 278 00:09:13,007 --> 00:09:15,229 that not only is it a plane to his base 279 00:09:15,229 --> 00:09:17,340 where he was in Saudi Arabia , but to 280 00:09:17,340 --> 00:09:19,562 multiple other teams . Again , the idea 281 00:09:19,562 --> 00:09:21,562 is that the problems we face here , 282 00:09:21,562 --> 00:09:23,562 especially force protection are not 283 00:09:23,562 --> 00:09:25,673 centcom specific . This is stuff that 284 00:09:25,673 --> 00:09:27,840 everyone across the department faces . 285 00:09:27,840 --> 00:09:27,815 And so if we can create a solution that 286 00:09:27,815 --> 00:09:29,982 multiple people can leverage , we want 287 00:09:29,982 --> 00:09:32,204 to make sure that we're doing that task 288 00:09:32,204 --> 00:09:34,315 Force 39 is going to be involved in a 289 00:09:34,315 --> 00:09:36,482 range of counter US efforts to include 290 00:09:36,482 --> 00:09:36,295 red sands , which is a program that 291 00:09:36,295 --> 00:09:38,462 will be shifting experiment related to 292 00:09:38,462 --> 00:09:40,462 counter us throughout the region so 293 00:09:40,462 --> 00:09:42,684 that everybody can benefit from it . Um 294 00:09:42,684 --> 00:09:44,795 So they are off to the races in terms 295 00:09:44,795 --> 00:09:46,940 of new authorities . What has been 296 00:09:46,950 --> 00:09:49,172 interesting for us is realizing that we 297 00:09:49,172 --> 00:09:51,172 can actually work with the existing 298 00:09:51,172 --> 00:09:53,394 ones fairly flexibly . Um it's simply , 299 00:09:53,394 --> 00:09:55,506 you know , the question of whether or 300 00:09:55,506 --> 00:09:57,506 not the authority exists or whether 301 00:09:57,506 --> 00:09:59,672 simply it's never been tried before is 302 00:09:59,672 --> 00:10:01,839 something that we're constantly asking 303 00:10:01,839 --> 00:10:04,006 the question . And so Task Force 5 9 , 304 00:10:04,006 --> 00:10:03,985 I think helped pave the way in a lot of 305 00:10:03,995 --> 00:10:06,106 ways of understanding what the limits 306 00:10:06,106 --> 00:10:08,217 are and what the capabilities are for 307 00:10:08,217 --> 00:10:10,273 acquisition and what a leasing model 308 00:10:10,273 --> 00:10:12,384 might look like for a command and how 309 00:10:12,384 --> 00:10:14,439 you can push tech experimentation in 310 00:10:14,439 --> 00:10:16,662 the field at a faster rate than we have 311 00:10:16,662 --> 00:10:18,662 previously . And so in terms of new 312 00:10:18,662 --> 00:10:20,773 authorities , I don't know that we're 313 00:10:20,773 --> 00:10:22,995 necessarily pushing for them so much as 314 00:10:22,995 --> 00:10:25,162 we are better leveraging the ones that 315 00:10:25,162 --> 00:10:27,162 we've already had real quick on red 316 00:10:27,162 --> 00:10:29,051 sands . Is that possible ? I just 317 00:10:29,051 --> 00:10:30,939 wonder you mentioned that will be 318 00:10:30,939 --> 00:10:33,051 moving around the region is no longer 319 00:10:33,051 --> 00:10:35,051 slated to be solely in Saudi Arabia 320 00:10:35,051 --> 00:10:34,590 correct . That is correct . It will be , 321 00:10:34,600 --> 00:10:36,711 it is a program that will be shifting 322 00:10:36,711 --> 00:10:40,090 locations . Hi , I'm Tara with the 323 00:10:40,090 --> 00:10:42,257 Associated Press , I actually also had 324 00:10:42,257 --> 00:10:44,479 a red sands question , so has red sands 325 00:10:44,479 --> 00:10:46,590 kind of shifted from being a location 326 00:10:46,590 --> 00:10:48,730 like a training range to more of a 327 00:10:48,740 --> 00:10:51,570 concept of testing and training . I'm 328 00:10:51,570 --> 00:10:53,626 not quite sure what it is now . So I 329 00:10:53,626 --> 00:10:55,737 think the recognition that we had was 330 00:10:55,737 --> 00:10:57,626 that counter us is such a broadly 331 00:10:57,626 --> 00:10:59,792 shared problem in the region and there 332 00:10:59,792 --> 00:11:01,848 were so many partners that wanted to 333 00:11:01,848 --> 00:11:01,690 take part in it that we wanted to 334 00:11:01,690 --> 00:11:03,912 ensure that we were able to bring those 335 00:11:03,912 --> 00:11:06,079 folks in earlier rather than later and 336 00:11:06,079 --> 00:11:08,246 to us . I mean it's another example of 337 00:11:08,246 --> 00:11:10,468 why technology like this is so exciting 338 00:11:10,468 --> 00:11:12,579 because it creates an opportunity for 339 00:11:12,579 --> 00:11:14,801 partnership and integrated capability , 340 00:11:14,801 --> 00:11:16,968 frankly , in a way that might not have 341 00:11:16,968 --> 00:11:19,246 otherwise existed for traditional tech . 342 00:11:19,246 --> 00:11:21,468 You might not be able to invest in a $3 343 00:11:21,468 --> 00:11:20,996 billion destroyer , but you can invest 344 00:11:20,996 --> 00:11:23,218 in a Counter US trainer in the software 345 00:11:23,218 --> 00:11:25,329 associated and build interoperability 346 00:11:25,329 --> 00:11:27,916 side by side . But just to circle back 347 00:11:27,926 --> 00:11:29,926 is red sands actually going to be a 348 00:11:29,926 --> 00:11:32,148 training location in Saudi Arabia or is 349 00:11:32,148 --> 00:11:34,632 it more of a concept of counter US 350 00:11:34,632 --> 00:11:36,465 programs going on ? It will be a 351 00:11:36,465 --> 00:11:38,354 program that will shift locations 352 00:11:38,354 --> 00:11:40,521 depending on what the specific project 353 00:11:40,521 --> 00:11:43,742 is . And then I had two more . How much 354 00:11:43,742 --> 00:11:46,092 has the counter US capabilities that 355 00:11:46,092 --> 00:11:48,392 you all are developing been shaped 356 00:11:48,392 --> 00:11:50,792 heavily by Iran's own capabilities that 357 00:11:50,792 --> 00:11:53,052 is displaying and what have you learned 358 00:11:53,062 --> 00:11:55,952 by example watching the showerheads . 359 00:11:57,220 --> 00:11:59,520 It's an interesting process because , 360 00:11:59,530 --> 00:12:01,650 and I think it highlights the 361 00:12:01,650 --> 00:12:03,790 importance of again conducting 362 00:12:03,790 --> 00:12:06,160 experimentation against a live threat 363 00:12:06,160 --> 00:12:08,382 as much as you can because you can only 364 00:12:08,382 --> 00:12:10,600 simulate so far the shape and size and 365 00:12:10,600 --> 00:12:12,711 speed of what is coming at folks like 366 00:12:12,711 --> 00:12:14,711 sergeant rebound Saudi Arabia , but 367 00:12:14,711 --> 00:12:16,950 also in Ukraine um , is something that 368 00:12:16,950 --> 00:12:19,117 you need needs to be experienced . The 369 00:12:19,117 --> 00:12:21,283 friction points are something that you 370 00:12:21,283 --> 00:12:23,450 need to understand and navigate in the 371 00:12:23,450 --> 00:12:25,506 field . And so really our experience 372 00:12:25,506 --> 00:12:27,450 with with the Shahid and the other 373 00:12:27,450 --> 00:12:29,617 types that we've seen flying across is 374 00:12:29,617 --> 00:12:31,617 that it's a great opportunity and a 375 00:12:31,617 --> 00:12:33,617 learning experience for some of the 376 00:12:33,617 --> 00:12:33,210 software that we're looking at . So 377 00:12:33,210 --> 00:12:35,377 some analytical tools are , you know , 378 00:12:35,377 --> 00:12:37,266 you have a radar that has so many 379 00:12:37,266 --> 00:12:39,377 contacts that a single person sifting 380 00:12:39,377 --> 00:12:41,321 through . It has difficult finding 381 00:12:41,321 --> 00:12:43,599 which of these is the most threatening . 382 00:12:43,599 --> 00:12:45,766 If you had a tool that was able to say 383 00:12:45,766 --> 00:12:47,988 90% confidence you can sift these out . 384 00:12:47,988 --> 00:12:47,930 These are the 3 to 4 that really are 385 00:12:47,930 --> 00:12:49,930 the highest threat to you . That is 386 00:12:49,930 --> 00:12:51,708 something that is so incredibly 387 00:12:51,708 --> 00:12:53,708 valuable . And we have every day an 388 00:12:53,708 --> 00:12:55,874 opportunity to test that live . And so 389 00:12:55,874 --> 00:12:55,840 we would love to keep building on those 390 00:12:55,840 --> 00:12:59,560 tools and then just one more So with 391 00:12:59,560 --> 00:13:02,430 your , with the product that you've 392 00:13:02,430 --> 00:13:04,486 created , if this had been done by a 393 00:13:04,486 --> 00:13:06,374 government contractor , obviously 394 00:13:06,374 --> 00:13:08,486 they'd be charging the government for 395 00:13:08,486 --> 00:13:10,763 it . Did you get a cash award for this ? 396 00:13:10,763 --> 00:13:12,986 No , ma'am , I did not . I'm doing this 397 00:13:12,986 --> 00:13:12,600 right now for the mission . That was 398 00:13:12,600 --> 00:13:14,767 always the intent . This was something 399 00:13:14,767 --> 00:13:16,933 I was building out before I even heard 400 00:13:16,933 --> 00:13:19,044 about Innovation Oasis because I felt 401 00:13:19,044 --> 00:13:21,044 that this was good training that my 402 00:13:21,044 --> 00:13:23,267 bass and my team needed . Are there any 403 00:13:23,267 --> 00:13:25,156 thoughts of creating some sort of 404 00:13:25,156 --> 00:13:27,322 financial incentive ? Just because you 405 00:13:27,322 --> 00:13:29,211 know , if if they were government 406 00:13:29,211 --> 00:13:31,267 civilians instead of in uniform , um 407 00:13:31,267 --> 00:13:33,489 you probably have to pay a lot of money 408 00:13:33,489 --> 00:13:36,070 for this software or so what we're 409 00:13:36,070 --> 00:13:38,800 doing right now is the sort of prize at 410 00:13:38,800 --> 00:13:40,967 the , at the back end of this was that 411 00:13:40,967 --> 00:13:43,189 he can find a school of his choosing um 412 00:13:43,189 --> 00:13:45,411 and go there and then also again making 413 00:13:45,411 --> 00:13:47,411 sure that he can speak to the other 414 00:13:47,411 --> 00:13:49,522 teams and circle back and share those 415 00:13:49,522 --> 00:13:51,689 lessons with his going forward . We're 416 00:13:51,689 --> 00:13:51,680 going to keep during what the incentive 417 00:13:51,680 --> 00:13:53,847 structure looks like to make sure that 418 00:13:53,847 --> 00:13:55,513 people are sharing these . We 419 00:13:55,513 --> 00:13:57,624 understand frankly that in some cases 420 00:13:57,624 --> 00:13:57,570 folks might build out a product that 421 00:13:57,570 --> 00:13:59,792 they then realize I actually would like 422 00:13:59,792 --> 00:14:01,959 to monetize this and take this outside 423 00:14:01,959 --> 00:14:04,292 of the command and that is okay with us . 424 00:14:04,292 --> 00:14:04,180 We're always going to be make sure that 425 00:14:04,180 --> 00:14:07,060 we are open about that conversation but 426 00:14:07,070 --> 00:14:09,237 highlighting it is a priority for us . 427 00:14:09,237 --> 00:14:11,403 First and foremost . Thank you . We'll 428 00:14:11,403 --> 00:14:13,570 go to the phones nancy . Are you still 429 00:14:13,570 --> 00:14:17,490 on ? I am . And um just to follow up on 430 00:14:17,490 --> 00:14:20,080 that point , can you clarify who owns 431 00:14:20,080 --> 00:14:22,136 the intellectual property in private 432 00:14:22,136 --> 00:14:24,136 sector is usually the creator , you 433 00:14:24,136 --> 00:14:27,180 said that some could make money in the 434 00:14:27,180 --> 00:14:29,513 private sector if they chose to sell it . 435 00:14:29,513 --> 00:14:31,402 Is there an intellectual property 436 00:14:31,402 --> 00:14:33,513 agreement ? And and can you spell out 437 00:14:33,513 --> 00:14:35,670 to us what it is short . So we have 438 00:14:35,670 --> 00:14:37,892 engaged with every project . It's going 439 00:14:37,892 --> 00:14:39,837 to be different . So with Sergeant 440 00:14:39,837 --> 00:14:42,059 reeve the first step first and foremost 441 00:14:42,059 --> 00:14:44,281 is making sure that he understands what 442 00:14:44,281 --> 00:14:43,940 his intellectual property rights and 443 00:14:43,950 --> 00:14:46,006 options are for any case like this . 444 00:14:46,006 --> 00:14:48,006 And so we are in the middle of that 445 00:14:48,006 --> 00:14:50,228 conversation again to make sure that he 446 00:14:50,228 --> 00:14:52,006 is educated and that we are not 447 00:14:52,006 --> 00:14:54,228 applying any pressure at the main point 448 00:14:54,228 --> 00:14:56,450 to us is that his idea is an incredibly 449 00:14:56,450 --> 00:14:56,200 good one and that it was highlighted 450 00:14:56,200 --> 00:14:58,367 for the command that that in itself is 451 00:14:58,367 --> 00:15:00,367 a win . If we can build it out into 452 00:15:00,367 --> 00:15:02,478 something more substantive , we would 453 00:15:02,478 --> 00:15:04,311 love to but that is entirely his 454 00:15:04,311 --> 00:15:06,478 decision . We will continue to do that 455 00:15:06,478 --> 00:15:05,810 with every idea that comes out of 456 00:15:05,810 --> 00:15:08,040 future innovation Oasis . Um and making 457 00:15:08,040 --> 00:15:10,262 sure that first and foremost folks know 458 00:15:10,262 --> 00:15:12,318 what their rights are and what their 459 00:15:12,318 --> 00:15:11,760 options are and then we can proceed 460 00:15:11,760 --> 00:15:14,550 from there . It's back to the phones . 461 00:15:15,820 --> 00:15:17,320 Megan . Are you still in ? 462 00:15:23,770 --> 00:15:25,881 Okay , coming back in the room in the 463 00:15:25,881 --> 00:15:28,260 back anyway . So just to clarify , 464 00:15:28,270 --> 00:15:30,326 because we've all been talking about 465 00:15:30,326 --> 00:15:32,214 the Iranian drones , but this was 466 00:15:32,214 --> 00:15:34,270 sergeant , you tailored this towards 467 00:15:34,270 --> 00:15:36,492 Iranian made drones , is that correct ? 468 00:15:36,492 --> 00:15:38,603 No , ma'am . The way designed was was 469 00:15:38,603 --> 00:15:40,714 to essentially build out the criteria 470 00:15:40,714 --> 00:15:42,937 to emulate any sort of us . So it's not 471 00:15:42,937 --> 00:15:45,159 tailored to one us specifically but can 472 00:15:45,159 --> 00:15:47,381 be broadly applied and there's tools to 473 00:15:47,381 --> 00:15:48,992 make that as specific to the 474 00:15:48,992 --> 00:15:51,048 information that we have about these 475 00:15:51,048 --> 00:15:53,214 threats . Okay , great . And then just 476 00:15:53,214 --> 00:15:55,548 also to clarify , you mentioned Ukraine . 477 00:15:55,548 --> 00:15:57,714 Uh you both mentioned that this is not 478 00:15:57,714 --> 00:15:59,881 centcom specific per se . How much are 479 00:15:59,881 --> 00:16:02,200 you sharing with you com will this be 480 00:16:02,200 --> 00:16:04,410 available to you calm to and 481 00:16:04,420 --> 00:16:07,220 potentially to the Ukrainian military 482 00:16:07,230 --> 00:16:09,286 as well . I mean what are the future 483 00:16:09,286 --> 00:16:11,643 plans for this ? Yes , yes . So I mean 484 00:16:11,643 --> 00:16:13,476 part of Sergeant Reeves Tour has 485 00:16:13,476 --> 00:16:15,476 included engagement with counter US 486 00:16:15,476 --> 00:16:17,643 teams that are across the country here 487 00:16:17,643 --> 00:16:19,593 and also in theater . So the short 488 00:16:19,593 --> 00:16:21,593 answer is absolutely within our own 489 00:16:21,593 --> 00:16:23,815 team . We also have constant engagement 490 00:16:23,815 --> 00:16:25,982 with you calm in particular because of 491 00:16:25,982 --> 00:16:28,204 the counter the counter us threats that 492 00:16:28,204 --> 00:16:30,204 they share . Um but even beyond you 493 00:16:30,204 --> 00:16:32,426 come , I mean everyone is going to face 494 00:16:32,426 --> 00:16:34,593 this challenge . This is not unique to 495 00:16:34,593 --> 00:16:36,649 centcom counter us is something that 496 00:16:36,649 --> 00:16:38,649 all of us are going to have to deal 497 00:16:38,649 --> 00:16:40,760 with . And so to the extent also that 498 00:16:40,760 --> 00:16:42,815 we can integrate their feedback into 499 00:16:42,815 --> 00:16:44,982 what we build with Sergeant Reeve . So 500 00:16:44,982 --> 00:16:44,550 that's applicable to multiple regions . 501 00:16:44,550 --> 00:16:46,828 We would love to do that . And finally , 502 00:16:46,828 --> 00:16:48,939 what's the timeline , when do you see 503 00:16:48,939 --> 00:16:51,550 this software coming into action ? So , 504 00:16:51,550 --> 00:16:54,020 Innovation Oasis was October 505 00:16:54,480 --> 00:16:56,830 October and then where we are working 506 00:16:56,830 --> 00:16:59,052 with army software factory right now to 507 00:16:59,052 --> 00:17:01,052 get them out into theater , they're 508 00:17:01,052 --> 00:17:00,690 running a discovery sprint . And our 509 00:17:00,690 --> 00:17:02,940 goal is to have a fully fleshed out 510 00:17:02,940 --> 00:17:06,710 product inside of 90 days . Thanks 511 00:17:06,710 --> 00:17:08,766 Travis tritt military dot com Thanks 512 00:17:08,766 --> 00:17:11,190 for doing this . Um so as artificial 513 00:17:11,190 --> 00:17:14,550 intelligence integrated into combat 514 00:17:14,560 --> 00:17:17,970 operations currently , um particularly 515 00:17:17,970 --> 00:17:20,270 encountering Iran , I believe that that 516 00:17:20,270 --> 00:17:22,548 was one of the initiatives of the jake . 517 00:17:22,548 --> 00:17:26,240 Um and if it's is it part like when we 518 00:17:26,240 --> 00:17:28,570 have to blow someone up ? Is a I part 519 00:17:28,570 --> 00:17:31,840 of the kill chain And if so like how is 520 00:17:31,840 --> 00:17:35,270 it part of the chain . We are very 521 00:17:35,270 --> 00:17:37,430 mindful and continued conversations 522 00:17:37,430 --> 00:17:39,652 with the policy team at all times about 523 00:17:39,652 --> 00:17:41,708 what the exact limits of what we can 524 00:17:41,708 --> 00:17:43,930 and cannot do in theater are for that . 525 00:17:43,930 --> 00:17:45,597 Um where we're really heavily 526 00:17:45,597 --> 00:17:47,970 integrating AI is into historical 527 00:17:47,970 --> 00:17:50,137 looking data so that we understand the 528 00:17:50,137 --> 00:17:52,303 patterns of life that are happening in 529 00:17:52,303 --> 00:17:54,359 the region . So again for the Navy's 530 00:17:54,359 --> 00:17:54,270 perspective , a lot of what they're 531 00:17:54,270 --> 00:17:56,430 trying to track is where are where is 532 00:17:56,430 --> 00:17:58,597 weapons smuggling mostly coming out of 533 00:17:58,597 --> 00:18:00,208 what ports do you need to be 534 00:18:00,208 --> 00:18:02,430 particularly mindful of what vessels do 535 00:18:02,430 --> 00:18:04,597 you need to be watching more closely . 536 00:18:04,597 --> 00:18:06,819 And so what we can do is inject as much 537 00:18:06,819 --> 00:18:09,097 of the data both from commercial and D . 538 00:18:09,097 --> 00:18:11,319 O . D . Into an AI . And that's focused 539 00:18:11,319 --> 00:18:13,263 on maritime anomalous behavior for 540 00:18:13,263 --> 00:18:15,263 example and say ah okay this is the 541 00:18:15,263 --> 00:18:17,374 type of behavior and in this specific 542 00:18:17,374 --> 00:18:19,374 region that you should look at more 543 00:18:19,374 --> 00:18:21,486 closely . So you know a comparison of 544 00:18:21,486 --> 00:18:23,819 what a before and after would look like . 545 00:18:23,819 --> 00:18:25,652 Previously we've had a destroyer 546 00:18:25,652 --> 00:18:27,541 patrolling the Red Sea that's the 547 00:18:27,541 --> 00:18:29,597 equivalent of one cop car patrolling 548 00:18:29,597 --> 00:18:31,763 the whole of California . It really is 549 00:18:31,763 --> 00:18:31,660 just the coverage is very difficult . 550 00:18:31,820 --> 00:18:33,931 Whereas what we can do now is put out 551 00:18:33,931 --> 00:18:36,098 autonomous sensors two that are in the 552 00:18:36,098 --> 00:18:38,209 hundreds if not thousands if you have 553 00:18:38,209 --> 00:18:40,431 buoys out up all of that data and say I 554 00:18:40,431 --> 00:18:42,653 now have a really good idea of what the 555 00:18:42,653 --> 00:18:44,764 pattern of life is and I believe that 556 00:18:44,764 --> 00:18:46,931 inside of this 10 nautical mile radius 557 00:18:46,931 --> 00:18:48,931 there is a particularly threatening 558 00:18:48,931 --> 00:18:51,098 activity . The manned assets , we have 559 00:18:51,098 --> 00:18:52,987 destroyers or otherwise should be 560 00:18:52,987 --> 00:18:55,153 deployed there . So it allows us to be 561 00:18:55,153 --> 00:18:57,320 much more precise so it's not actually 562 00:18:57,320 --> 00:18:59,542 involved if there's a strike called the 563 00:18:59,542 --> 00:19:01,653 I wouldn't be part of that chain from 564 00:19:01,653 --> 00:19:03,764 the time that is decided to when it's 565 00:19:03,764 --> 00:19:05,598 carried out for for for striking 566 00:19:05,598 --> 00:19:07,764 kinetic action . We will always have a 567 00:19:07,764 --> 00:19:09,931 human making that decision and heavily 568 00:19:09,931 --> 00:19:12,153 involved in that . Right ? I understand 569 00:19:12,153 --> 00:19:11,680 but is a I also involved in that 570 00:19:11,690 --> 00:19:13,790 process at this point it informs the 571 00:19:13,790 --> 00:19:15,901 decision making to the extent that it 572 00:19:15,901 --> 00:19:18,068 helps you filter down the contacts but 573 00:19:18,068 --> 00:19:20,179 there will always be a layer of human 574 00:19:20,179 --> 00:19:22,346 decision making on top of that . Thank 575 00:19:22,346 --> 00:19:24,457 you sir , brian aviation week you had 576 00:19:24,457 --> 00:19:26,568 touched on just how broad of an issue 577 00:19:26,568 --> 00:19:28,512 for us is . And across the service 578 00:19:28,512 --> 00:19:30,679 there are so many different efforts to 579 00:19:30,679 --> 00:19:32,679 have the U . S . Office of what the 580 00:19:32,679 --> 00:19:34,846 services are doing with their labs are 581 00:19:34,846 --> 00:19:36,568 developing even within centcom 582 00:19:36,568 --> 00:19:36,220 different bases are doing different 583 00:19:36,220 --> 00:19:38,660 things . How do you avoid to use the 584 00:19:38,660 --> 00:19:40,549 pentagon favorite term stovepipes 585 00:19:40,549 --> 00:19:42,382 however , is what you're doing , 586 00:19:42,382 --> 00:19:43,993 communicating to back to the 587 00:19:43,993 --> 00:19:46,160 headquarters and across the services . 588 00:19:46,160 --> 00:19:48,327 So what we've found is the best way we 589 00:19:48,327 --> 00:19:50,438 can do this is getting folks out into 590 00:19:50,438 --> 00:19:52,493 theater to see what we're doing live 591 00:19:52,493 --> 00:19:52,450 because that is what makes people 592 00:19:52,450 --> 00:19:54,450 really excited about integrating it 593 00:19:54,450 --> 00:19:56,672 themselves and then also connecting the 594 00:19:56,672 --> 00:19:58,672 dots of ah I'm working on a project 595 00:19:58,672 --> 00:20:00,839 that overlaps with this perfectly . We 596 00:20:00,839 --> 00:20:00,710 should get together and see what we can 597 00:20:00,710 --> 00:20:02,940 build and so whether it's having 598 00:20:02,940 --> 00:20:05,051 examples like red sands where we will 599 00:20:05,051 --> 00:20:07,051 heavily heavily promote that to the 600 00:20:07,051 --> 00:20:09,162 building and ask that people come out 601 00:20:09,162 --> 00:20:11,218 and engage whether it's having folks 602 00:20:11,218 --> 00:20:12,996 like ourselves come up into the 603 00:20:12,996 --> 00:20:15,107 pentagon and have those conversations 604 00:20:15,107 --> 00:20:17,218 describing in pretty intricate detail 605 00:20:17,218 --> 00:20:16,700 what the tech solutions are that we're 606 00:20:16,700 --> 00:20:18,790 building out . Both of those are how 607 00:20:18,790 --> 00:20:20,957 we're going about it . Unfortunately , 608 00:20:20,957 --> 00:20:23,179 you know , they're they're always there 609 00:20:23,179 --> 00:20:25,512 are a lot of teams working on counter U . 610 00:20:25,512 --> 00:20:27,734 I . S in the pentagon and that's a good 611 00:20:27,734 --> 00:20:29,846 thing , it's just making sure that we 612 00:20:29,846 --> 00:20:31,957 are finding the connective tissue and 613 00:20:31,957 --> 00:20:31,480 leveraging one another in a 614 00:20:31,480 --> 00:20:33,591 collaborative , not duplicative way . 615 00:20:33,591 --> 00:20:35,647 Um and I think we're getting at that 616 00:20:35,647 --> 00:20:37,813 just by sheer volume of outreach . Can 617 00:20:37,813 --> 00:20:40,036 you talk a little bit about how in your 618 00:20:40,036 --> 00:20:42,091 A . O . R . The threat has evolved , 619 00:20:42,091 --> 00:20:44,313 are you seeing more usa seeing swarming 620 00:20:44,313 --> 00:20:46,480 coordinated attacks , how what are you 621 00:20:46,480 --> 00:20:48,313 preparing for ? I think it would 622 00:20:48,313 --> 00:20:50,424 actually be better for you to start ? 623 00:20:50,424 --> 00:20:52,640 And so with this um from the 624 00:20:52,640 --> 00:20:55,320 operational perspective we right now we 625 00:20:55,320 --> 00:20:58,000 prepare for all threats based on the 626 00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:00,111 way that our capabilities work in the 627 00:21:00,111 --> 00:21:02,000 way that we're able to employ our 628 00:21:02,000 --> 00:21:03,778 capabilities , were able to run 629 00:21:03,778 --> 00:21:05,722 scenarios and run essentially it's 630 00:21:05,722 --> 00:21:07,667 called a battle drill too . Tackle 631 00:21:07,667 --> 00:21:09,722 these threats with the tools that we 632 00:21:09,722 --> 00:21:11,778 currently have and to that extent we 633 00:21:11,778 --> 00:21:13,722 have great faith , great faith and 634 00:21:13,722 --> 00:21:15,944 great trust in our system to be able to 635 00:21:15,944 --> 00:21:18,167 defeat whatever these threats are . And 636 00:21:18,167 --> 00:21:19,722 we have these scenarios and 637 00:21:19,722 --> 00:21:21,944 contingencies planned out to be able to 638 00:21:21,944 --> 00:21:24,167 counter these threats . And I think the 639 00:21:24,167 --> 00:21:26,333 the shift is as you would imagine is a 640 00:21:26,333 --> 00:21:28,500 volume and diversity problem . Right . 641 00:21:28,500 --> 00:21:30,667 Where the sheer volume of what is what 642 00:21:30,667 --> 00:21:32,889 folks are able to throw at us is larger 643 00:21:32,889 --> 00:21:32,730 than previous . The diversity of it is 644 00:21:32,730 --> 00:21:34,619 changing just as new systems come 645 00:21:34,619 --> 00:21:36,841 online . And so what that means is that 646 00:21:36,841 --> 00:21:38,850 your what you're looking for is 647 00:21:38,850 --> 00:21:41,080 changing on a fairly regular basis and 648 00:21:41,080 --> 00:21:43,080 the volume of what you're having to 649 00:21:43,080 --> 00:21:45,660 sift through is quite large . But that 650 00:21:45,670 --> 00:21:47,800 is a good example of why his trainer 651 00:21:47,800 --> 00:21:49,800 was so helpful because I think that 652 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:51,967 previously we've tried to overwork the 653 00:21:51,967 --> 00:21:54,078 problem to a certain extent of having 654 00:21:54,078 --> 00:21:56,300 counter U . S . Trainers that were very 655 00:21:56,300 --> 00:21:59,130 specific to one type of um whether 656 00:21:59,130 --> 00:22:01,241 Iranian or other drone that everybody 657 00:22:01,241 --> 00:22:03,186 is going to be looking for and the 658 00:22:03,186 --> 00:22:05,186 beauty of his is that it's platform 659 00:22:05,186 --> 00:22:07,352 agnostic . You can change it depending 660 00:22:07,352 --> 00:22:09,352 on the size the speed , the payload 661 00:22:09,352 --> 00:22:11,630 that might be coming in and that again , 662 00:22:11,630 --> 00:22:13,963 the fact that uh folks outside of the A . 663 00:22:13,963 --> 00:22:15,963 O . R . Couldn't quite come up with 664 00:22:15,963 --> 00:22:18,019 that solution . But he could is such 665 00:22:18,019 --> 00:22:20,186 clear evidence that the people closest 666 00:22:20,186 --> 00:22:19,720 to the problem should be closely 667 00:22:19,720 --> 00:22:22,850 involved in the solution building chris 668 00:22:22,850 --> 00:22:25,017 Gordon here in Space forces magazine ? 669 00:22:25,017 --> 00:22:27,072 I'd like to follow up on a point you 670 00:22:27,072 --> 00:22:29,350 made um , you said this is an active A . 671 00:22:29,350 --> 00:22:31,730 O . R . You're facing real threats . Um , 672 00:22:31,740 --> 00:22:34,030 but you also want to experiment against 673 00:22:34,030 --> 00:22:36,300 those real threats . So if it's an 674 00:22:36,300 --> 00:22:38,220 experiment , what happens if that 675 00:22:38,230 --> 00:22:40,920 experiment fails ? How much can this 676 00:22:40,920 --> 00:22:43,440 really be taken against a real threat 677 00:22:43,450 --> 00:22:45,830 that might hold your forces at risk . 678 00:22:45,980 --> 00:22:48,036 So I'm just trying to get a sense of 679 00:22:48,036 --> 00:22:51,260 how real that is . Um , so I'll maybe 680 00:22:51,270 --> 00:22:54,210 uh , Inject an answer before any of you 681 00:22:54,210 --> 00:22:56,377 even have the chance to ask it , which 682 00:22:56,377 --> 00:22:58,543 is the instance of the sale drone from 683 00:22:58,543 --> 00:23:00,766 the summer that was towed by an Iranian 684 00:23:00,766 --> 00:23:03,190 worship . And to us that is actually an 685 00:23:03,190 --> 00:23:05,240 example of what started as 686 00:23:05,240 --> 00:23:07,351 experimentation with the sale drone . 687 00:23:07,351 --> 00:23:09,462 We discovered that it worked and that 688 00:23:09,462 --> 00:23:11,740 we could have it out for 200 plus days . 689 00:23:11,740 --> 00:23:13,851 And so we pushed it to operations and 690 00:23:13,851 --> 00:23:15,684 then we were able to shift it to 691 00:23:15,684 --> 00:23:17,351 increasingly more challenging 692 00:23:17,351 --> 00:23:19,407 environments over time . And then we 693 00:23:19,407 --> 00:23:21,462 hit the point in the summer where it 694 00:23:21,462 --> 00:23:23,462 got towed and we lost a couple $100 695 00:23:23,462 --> 00:23:25,629 worth of cameras . Nothing sensitive . 696 00:23:25,629 --> 00:23:27,851 There were no sensitive sensors on it . 697 00:23:27,851 --> 00:23:29,962 There was no sensitive data on it and 698 00:23:29,962 --> 00:23:29,480 what we were . But what we were able to 699 00:23:29,480 --> 00:23:31,702 learn with it from that was okay , What 700 00:23:31,702 --> 00:23:33,813 are we going to do in the future ? If 701 00:23:33,813 --> 00:23:36,091 there are sensitive equipment on there ? 702 00:23:36,091 --> 00:23:38,258 If there is sensitive data , what does 703 00:23:38,258 --> 00:23:40,480 remote wiping gonna look like ? What do 704 00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:42,591 floatable containers look like that ? 705 00:23:42,591 --> 00:23:44,480 Might wipe a sensor . Um , we are 706 00:23:44,480 --> 00:23:46,647 learning from our experiments in a way 707 00:23:46,647 --> 00:23:48,702 that again , we want to work through 708 00:23:48,702 --> 00:23:50,647 these friction points before other 709 00:23:50,647 --> 00:23:52,813 combatant commands have to . And so to 710 00:23:52,813 --> 00:23:52,340 me that's a good example of one where 711 00:23:52,340 --> 00:23:54,507 we're pushing the outer limits of what 712 00:23:54,507 --> 00:23:56,618 operations with this technology looks 713 00:23:56,618 --> 00:23:58,840 like . But we're doing it in a way that 714 00:23:58,840 --> 00:24:00,840 is not going to incur risk that the 715 00:24:00,840 --> 00:24:02,840 department can't accept something . 716 00:24:02,840 --> 00:24:05,062 Then with an experiment you always have 717 00:24:05,062 --> 00:24:07,062 some form of backup . There's never 718 00:24:07,062 --> 00:24:10,370 going to be just relying on one of your 719 00:24:10,510 --> 00:24:13,240 systems that you're testing . So that's 720 00:24:13,240 --> 00:24:15,462 the beauty of it though , is that we're 721 00:24:15,462 --> 00:24:17,518 able to ramp it up . So you start by 722 00:24:17,518 --> 00:24:19,629 having pretty heavy oversight because 723 00:24:19,629 --> 00:24:19,370 you've got to make sure , hey , does 724 00:24:19,370 --> 00:24:21,481 this autonomous system even work ? Is 725 00:24:21,481 --> 00:24:23,592 it gonna run into other vessels ? The 726 00:24:23,592 --> 00:24:25,648 company can tell us it's going to be 727 00:24:25,648 --> 00:24:27,870 autonomous but we find out very quickly 728 00:24:27,870 --> 00:24:29,981 whether or not it is once it's out in 729 00:24:29,981 --> 00:24:29,430 the water . So you stay start with 730 00:24:29,430 --> 00:24:31,152 heavier oversight and then you 731 00:24:31,152 --> 00:24:33,263 essentially start taking the training 732 00:24:33,263 --> 00:24:35,430 wheels off as you go and then you also 733 00:24:35,430 --> 00:24:37,597 have to have a conversation about what 734 00:24:37,597 --> 00:24:39,819 is the cost of the system . What is the 735 00:24:39,819 --> 00:24:41,986 contractual requirement of replacing a 736 00:24:41,986 --> 00:24:44,152 broken part or a lost part And then to 737 00:24:44,152 --> 00:24:46,152 make a more precise decision really 738 00:24:46,152 --> 00:24:48,152 about how you're deploying unmanned 739 00:24:48,152 --> 00:24:50,263 assets based on the cost and the risk 740 00:24:50,263 --> 00:24:52,319 that you can quantify based on those 741 00:24:52,319 --> 00:24:54,486 metrics . Sure . Let's go to the phone 742 00:24:54,486 --> 00:24:53,550 real quick and I'll come back to you . 743 00:24:53,600 --> 00:24:55,822 Anyone on the phone ? Have a question . 744 00:24:56,190 --> 00:24:58,810 Yes , this is Carly Goldenberg . Um My 745 00:24:58,810 --> 00:25:01,110 question is for Sergeant Reeve . Good 746 00:25:01,110 --> 00:25:02,943 evening . Sergeant Reeve . I was 747 00:25:02,943 --> 00:25:05,166 reading one of your interviews from mid 748 00:25:05,166 --> 00:25:07,332 october where you talked about how the 749 00:25:07,332 --> 00:25:09,221 ideal outcome for your counter US 750 00:25:09,221 --> 00:25:11,443 system would be that it would provide a 751 00:25:11,443 --> 00:25:13,499 critical asset for training on bases 752 00:25:13,499 --> 00:25:15,721 everywhere . So I was curious , can you 753 00:25:15,721 --> 00:25:17,832 give us a sense of the impact of this 754 00:25:17,832 --> 00:25:20,054 Counter US software for soldiers on the 755 00:25:20,054 --> 00:25:21,999 ground are deployed throughout the 756 00:25:21,999 --> 00:25:24,060 world . Thank you . I designed my 757 00:25:24,060 --> 00:25:26,490 software was to be as agnostic to any 758 00:25:26,490 --> 00:25:28,434 base , any situation as possible . 759 00:25:28,434 --> 00:25:30,157 Everything is user defined and 760 00:25:30,157 --> 00:25:32,212 everything is user created . And the 761 00:25:32,212 --> 00:25:34,434 reason why I did it that way is because 762 00:25:34,434 --> 00:25:36,657 nobody knows best the situation and the 763 00:25:36,657 --> 00:25:38,879 realities on the ground rather than the 764 00:25:38,879 --> 00:25:41,101 people that face it . 365 days a year , 765 00:25:41,101 --> 00:25:43,268 24 hours a day . So with that then I'm 766 00:25:43,268 --> 00:25:45,490 providing them all the tools to use and 767 00:25:45,490 --> 00:25:47,101 all the tools to mimic their 768 00:25:47,101 --> 00:25:49,101 operational environments . To train 769 00:25:49,101 --> 00:25:51,212 against a common to train against the 770 00:25:51,212 --> 00:25:53,379 common operating picture ? But there's 771 00:25:53,379 --> 00:25:55,546 nothing inherently about it that would 772 00:25:55,546 --> 00:25:57,768 require it to be modified or changed in 773 00:25:57,768 --> 00:25:59,657 any sort of significant way to be 774 00:25:59,657 --> 00:26:01,768 employed across um across the wider a 775 00:26:01,768 --> 00:26:04,120 wider um area of responsibility . 776 00:26:05,590 --> 00:26:09,430 Anyone else on the phone ? Yeah . Here 777 00:26:09,440 --> 00:26:12,970 go ahead . Thank you so 778 00:26:12,970 --> 00:26:15,450 much . This is Samira carry from your 779 00:26:15,450 --> 00:26:18,160 international my question is that um is 780 00:26:18,160 --> 00:26:20,104 this action this operation ? Is it 781 00:26:20,104 --> 00:26:23,550 gonna be helpful in any sense or be an 782 00:26:23,560 --> 00:26:26,400 incentive to the formation of the so 783 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:28,760 called Middle east NATO ? Are you 784 00:26:28,760 --> 00:26:31,110 willing to share this sort of text with 785 00:26:31,110 --> 00:26:34,700 your original alive ? And also is it 786 00:26:34,710 --> 00:26:37,480 going to be successful in confronting 787 00:26:37,480 --> 00:26:40,020 Iranian maritime activities or it's 788 00:26:40,030 --> 00:26:42,680 only about the new abc . 789 00:26:44,050 --> 00:26:46,161 I'm sorry , I think I lost the second 790 00:26:46,161 --> 00:26:48,272 half of your first question formation 791 00:26:48,272 --> 00:26:50,606 of and then i it was a little bit fuzzy . 792 00:26:51,960 --> 00:26:54,071 Okay , I'm sorry the formation of the 793 00:26:54,071 --> 00:26:57,490 so called Middle eastern NATO . And are 794 00:26:57,490 --> 00:26:59,760 you willing to share any of these 795 00:26:59,770 --> 00:27:02,240 technologies with your allies , the 796 00:27:02,240 --> 00:27:04,730 regional allies and also about the 797 00:27:04,730 --> 00:27:06,810 maritime activities . Is this 798 00:27:06,820 --> 00:27:09,130 specifically about the U . A . B . S . 799 00:27:09,140 --> 00:27:12,950 Or is it gonna help us confronting 800 00:27:12,960 --> 00:27:15,830 Iranian maritime activities as well ? 801 00:27:16,590 --> 00:27:19,490 Thank you for the clarification . Um so 802 00:27:19,490 --> 00:27:22,000 I mean I think from the sort of quote 803 00:27:22,000 --> 00:27:24,222 unquote Middle eastern NATO perspective 804 00:27:24,222 --> 00:27:26,278 again , the the beauty of what we've 805 00:27:26,278 --> 00:27:28,333 seen with some of this technology is 806 00:27:28,333 --> 00:27:30,840 that it allows us to develop genuinely 807 00:27:30,840 --> 00:27:33,800 joint capability and interoperability 808 00:27:33,810 --> 00:27:35,600 at a level that was previously 809 00:27:35,600 --> 00:27:37,820 unimaginable because a lot of this is 810 00:27:37,820 --> 00:27:40,100 commercial tech that is very accessible 811 00:27:40,100 --> 00:27:42,156 and at a cost point that any partner 812 00:27:42,156 --> 00:27:44,380 can and then at the same time we are 813 00:27:44,380 --> 00:27:46,436 all genuinely experimenting with one 814 00:27:46,436 --> 00:27:48,769 another transitioning to the operations , 815 00:27:48,769 --> 00:27:50,658 determining the capabilities that 816 00:27:50,658 --> 00:27:52,547 actually meet our joint threat in 817 00:27:52,547 --> 00:27:54,713 capability requirements as needed . Um 818 00:27:54,713 --> 00:27:57,160 and so for us it's critically important 819 00:27:57,160 --> 00:27:59,104 to think of these as a partnership 820 00:27:59,104 --> 00:28:01,327 mechanism . Almost first and foremost , 821 00:28:01,327 --> 00:28:03,327 you'll hear Admiral cooper from the 822 00:28:03,327 --> 00:28:05,271 Navy talking about 100 U . S . V . 823 00:28:05,271 --> 00:28:07,493 Fleet , that fleet is 80% partnered and 824 00:28:07,493 --> 00:28:10,780 20% us . And that I think really sums 825 00:28:10,780 --> 00:28:12,900 up exactly what the potential is here 826 00:28:12,900 --> 00:28:15,011 because for the fleet of that size to 827 00:28:15,011 --> 00:28:17,011 be useful , all of that has to be , 828 00:28:17,011 --> 00:28:19,067 that data has to be integrated . You 829 00:28:19,067 --> 00:28:20,678 have to have a shared common 830 00:28:20,678 --> 00:28:22,678 operational picture . Um and all of 831 00:28:22,678 --> 00:28:24,400 that becomes a really exciting 832 00:28:24,400 --> 00:28:26,289 opportunity from the Iranian Navy 833 00:28:26,289 --> 00:28:28,289 question that , I mean that in many 834 00:28:28,289 --> 00:28:30,400 ways is the driving function for what 835 00:28:30,400 --> 00:28:32,567 we're doing in the in the navy space . 836 00:28:32,567 --> 00:28:35,590 So task Force 59 , we were looking at 837 00:28:35,590 --> 00:28:38,230 really two forms of ai deployment . One 838 00:28:38,230 --> 00:28:40,230 was computer vision and so that was 839 00:28:40,230 --> 00:28:42,230 looking at all of the pictures that 840 00:28:42,230 --> 00:28:44,286 were coming in and being able to say 841 00:28:44,286 --> 00:28:46,341 this is a fishing vessel , this is a 842 00:28:46,341 --> 00:28:48,508 commercial vessel , this is a military 843 00:28:48,508 --> 00:28:50,508 warship . Um and then being able to 844 00:28:50,508 --> 00:28:50,400 drop down a layer on top of that of 845 00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:52,344 saying , okay , anomalous behavior 846 00:28:52,344 --> 00:28:54,567 detection . It's a fishing vessel , but 847 00:28:54,567 --> 00:28:56,567 it's in an area where fishing often 848 00:28:56,567 --> 00:28:58,844 does not occur and then in the picture , 849 00:28:58,844 --> 00:29:00,956 you have no fishing equipment on your 850 00:29:00,956 --> 00:29:02,844 boat . So signs point to you or a 851 00:29:02,844 --> 00:29:05,067 suspicious vessel that we might want to 852 00:29:05,067 --> 00:29:04,960 take a harder look at . It's 853 00:29:04,960 --> 00:29:07,182 challenging in the Iranian context just 854 00:29:07,182 --> 00:29:09,182 because there are so many different 855 00:29:09,182 --> 00:29:11,293 types of vessels being using that are 856 00:29:11,293 --> 00:29:13,349 not flying the flag of Iran that are 857 00:29:13,349 --> 00:29:15,460 not warships . But again , this is an 858 00:29:15,460 --> 00:29:17,571 opportunity for us to train ourselves 859 00:29:17,571 --> 00:29:19,738 and to train our algorithms to be more 860 00:29:19,738 --> 00:29:18,810 thoughtful and be able to catch some of 861 00:29:18,810 --> 00:29:20,810 this threatening activity earlier . 862 00:29:21,770 --> 00:29:24,420 Thanks defense . One good to see you in 863 00:29:24,420 --> 00:29:26,753 person sergeant . Good to meet you . Um , 864 00:29:26,753 --> 00:29:29,350 so as part of this uh common operating 865 00:29:29,360 --> 00:29:31,193 picture that you're developing , 866 00:29:31,193 --> 00:29:33,249 there's a ton of different county US 867 00:29:33,249 --> 00:29:35,304 systems that are deployed now in the 868 00:29:35,304 --> 00:29:37,471 Middle East . There's a handheld drone 869 00:29:37,471 --> 00:29:39,693 defender things , There's facility wide 870 00:29:39,693 --> 00:29:41,860 base things on the ponds . There was a 871 00:29:41,860 --> 00:29:43,916 50 kilowatt laser . Are you learning 872 00:29:43,916 --> 00:29:45,804 about what the limitations are in 873 00:29:45,804 --> 00:29:48,160 specific counter US systems that the U . 874 00:29:48,160 --> 00:29:50,680 S . Is deploying . And how does that 875 00:29:50,690 --> 00:29:52,900 new intelligence about strengths or 876 00:29:52,900 --> 00:29:55,150 weaknesses of one system over another ? 877 00:29:55,180 --> 00:29:57,720 Get transferred up to become useful . 878 00:29:57,800 --> 00:29:59,967 So I mean I've been having those exact 879 00:29:59,967 --> 00:30:02,189 conversations with the counter US teams 880 00:30:02,189 --> 00:30:04,133 in the building this week which is 881 00:30:04,133 --> 00:30:06,300 about their feedback of . Okay , we're 882 00:30:06,300 --> 00:30:08,633 curious about your feedback about X . Y . 883 00:30:08,633 --> 00:30:08,540 Z . System . What can you tell us about 884 00:30:08,540 --> 00:30:10,707 that and connecting them with the team 885 00:30:10,707 --> 00:30:12,762 who can give the feedback of in this 886 00:30:12,762 --> 00:30:14,984 past week we used it in this way and it 887 00:30:14,984 --> 00:30:17,060 worked to X Y Z effect um and also 888 00:30:17,060 --> 00:30:19,116 having their teams physically go out 889 00:30:19,116 --> 00:30:21,338 and say , okay , is the reason that the 890 00:30:21,338 --> 00:30:23,449 effectiveness is lower higher than we 891 00:30:23,449 --> 00:30:25,616 expected because you are using it in a 892 00:30:25,616 --> 00:30:27,782 way that we did not necessarily expect 893 00:30:27,782 --> 00:30:29,893 or is it because you really are using 894 00:30:29,893 --> 00:30:31,838 it correctly and this simply isn't 895 00:30:31,838 --> 00:30:34,004 meeting your needs and so finding that 896 00:30:34,004 --> 00:30:33,410 back and forth , where there are folks 897 00:30:33,410 --> 00:30:35,577 that might be able to help you use the 898 00:30:35,577 --> 00:30:37,688 system more effectively or the system 899 00:30:37,688 --> 00:30:39,900 simply may not be meeting the need um 900 00:30:39,910 --> 00:30:41,854 is all part of the discussion that 901 00:30:41,854 --> 00:30:43,854 we're trying to promote . Okay , so 902 00:30:43,854 --> 00:30:45,799 really quick on the gap is the gap 903 00:30:45,799 --> 00:30:47,966 potentially that there's not enough of 904 00:30:47,966 --> 00:30:50,460 one type of system is that there's too 905 00:30:50,460 --> 00:30:52,460 many . And so this common operating 906 00:30:52,460 --> 00:30:54,682 picture is necessary is that that there 907 00:30:54,682 --> 00:30:56,793 aren't enough isn't enough variety of 908 00:30:56,793 --> 00:30:58,682 systems . What would you the most 909 00:30:58,682 --> 00:31:00,516 urgent question about fixing the 910 00:31:00,516 --> 00:31:03,560 counter us problem be ? So right now , 911 00:31:03,570 --> 00:31:07,200 um what we have is a multiple of these 912 00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:09,367 systems all perform slightly different 913 00:31:09,367 --> 00:31:11,367 functions and they're all better or 914 00:31:11,367 --> 00:31:13,422 worse at different things and that's 915 00:31:13,422 --> 00:31:15,478 really informing our layered defense 916 00:31:15,478 --> 00:31:17,589 where there's no one system out there 917 00:31:17,589 --> 00:31:16,990 right now , that's doing everything 918 00:31:16,990 --> 00:31:19,380 perfectly . So having these multiple 919 00:31:19,380 --> 00:31:21,491 systems is really enabling us to fill 920 00:31:21,491 --> 00:31:23,540 in the gaps of where one system's 921 00:31:23,550 --> 00:31:25,661 capabilities may end or where another 922 00:31:25,661 --> 00:31:27,717 ones begin and really allowing us to 923 00:31:27,717 --> 00:31:29,880 also tailor our defeat decisions to 924 00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:31,991 whatever the threat that we're facing 925 00:31:31,991 --> 00:31:34,920 is . I think sometimes we hope for a 926 00:31:34,920 --> 00:31:37,850 solution that is the cure all that is 927 00:31:37,850 --> 00:31:40,017 going to meet every single requirement 928 00:31:40,017 --> 00:31:42,128 for a counter us coming in that it is 929 00:31:42,128 --> 00:31:44,128 going to , you know , be the sensor 930 00:31:44,128 --> 00:31:46,072 that collects everything . And the 931 00:31:46,072 --> 00:31:48,072 reality that we consistently see is 932 00:31:48,072 --> 00:31:50,239 that you have tools that are very good 933 00:31:50,239 --> 00:31:52,350 at a particular thing and you have to 934 00:31:52,350 --> 00:31:54,406 layer it with other pieces . You are 935 00:31:54,406 --> 00:31:56,461 not going to have a single we we are 936 00:31:56,461 --> 00:31:56,420 often promised this by vendors and by 937 00:31:56,420 --> 00:31:58,420 other folks that they will have the 938 00:31:58,420 --> 00:32:00,531 magic solution that does everything . 939 00:32:00,531 --> 00:32:02,642 Um the magic solution is when we take 940 00:32:02,642 --> 00:32:04,753 multiple different solutions and work 941 00:32:04,753 --> 00:32:06,976 them together . So we've got time for a 942 00:32:06,976 --> 00:32:06,630 couple more questions sir . Thank you , 943 00:32:06,640 --> 00:32:08,807 john harper with defense scoop . Sorry 944 00:32:08,807 --> 00:32:10,751 if I missed this but does Sergeant 945 00:32:10,751 --> 00:32:13,260 Reeves technology have a name yet for 946 00:32:13,260 --> 00:32:16,260 this particular capability ? We haven't 947 00:32:16,260 --> 00:32:18,316 actually named it yet . No , there's 948 00:32:18,316 --> 00:32:20,538 there's a running name for it right now 949 00:32:20,538 --> 00:32:22,316 which is the interim platform . 950 00:32:22,316 --> 00:32:24,482 Agnostic Counter US training tool . Um 951 00:32:24,482 --> 00:32:26,593 it's the first acronym that I thought 952 00:32:26,593 --> 00:32:28,704 of . It stands for impact but there's 953 00:32:28,704 --> 00:32:30,927 no operational name for this tool yet . 954 00:32:32,040 --> 00:32:34,470 And um will this technology be ready 955 00:32:34,470 --> 00:32:36,710 for the red sands experiment that's 956 00:32:36,750 --> 00:32:39,200 coming up . So the timing to us was 957 00:32:39,200 --> 00:32:41,033 perfect because I mean we really 958 00:32:41,033 --> 00:32:43,089 couldn't have planned this better of 959 00:32:43,089 --> 00:32:45,200 Sergeant Reeve creating this tool and 960 00:32:45,200 --> 00:32:47,311 this tool a trainer is something that 961 00:32:47,311 --> 00:32:49,478 not only we can use , but our partners 962 00:32:49,478 --> 00:32:49,240 can use it going to be accessible and 963 00:32:49,240 --> 00:32:51,462 all of the networks where folks can and 964 00:32:51,462 --> 00:32:53,796 so it's a perfect starting point to say , 965 00:32:53,796 --> 00:32:55,907 okay , are we all thinking about this 966 00:32:55,907 --> 00:32:58,073 in the same way ? Are the factors that 967 00:32:58,073 --> 00:33:00,073 you can cue on this trainer meeting 968 00:33:00,073 --> 00:33:02,184 everybody's collective needs for it ? 969 00:33:02,184 --> 00:33:01,450 So it's certainly a great starting 970 00:33:01,450 --> 00:33:03,617 point . There will be a broader set of 971 00:33:03,617 --> 00:33:05,672 counter us efforts inside of the red 972 00:33:05,672 --> 00:33:07,894 stands program , but absolutely a great 973 00:33:07,894 --> 00:33:10,006 starting point . And is this the work 974 00:33:10,006 --> 00:33:12,228 that the army software factory is doing 975 00:33:12,228 --> 00:33:14,283 for this particular effort ? Is this 976 00:33:14,283 --> 00:33:16,283 like part of a broader relationship 977 00:33:16,283 --> 00:33:18,339 that you have with the Army software 978 00:33:18,339 --> 00:33:20,450 factory is very specifically tailored 979 00:33:20,450 --> 00:33:22,228 to this single project . We are 980 00:33:22,228 --> 00:33:24,339 starting with this project and we are 981 00:33:24,339 --> 00:33:24,050 excited to keep partnering with them 982 00:33:24,050 --> 00:33:26,161 going forward . What's been wonderful 983 00:33:26,161 --> 00:33:28,770 about this experience is um you know , 984 00:33:28,770 --> 00:33:31,870 I I came from OS and I watched many of 985 00:33:31,870 --> 00:33:34,092 these teams stand up from army software 986 00:33:34,092 --> 00:33:36,203 factory to defense innovation unit to 987 00:33:36,203 --> 00:33:38,250 kessel run to keep naming Defense 988 00:33:38,250 --> 00:33:40,083 Digital Service , the innovation 989 00:33:40,083 --> 00:33:42,194 community and the department has been 990 00:33:42,194 --> 00:33:44,306 building for years . And I think what 991 00:33:44,306 --> 00:33:46,528 we are now able to take advantage of is 992 00:33:46,528 --> 00:33:48,694 the fact that we as operators can very 993 00:33:48,694 --> 00:33:50,861 clearly define the problem set that we 994 00:33:50,861 --> 00:33:52,861 have and then reach back and say we 995 00:33:52,861 --> 00:33:55,028 need software developer , we need data 996 00:33:55,028 --> 00:33:54,420 scientists , we need network and 997 00:33:54,430 --> 00:33:56,820 architects and that talent actually 998 00:33:56,820 --> 00:33:58,876 exists in the department . It's just 999 00:33:58,876 --> 00:34:01,098 about you know , to his earlier point , 1000 00:34:01,098 --> 00:34:03,209 there are so many mixed efforts going 1001 00:34:03,209 --> 00:34:05,431 on . It's about knowing where the teams 1002 00:34:05,431 --> 00:34:05,340 are and being able to reach out and 1003 00:34:05,340 --> 00:34:07,430 leverage them correctly . Thank you 1004 00:34:07,430 --> 00:34:09,486 last question . So just a reminder , 1005 00:34:09,486 --> 00:34:11,541 we'll have some representatives from 1006 00:34:11,541 --> 00:34:13,597 income public affairs to answer your 1007 00:34:13,597 --> 00:34:13,470 questions if we didn't get a chance to . 1008 00:34:13,470 --> 00:34:17,220 So last question in the room Sure . 1009 00:34:17,230 --> 00:34:20,170 You talk about how this software fits 1010 00:34:20,170 --> 00:34:22,370 into the concept of the Middle East 1011 00:34:22,380 --> 00:34:24,547 integrated air defenses that you heard 1012 00:34:24,547 --> 00:34:26,547 the president talking about earlier 1013 00:34:26,547 --> 00:34:29,320 this year and how much input will our 1014 00:34:29,330 --> 00:34:31,910 partners have into how it all fits 1015 00:34:31,910 --> 00:34:34,170 together ? So it's gonna be , it's 1016 00:34:34,170 --> 00:34:35,892 gonna be as you would expect . 1017 00:34:35,892 --> 00:34:37,948 Iterative . And as we noted with the 1018 00:34:37,948 --> 00:34:39,837 previous question that it's gonna 1019 00:34:39,837 --> 00:34:42,059 require a lot of different technologies 1020 00:34:42,059 --> 00:34:44,226 layered on top of one another . We can 1021 00:34:44,226 --> 00:34:46,337 describe the concept as an integrated 1022 00:34:46,337 --> 00:34:48,392 air defense picture and what it will 1023 00:34:48,392 --> 00:34:50,392 take from us is working through the 1024 00:34:50,392 --> 00:34:49,940 friction points for these different 1025 00:34:49,940 --> 00:34:52,107 technologies that are going to feed it 1026 00:34:52,107 --> 00:34:54,107 and it's going to require different 1027 00:34:54,107 --> 00:34:55,829 efforts for different partners 1028 00:34:55,829 --> 00:34:57,884 depending on the information sharing 1029 00:34:57,884 --> 00:35:00,107 agreements that we have . Some of it is 1030 00:35:00,107 --> 00:35:02,107 going to be a technical challenge , 1031 00:35:02,107 --> 00:35:01,910 Others are going to be policy related . 1032 00:35:02,050 --> 00:35:04,820 But the point for us is that we can in 1033 00:35:04,820 --> 00:35:07,190 theater shake loose the tree of the 1034 00:35:07,190 --> 00:35:09,412 friction points that are going to allow 1035 00:35:09,412 --> 00:35:11,740 us to actually execute it . Thank you . 1036 00:35:11,740 --> 00:35:13,796 So that's about all the time we have 1037 00:35:13,796 --> 00:35:15,962 for this to once again , thank you for 1038 00:35:15,962 --> 00:35:17,962 your interest in centcom innovation 1039 00:35:17,962 --> 00:35:17,690 initiatives and we'll have someone a 1040 00:35:17,690 --> 00:35:19,912 rep from centcom public affairs here to 1041 00:35:19,912 --> 00:35:22,134 answer any follow up questions you guys 1042 00:35:22,134 --> 00:35:21,760 may have . Thank you for your time . 1043 00:35:21,770 --> 00:35:22,850 Thank you .