1 00:00:07,081 --> 00:00:10,770 - Good morning, everybody, thanks for coming in today. 2 00:00:10,770 --> 00:00:13,360 First and foremost, I wanna express my condolences 3 00:00:13,360 --> 00:00:15,520 to the family and friends of a number 4 00:00:15,520 --> 00:00:18,300 of recent casualties that we've lost in CENTCOM 5 00:00:18,300 --> 00:00:20,100 over the last few days. 6 00:00:20,100 --> 00:00:22,240 Two Marines were killed in mountainous terrain 7 00:00:22,240 --> 00:00:25,150 in northern Iraq in an advise and accompany mission 8 00:00:25,150 --> 00:00:27,280 with our Iraqi partners during a mission 9 00:00:27,280 --> 00:00:29,200 against the remains of ISIS. 10 00:00:29,200 --> 00:00:31,820 A third Marine was killed in a vehicle accident 11 00:00:31,820 --> 00:00:35,580 in the United Arab Emirates during exercise Native Fury. 12 00:00:35,580 --> 00:00:37,939 Finally and most recently, a US Army soldier 13 00:00:37,939 --> 00:00:40,190 and a US Air Force Airman, 14 00:00:40,190 --> 00:00:41,960 and a medic from the United Kingdom 15 00:00:41,960 --> 00:00:43,379 were killed during a rocket attack 16 00:00:43,379 --> 00:00:45,480 by an Iranian-backed militia. 17 00:00:45,480 --> 00:00:47,920 Kata'ib Hezbollah on Camp Taji, 18 00:00:47,920 --> 00:00:49,460 which is an Iraqi base that hosts 19 00:00:49,460 --> 00:00:53,350 coalition forces engaged in the fight against ISIS. 20 00:00:53,350 --> 00:00:55,300 Beyond those killed, we want to recognize 21 00:00:55,300 --> 00:00:59,175 the 18 combat-wounded service members and civilians. 22 00:00:59,175 --> 00:01:02,680 We also want to recognize two additional service members 23 00:01:02,680 --> 00:01:04,740 who were injured in noncombat injuries 24 00:01:04,740 --> 00:01:08,053 involved in the vehicle rollover in Native Fury. 25 00:01:09,020 --> 00:01:11,050 Our thoughts and prayers are with the friends and families 26 00:01:11,050 --> 00:01:12,187 of those killed and wounded, 27 00:01:12,187 --> 00:01:14,090 and we wish a speedy and full recovery 28 00:01:14,090 --> 00:01:15,640 to the wounded and the injured. 29 00:01:17,100 --> 00:01:20,220 I'd like to brief you on last night's defensive strikes 30 00:01:20,220 --> 00:01:22,840 on five Iranian-backed Kata'ib Hezbollah 31 00:01:22,840 --> 00:01:25,563 advanced conventional weapons storage units in Iraq. 32 00:01:26,660 --> 00:01:28,770 Up front, we have information that confirms 33 00:01:28,770 --> 00:01:30,260 that Kata'ib Hezbollah conducted 34 00:01:30,260 --> 00:01:34,010 the rocket attacks on Camp Taji on March the 11th, 35 00:01:34,010 --> 00:01:36,973 that killed three coalition members and injured 14 others. 36 00:01:37,810 --> 00:01:40,350 We also assessed that Kata'ib Hezbollah has been involved 37 00:01:40,350 --> 00:01:42,989 in 12 rocket attacks, against coalition forces 38 00:01:42,989 --> 00:01:44,903 in the last six months. 39 00:01:46,040 --> 00:01:48,320 In response to this attack on an Iraqi base 40 00:01:48,320 --> 00:01:50,120 that hosts coalition forces, 41 00:01:50,120 --> 00:01:52,630 supporting the Iraqi fight against ISIS, 42 00:01:52,630 --> 00:01:55,280 We carried out precision defensive strikes 43 00:01:55,280 --> 00:01:58,400 to degrade and destroy advanced conventional weapons 44 00:01:58,400 --> 00:02:00,520 that have been provided to Kata'ib Hezbollah 45 00:02:00,520 --> 00:02:02,170 by their Iranian backers. 46 00:02:02,170 --> 00:02:04,640 Let's go to the first slide please. 47 00:02:04,640 --> 00:02:07,060 So what you see on the graphic there, 48 00:02:07,060 --> 00:02:09,050 are the five targets that we struck. 49 00:02:09,050 --> 00:02:10,630 I'll just briefly call them out for you. 50 00:02:10,630 --> 00:02:14,278 What we call target A-1, is the Arab Nawar Ahmad 51 00:02:14,278 --> 00:02:16,113 rocket storage facility. 52 00:02:17,030 --> 00:02:20,790 A-2 is the Jurf al-Sakher IRAM storage facility. 53 00:02:20,790 --> 00:02:23,950 And of course, IRAM are the improved heavy rockets 54 00:02:23,950 --> 00:02:25,630 that are so lethal. 55 00:02:25,630 --> 00:02:29,280 A-3 is the Karbala KH advanced conventional weapons 56 00:02:29,280 --> 00:02:31,020 storage facility. 57 00:02:31,020 --> 00:02:35,570 A-4 is the Al-Musayyib terrorist weapons storing facility. 58 00:02:35,570 --> 00:02:38,430 And A-5 is another Jurf al-Sakher facility, 59 00:02:38,430 --> 00:02:43,430 it's a propellant production facility and storage sites. 60 00:02:43,460 --> 00:02:46,000 I'm gonna hold those images for just a minute. 61 00:02:46,000 --> 00:02:49,140 We struck them at 6 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. 62 00:02:49,140 --> 00:02:51,680 We assess that each location stored weapons 63 00:02:51,680 --> 00:02:53,460 that would enable lethal operations 64 00:02:53,460 --> 00:02:56,270 against US and coalition forces in Iraq. 65 00:02:56,270 --> 00:02:58,840 We also assessed that the destruction of these sites 66 00:02:58,840 --> 00:03:00,810 will degrade Kata'ib Hezbollah's ability 67 00:03:00,810 --> 00:03:03,290 to conduct future strikes. 68 00:03:03,290 --> 00:03:05,220 While we face significant weather issues 69 00:03:05,220 --> 00:03:07,060 and continue to face significant weather issues 70 00:03:07,060 --> 00:03:08,280 in the Baghdad area, 71 00:03:08,280 --> 00:03:10,740 it prevented clear photos and videos 72 00:03:10,740 --> 00:03:12,290 that we would like, 73 00:03:12,290 --> 00:03:15,200 at the level we'd like to share with you via some images. 74 00:03:15,200 --> 00:03:16,920 And we are confident that we have effectively 75 00:03:16,920 --> 00:03:18,320 destroyed these facilities, 76 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:20,440 and expect they will no longer to house 77 00:03:20,440 --> 00:03:23,090 the type of advanced Iranian supply weapons 78 00:03:23,090 --> 00:03:25,400 that were used in the Kata'ib Hezbollah attacks 79 00:03:25,400 --> 00:03:27,230 on the Iraqi base at Camp Taji. 80 00:03:27,230 --> 00:03:29,750 So let's go to the next slide please. 81 00:03:29,750 --> 00:03:32,098 Same format, these are the after images. 82 00:03:32,098 --> 00:03:34,760 I'm sure we're gonna provide this to you in hard copies 83 00:03:34,760 --> 00:03:36,230 so that you can see them as well, 84 00:03:36,230 --> 00:03:38,290 after the brief this morning. 85 00:03:38,290 --> 00:03:40,760 We assess success at all sites, 86 00:03:40,760 --> 00:03:42,644 and we're very comfortable with the level of damage 87 00:03:42,644 --> 00:03:44,310 that we were able to, 88 00:03:44,310 --> 00:03:46,490 that we were able to achieve. 89 00:03:46,490 --> 00:03:48,220 I know it's a little hard to see from a distance. 90 00:03:48,220 --> 00:03:51,310 Again we'll make sure you actually get the slides. 91 00:03:51,310 --> 00:03:54,220 The strikes were all conducted my manned fighter aircraft, 92 00:03:54,220 --> 00:03:55,350 and they recovered safely 93 00:03:55,350 --> 00:03:56,760 at the completion of their mission. 94 00:03:56,760 --> 00:03:57,860 I'm not gonna be able to give you 95 00:03:57,860 --> 00:04:00,823 any specific information about where the aircraft or base 96 00:04:00,823 --> 00:04:02,730 and I'm not gonna be able to provide any more details 97 00:04:02,730 --> 00:04:04,950 about the type of weapons that we employed. 98 00:04:04,950 --> 00:04:06,210 But as you can see from the imagery, 99 00:04:06,210 --> 00:04:07,690 they were all precise weapons, 100 00:04:07,690 --> 00:04:10,354 carefully calibrated by our weaponeers to achieve 101 00:04:10,354 --> 00:04:14,503 maximum effect on the target and minimize collateral damage. 102 00:04:14,503 --> 00:04:16,340 I also want to reiterate these strikes, 103 00:04:16,340 --> 00:04:18,930 these defensive strikes, were designed to destroy 104 00:04:18,930 --> 00:04:22,060 Iranian supplied advanced conventional weapons. 105 00:04:22,060 --> 00:04:24,610 And that the United States acted in self-defense 106 00:04:24,610 --> 00:04:27,080 in response to a direct and deliberate attack, 107 00:04:27,080 --> 00:04:29,910 a direct and deliberate attack on an Iraqi base 108 00:04:29,910 --> 00:04:32,150 that hosts coalition service members. 109 00:04:32,150 --> 00:04:34,580 We are in Iraq to support the people of Iraq 110 00:04:34,580 --> 00:04:36,090 in their fight against ISIS. 111 00:04:36,090 --> 00:04:37,910 However, we always reserve the right 112 00:04:37,910 --> 00:04:39,160 to defend our forces, 113 00:04:39,160 --> 00:04:41,440 whenever they're attacked or threatened. 114 00:04:41,440 --> 00:04:44,270 Finally, I would caution Iran and its proxies 115 00:04:44,270 --> 00:04:46,630 from attempting a response that would endanger 116 00:04:46,630 --> 00:04:49,200 US and coalition forces, or our partners. 117 00:04:49,200 --> 00:04:51,500 US central command is well-postured 118 00:04:51,500 --> 00:04:53,510 to defend our forces around the region, 119 00:04:53,510 --> 00:04:56,610 and respond to any further aggression against our forces. 120 00:04:56,610 --> 00:04:59,380 In fact, I have asked, and the secretary has granted 121 00:04:59,380 --> 00:05:02,310 my request to continue to operate two aircraft carriers 122 00:05:02,310 --> 00:05:03,930 strike groups in the region, 123 00:05:03,930 --> 00:05:05,970 which is the first period of extended dual 124 00:05:05,970 --> 00:05:08,630 US carrier operations in US central command 125 00:05:08,630 --> 00:05:10,733 since we believe around 2012. 126 00:05:11,640 --> 00:05:13,780 We have the flexibility, the capability, 127 00:05:13,780 --> 00:05:16,400 and the will to respond to any threat. 128 00:05:16,400 --> 00:05:18,583 With that, I'll be happy to take your questions. 129 00:05:20,040 --> 00:05:22,210 - General, thank you. 130 00:05:22,210 --> 00:05:24,510 Can you tell us what your assessment is 131 00:05:24,510 --> 00:05:27,870 of any casualties in the strikes? 132 00:05:27,870 --> 00:05:31,324 And secondly, more broadly, can you talk about 133 00:05:31,324 --> 00:05:35,610 whether or not you think this does escalate tensions 134 00:05:35,610 --> 00:05:40,610 with Iran, and whether Iran directed these strikes? 135 00:05:40,700 --> 00:05:43,570 - Sure, so, we are still assessing damage 136 00:05:43,570 --> 00:05:45,260 on the target sites. 137 00:05:45,260 --> 00:05:48,500 As I noted earlier, weather in the Baghdad areas 138 00:05:48,500 --> 00:05:50,100 prevented us from really following up, 139 00:05:50,100 --> 00:05:52,000 so I don't have any numbers for you right now. 140 00:05:52,000 --> 00:05:53,830 But we believe the collateral damage 141 00:05:53,830 --> 00:05:55,010 is gonna be very low. 142 00:05:55,010 --> 00:05:57,900 We expect there are gonna be fatalities on the objective, 143 00:05:57,900 --> 00:05:59,620 but I don't have those numbers for you right now. 144 00:05:59,620 --> 00:06:02,160 We'll work to get those out here in the future, 145 00:06:02,160 --> 00:06:04,083 the near future, as we continue. 146 00:06:06,160 --> 00:06:08,620 We believe that this is gonna have an effect on deterring, 147 00:06:08,620 --> 00:06:10,560 on deterring future strikes on this nature. 148 00:06:10,560 --> 00:06:13,491 We've seen in the past what happens when you don't respond. 149 00:06:13,491 --> 00:06:16,440 Now people know that we're not gonna tolerate 150 00:06:16,440 --> 00:06:17,900 these direct attacks on American 151 00:06:17,900 --> 00:06:19,400 or coalition service members, 152 00:06:19,400 --> 00:06:21,320 and we're willing and able to respond. 153 00:06:21,320 --> 00:06:23,950 Kata'ib Hezbollah is closely linked to Iran. 154 00:06:23,950 --> 00:06:25,590 I couldn't tell you the details 155 00:06:25,590 --> 00:06:27,630 of the particular connection on this strike, 156 00:06:27,630 --> 00:06:29,920 I just don't know those yet. 157 00:06:29,920 --> 00:06:31,960 But we know morally there's a very strong connection 158 00:06:31,960 --> 00:06:33,180 between the two. 159 00:06:33,180 --> 00:06:34,960 - You can't at this moment, 160 00:06:34,960 --> 00:06:37,360 or you don't think you have enough evidence 161 00:06:37,360 --> 00:06:38,630 to directly tie this? 162 00:06:38,630 --> 00:06:41,073 - I'm not gonna, that's as far as I'll go on that. 163 00:06:42,410 --> 00:06:44,780 - General McKensie, is there any evidence 164 00:06:44,780 --> 00:06:47,330 that you killed General Siamand Mashhadani, 165 00:06:47,330 --> 00:06:50,620 who's a top IRGC commander in the strikes? 166 00:06:50,620 --> 00:06:54,550 And has there been any response from the PMU? 167 00:06:54,550 --> 00:06:58,040 There were reports of some rockets being fired at K1 base, 168 00:06:58,040 --> 00:07:00,150 have you seen any response so far? 169 00:07:00,150 --> 00:07:01,650 - I'll start at the back end of that question. 170 00:07:01,650 --> 00:07:02,820 We've seen no response yet. 171 00:07:02,820 --> 00:07:04,590 And of course, we track that very closely. 172 00:07:04,590 --> 00:07:06,160 Something may have happened in just the few minutes 173 00:07:06,160 --> 00:07:07,090 before I walked in. 174 00:07:07,090 --> 00:07:09,550 But as of a little while ago when I talked to General White, 175 00:07:09,550 --> 00:07:11,470 we had no information on that. 176 00:07:11,470 --> 00:07:14,430 I have no information on any IRGC general 177 00:07:14,430 --> 00:07:15,653 being killed or injured. 178 00:07:17,950 --> 00:07:21,280 - [Reporter] General, presumably you knew about these sites 179 00:07:21,280 --> 00:07:24,040 before last night, so the question is 180 00:07:24,040 --> 00:07:27,891 why wait until after American service members are killed 181 00:07:27,891 --> 00:07:30,150 to strike them? 182 00:07:30,150 --> 00:07:32,950 - Sure so, we're in Iraq at the invitation 183 00:07:32,950 --> 00:07:34,070 of the Iraqi government, 184 00:07:34,070 --> 00:07:36,200 we always want to work with the Iraqi government 185 00:07:36,200 --> 00:07:38,040 to minimize these types of attacks. 186 00:07:38,040 --> 00:07:40,220 We believe that Iraqi security forces 187 00:07:40,220 --> 00:07:42,390 have actually been active trying to reduce 188 00:07:42,390 --> 00:07:44,380 these levels of attack. 189 00:07:44,380 --> 00:07:47,040 We don't seek to, we don't look for opportunities 190 00:07:47,040 --> 00:07:49,020 to attack, to cause casualties. 191 00:07:49,020 --> 00:07:51,450 But if we're struck, we're gonna strike back. 192 00:07:51,450 --> 00:07:53,780 So that's probably the reason this occurred at this time, 193 00:07:53,780 --> 00:07:54,910 rather than earlier. 194 00:07:54,910 --> 00:07:56,610 - Did you ask the Iraqi government 195 00:07:56,610 --> 00:07:59,630 to do something about those particular sites earlier? 196 00:07:59,630 --> 00:08:01,110 - We're in constant communication with 197 00:08:01,110 --> 00:08:02,941 the Iraqi government about intelligence that we have, 198 00:08:02,941 --> 00:08:05,277 and that they have about Kata'ib Hezbollah 199 00:08:05,277 --> 00:08:06,717 and their locations. 200 00:08:08,584 --> 00:08:10,280 - General McKensie, I actually want to follow up 201 00:08:10,280 --> 00:08:13,600 on David's question, just to make clear. 202 00:08:13,600 --> 00:08:14,980 I understand what you're saying. 203 00:08:14,980 --> 00:08:18,061 But are you saying that US military, US policy 204 00:08:18,061 --> 00:08:22,000 is that you have to wait to be attacked? 205 00:08:22,000 --> 00:08:25,260 If you could just explain that a little bit more. 206 00:08:25,260 --> 00:08:28,240 And I wanted to also ask you now that several weeks 207 00:08:28,240 --> 00:08:30,253 have gone by since Soleimani's killing. 208 00:08:31,140 --> 00:08:33,400 His loyalists had made a number of statements 209 00:08:33,400 --> 00:08:35,430 right afterwards that they were gonna try 210 00:08:35,430 --> 00:08:40,430 and enact revenge, possibly against US officials. 211 00:08:40,580 --> 00:08:42,070 They had a lot of very hot rhetoric. 212 00:08:42,070 --> 00:08:45,250 Have you seen any evidence of Soleimani's loyalists 213 00:08:45,250 --> 00:08:48,310 trying to carry out any of that? 214 00:08:48,310 --> 00:08:49,260 Could you clarify? 215 00:08:49,260 --> 00:08:50,170 - Sure. 216 00:08:50,170 --> 00:08:52,770 Barbara we never have to wait to be struck. 217 00:08:52,770 --> 00:08:55,610 If we believe that an attack is imminent, 218 00:08:55,610 --> 00:08:58,100 or that we can prevent a blow from being landed 219 00:08:58,100 --> 00:09:01,170 by taking action, I and my commanders have full authority 220 00:09:01,170 --> 00:09:02,120 to do that. 221 00:09:02,120 --> 00:09:05,570 - [Reporter] So again, why, could you help us understand, 222 00:09:05,570 --> 00:09:09,680 in two cases now, the ones back in December and these, 223 00:09:09,680 --> 00:09:12,892 you only did it after the US was attacked. 224 00:09:12,892 --> 00:09:16,090 - The missiles, the rockets, the 107s that struck 225 00:09:16,090 --> 00:09:18,660 Camp Taji, were not fired from these locations. 226 00:09:18,660 --> 00:09:20,680 They were fired from another location. 227 00:09:20,680 --> 00:09:24,410 So we actually, in concert with our Iraqi partners, 228 00:09:24,410 --> 00:09:27,440 helped us recover the vehicle and the launch site for this. 229 00:09:27,440 --> 00:09:29,567 So we acted against that. 230 00:09:29,567 --> 00:09:31,330 The strikes that you see now 231 00:09:31,330 --> 00:09:34,110 are designed to send a clear, unambiguous signal 232 00:09:34,110 --> 00:09:35,820 that we will not tolerate this behavior 233 00:09:35,820 --> 00:09:37,494 in the future going forward. 234 00:09:37,494 --> 00:09:38,430 - [Reporter] And Soleimani? 235 00:09:38,430 --> 00:09:40,110 - So talk a little bit about Soleimani. 236 00:09:40,110 --> 00:09:41,980 Let me just observe, first of all, 237 00:09:41,980 --> 00:09:43,301 they miss Soleimani. 238 00:09:43,301 --> 00:09:48,301 He was, he's one who held a lot of things together for them. 239 00:09:48,720 --> 00:09:51,350 And over time, he had grown to dominate 240 00:09:51,350 --> 00:09:52,870 a lot of their decision-making. 241 00:09:52,870 --> 00:09:56,536 In the wake of his death, I think they're still struggling 242 00:09:56,536 --> 00:09:57,956 to find a way to come together 243 00:09:57,956 --> 00:10:00,350 and make good and effective decisions. 244 00:10:00,350 --> 00:10:01,520 And they're still trying to find a way 245 00:10:01,520 --> 00:10:03,720 to actually have effective command and control 246 00:10:03,720 --> 00:10:06,113 over some of the groups in Iraq going forward. 247 00:10:07,820 --> 00:10:09,926 - [Reporter] Any evidence they're trying to carry out? 248 00:10:09,926 --> 00:10:14,602 - I think we saw an attack a couple of days ago right here. 249 00:10:14,602 --> 00:10:17,200 I would not be prepared to describe it directly 250 00:10:17,200 --> 00:10:18,710 to revenge for that, 251 00:10:18,710 --> 00:10:21,610 but I think clearly we're gonna continue 252 00:10:21,610 --> 00:10:22,910 to see a reaction to that. 253 00:10:23,840 --> 00:10:27,490 - It's been pointed out that the Camp Taji attack 254 00:10:27,490 --> 00:10:30,190 coincided with Soleimani's 63rd birthday. 255 00:10:30,190 --> 00:10:32,740 Is it CENTCOM's opinion that that's coincidence 256 00:10:33,769 --> 00:10:36,090 or that could've been a motive for the attack? 257 00:10:36,090 --> 00:10:37,188 - I don't have enough information 258 00:10:37,188 --> 00:10:40,380 to do anything other than acknowledge 259 00:10:40,380 --> 00:10:42,240 that it happened on that day. 260 00:10:42,240 --> 00:10:44,250 - The CENTCOM continues to describe 261 00:10:44,250 --> 00:10:46,800 these attacks as defensive, 262 00:10:46,800 --> 00:10:49,140 with respect, aren't you stretching the definition 263 00:10:49,140 --> 00:10:50,273 of defensive? 264 00:10:51,300 --> 00:10:52,750 - Actually no, I don't think so at all. 265 00:10:52,750 --> 00:10:55,500 I think these attacks are designed to prevent 266 00:10:55,500 --> 00:10:57,130 future attacks on us. 267 00:10:57,130 --> 00:10:59,500 Which would be the definition of a defensive action. 268 00:10:59,500 --> 00:11:01,721 Clearly, dropping a bomb is in and of itself 269 00:11:01,721 --> 00:11:03,960 an offensive tactical action. 270 00:11:03,960 --> 00:11:05,840 But in a broader context, there are designed 271 00:11:05,840 --> 00:11:07,053 to be defensive strikes. 272 00:11:09,399 --> 00:11:11,720 - Sir, you talked about keeping two carrier strikers 273 00:11:11,720 --> 00:11:13,060 in the region, 274 00:11:13,060 --> 00:11:14,000 can you tell us which ones? 275 00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:15,560 We have the Eisenhower, and the Truman out there now. 276 00:11:15,560 --> 00:11:17,530 Will the Truman extend its stay? 277 00:11:17,530 --> 00:11:19,230 And what's their mission as you see it? 278 00:11:19,230 --> 00:11:22,400 Is it, again, as a defensive measure? 279 00:11:22,400 --> 00:11:24,363 Do you see it in any other way? 280 00:11:25,573 --> 00:11:27,110 - Sure, the two carriers right now, 281 00:11:27,110 --> 00:11:30,040 they're in the CENTCOM AOR, the Ike, the Eisenhower. 282 00:11:30,040 --> 00:11:30,970 She just came in. 283 00:11:30,970 --> 00:11:31,980 And the Truman. 284 00:11:31,980 --> 00:11:33,520 So we're gonna keep them for a while. 285 00:11:33,520 --> 00:11:35,970 I'm not gonna comment on exactly how long that'll be, 286 00:11:35,970 --> 00:11:37,750 because we typically try to avoid talking 287 00:11:37,750 --> 00:11:40,250 about tactical operations. 288 00:11:40,250 --> 00:11:42,030 The beauty of the aircraft carrier is this: 289 00:11:42,030 --> 00:11:44,360 it has enormous offensive capability, 290 00:11:44,360 --> 00:11:46,470 it has enormous defensive capability. 291 00:11:46,470 --> 00:11:47,360 It has mobility. 292 00:11:47,360 --> 00:11:48,610 We can move it around. 293 00:11:48,610 --> 00:11:50,830 Additionally there are no access, basing, 294 00:11:50,830 --> 00:11:53,540 and overflight issues associated with an aircraft carrier. 295 00:11:53,540 --> 00:11:55,710 It's a floating piece of American sovereignty, 296 00:11:55,710 --> 00:11:58,120 so I can employ it in a variety of different ways. 297 00:11:58,120 --> 00:12:02,050 So we can move it around to present a completely 298 00:12:02,050 --> 00:12:04,840 changing potential threat to an adversary. 299 00:12:04,840 --> 00:12:06,870 So the carriers, they are very important to us, 300 00:12:06,870 --> 00:12:10,647 and we know that the Iranians watch them very closely too. 301 00:12:10,647 --> 00:12:14,440 - I'm sorry, just to clarify, you move some of the 82nd, 302 00:12:14,440 --> 00:12:15,740 are we to take from this than rather 303 00:12:15,740 --> 00:12:17,050 than depending on ground troops, 304 00:12:17,050 --> 00:12:18,920 we'll see an increased security presence 305 00:12:18,920 --> 00:12:21,130 through the carriers, through the Navy, 306 00:12:21,130 --> 00:12:22,077 rather than through ground forces. 307 00:12:22,077 --> 00:12:24,150 - No, we, when I think about what's going on 308 00:12:24,150 --> 00:12:24,983 in the region, 309 00:12:24,983 --> 00:12:26,590 I think in a completely integrated fashion 310 00:12:26,590 --> 00:12:27,840 about the joint force. 311 00:12:27,840 --> 00:12:30,430 All elements of the joint force provide capabilities. 312 00:12:30,430 --> 00:12:33,070 You know, the 82nd provides a unique capability. 313 00:12:33,070 --> 00:12:35,070 The carrier provides a unique capability. 314 00:12:35,070 --> 00:12:37,600 Land, based air, you know, Marine aviation, 315 00:12:37,600 --> 00:12:39,250 a Marine expeditionary unit, 316 00:12:39,250 --> 00:12:43,090 all are capabilities that we sort of stitch together 317 00:12:43,090 --> 00:12:43,923 in a mosaic. 318 00:12:45,742 --> 00:12:47,520 - [Reporter] Thank you. 319 00:12:47,520 --> 00:12:51,480 - Some of these pro-Iranian groups are integrated 320 00:12:51,480 --> 00:12:53,511 into the Iraqi army. 321 00:12:53,511 --> 00:12:56,650 First, did you consult with the Iraqi army 322 00:12:56,650 --> 00:12:58,760 before launching the strikes? 323 00:12:58,760 --> 00:13:02,870 And second, do you think it will hamper your negotiations 324 00:13:02,870 --> 00:13:07,133 with the Iraqi government to stay in Iraq? 325 00:13:08,290 --> 00:13:11,880 - We talk constantly that there are a variety of levels 326 00:13:11,880 --> 00:13:13,100 with the Iraqis. 327 00:13:13,100 --> 00:13:14,650 My level is the middle to middle level, 328 00:13:14,650 --> 00:13:15,640 the Chief of Defense level. 329 00:13:15,640 --> 00:13:18,740 General White, our commander on the ground, also engages 330 00:13:18,740 --> 00:13:20,980 at that level, so we have a continual dialogue 331 00:13:20,980 --> 00:13:22,740 about our presence going forward. 332 00:13:22,740 --> 00:13:24,790 And I believe when it's all said and done, 333 00:13:24,790 --> 00:13:26,410 the Iraqis are going to recognize 334 00:13:26,410 --> 00:13:28,630 the value that we bring by being there 335 00:13:28,630 --> 00:13:29,920 in the counter ISIS fight, 336 00:13:29,920 --> 00:13:31,750 and for other things as well. 337 00:13:31,750 --> 00:13:34,097 My belief is we're gonna be able to negotiate this 338 00:13:34,097 --> 00:13:36,000 and we're gonna be able to go forward 339 00:13:36,000 --> 00:13:37,860 and maintain a presence there. 340 00:13:37,860 --> 00:13:41,430 So as to whether we consulted with the Iraqis on this, 341 00:13:41,430 --> 00:13:43,510 we consulted with them in the wake of the attack. 342 00:13:43,510 --> 00:13:45,870 They knew that a response was coming. 343 00:13:45,870 --> 00:13:47,760 I'll just leave it at that. 344 00:13:47,760 --> 00:13:52,760 - Do you think that they are going to keep these groups 345 00:13:52,920 --> 00:13:55,555 inside their armed forces 346 00:13:55,555 --> 00:13:58,670 with all the problems it creates for you? 347 00:13:58,670 --> 00:14:01,859 - We would certainly urge them to not do that, 348 00:14:01,859 --> 00:14:03,433 to minimize it to the extent possible. 349 00:14:04,560 --> 00:14:06,350 - General, thanks for doing this. 350 00:14:06,350 --> 00:14:09,100 First of all, you said you consulted with the Iraqis, 351 00:14:09,100 --> 00:14:12,830 however, the official account of the security media cell 352 00:14:12,830 --> 00:14:16,060 that is associated with the prime minister of Iran 353 00:14:16,060 --> 00:14:18,020 described what happened, 354 00:14:18,020 --> 00:14:20,930 that he was attacked as an assault. 355 00:14:20,930 --> 00:14:23,410 And in the Tweet yesterday, they mentioned 356 00:14:24,290 --> 00:14:26,610 I guess, a contingency within their special forces 357 00:14:26,610 --> 00:14:29,260 that belongs to the military that was hit. 358 00:14:29,260 --> 00:14:31,400 That's the first question. 359 00:14:31,400 --> 00:14:33,833 When you say you consulted with them, 360 00:14:34,790 --> 00:14:38,100 it seems they were not happy with what happened. 361 00:14:38,100 --> 00:14:39,260 The second question, 362 00:14:39,260 --> 00:14:41,110 on the hill you described the type 363 00:14:42,268 --> 00:14:43,750 of deterrence you have against Iran 364 00:14:43,750 --> 00:14:48,380 as rough or contested, I believe these were your words. 365 00:14:48,380 --> 00:14:51,830 Does that mean we're gonna see this cycle of attacks 366 00:14:51,830 --> 00:14:55,240 by a group associated with Iran and then the US strike back? 367 00:14:55,240 --> 00:14:58,480 What does contested deterrence mean exactly? 368 00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:01,970 - Sure, so let me take the first part of your question. 369 00:15:01,970 --> 00:15:04,690 I don't know whether the Iraqis are happy or unhappy. 370 00:15:04,690 --> 00:15:07,020 We talked to them and expressed our concern 371 00:15:07,020 --> 00:15:08,243 after the attack. 372 00:15:09,370 --> 00:15:11,090 These locations that we struck 373 00:15:11,090 --> 00:15:13,890 are clear locations of terrorist bases. 374 00:15:13,890 --> 00:15:18,070 If Iraqis were there, if Iraqi military forces were there, 375 00:15:18,070 --> 00:15:19,510 I would say it's probably not a good idea 376 00:15:19,510 --> 00:15:22,050 to position yourself with Kata'ib Hezbollah 377 00:15:22,050 --> 00:15:23,860 in the wake of a strike that killed Americans 378 00:15:23,860 --> 00:15:25,250 and coalition members. 379 00:15:25,250 --> 00:15:27,410 So to the second part of your question, 380 00:15:27,410 --> 00:15:29,170 we use the phrase contested deterrence 381 00:15:29,170 --> 00:15:31,920 to describe where we are now with Iran. 382 00:15:31,920 --> 00:15:33,530 We believe that we have established 383 00:15:33,530 --> 00:15:37,198 a level of state to state deterrence, 384 00:15:37,198 --> 00:15:39,495 and that Iran does not seek a large-scale military 385 00:15:39,495 --> 00:15:41,960 exchange with the United States. 386 00:15:41,960 --> 00:15:45,400 However, as the maximum pressure campaign continues, 387 00:15:45,400 --> 00:15:48,720 Iran still seeks ways to reduce 388 00:15:48,720 --> 00:15:52,410 the diplomatic and economic effects of that campaign 389 00:15:52,410 --> 00:15:53,810 by military action, 390 00:15:53,810 --> 00:15:55,860 and military action (unintelligible), 391 00:15:55,860 --> 00:15:57,430 either direct or indirect. 392 00:15:57,430 --> 00:15:59,210 Direct would be state on state, 393 00:15:59,210 --> 00:16:00,540 we think that's unlikely. 394 00:16:00,540 --> 00:16:03,490 Indirect would be through continued proxy actions. 395 00:16:03,490 --> 00:16:05,400 And that's a continuing engagement 396 00:16:05,400 --> 00:16:06,580 that we're just gonna have to, 397 00:16:06,580 --> 00:16:07,440 we're gonna have to deal with 398 00:16:07,440 --> 00:16:08,750 in the theater moving forward. 399 00:16:08,750 --> 00:16:10,860 I believe the actions that we took today, 400 00:16:10,860 --> 00:16:13,150 or yesterday, are gonna send a signal 401 00:16:13,150 --> 00:16:14,250 that we're not gonna tolerate 402 00:16:14,250 --> 00:16:16,030 that continued indirect approach. 403 00:16:16,030 --> 00:16:18,253 Particularly when it causes loss of life. 404 00:16:19,193 --> 00:16:21,512 (reporters typing) 405 00:16:21,512 --> 00:16:25,740 - [] Could you update us on the patriot and c-rams 406 00:16:25,740 --> 00:16:27,420 if the Iraqi government has approved that, 407 00:16:27,420 --> 00:16:29,380 or where in the process that is? 408 00:16:29,380 --> 00:16:31,000 And then just following on that, 409 00:16:31,000 --> 00:16:32,320 where would you characterize 410 00:16:32,320 --> 00:16:33,990 the continued asymmetric threat? 411 00:16:33,990 --> 00:16:37,220 Is it, is the level of tension or threat 412 00:16:37,220 --> 00:16:40,530 as high as it was right after the xSoleimani death, 413 00:16:40,530 --> 00:16:42,030 or is it down? 414 00:16:42,030 --> 00:16:43,840 Can you just give us your overall assessment 415 00:16:43,840 --> 00:16:45,230 of where that threat lies now? 416 00:16:45,230 --> 00:16:46,063 - Let me actually start with that 417 00:16:46,063 --> 00:16:49,040 because it sort of leads in to the broader question. 418 00:16:49,040 --> 00:16:51,160 So I think the threat remains very high. 419 00:16:51,160 --> 00:16:53,820 I think that the tensions have actually not gone down. 420 00:16:53,820 --> 00:16:55,920 I think that Iran has learned some lessons 421 00:16:55,920 --> 00:16:58,330 from the Soleimani exchange. 422 00:16:58,330 --> 00:17:01,680 Because they have always respected our capability, 423 00:17:01,680 --> 00:17:03,610 but they've had doubts about our will, 424 00:17:03,610 --> 00:17:05,660 so our will is a little more obvious to them 425 00:17:05,660 --> 00:17:06,870 about what we're gonna be, 426 00:17:06,870 --> 00:17:08,520 what we're gonna do, 427 00:17:08,520 --> 00:17:10,900 so I think that has an effect on their calculus. 428 00:17:10,900 --> 00:17:12,884 I still think they are actively seeking ways 429 00:17:12,884 --> 00:17:15,071 to achieve destabilization 430 00:17:15,071 --> 00:17:17,910 that would allow them to escape the strictures 431 00:17:17,910 --> 00:17:19,880 of the maximum pressure campaign. 432 00:17:19,880 --> 00:17:22,270 So I believe that is still very much alive and well. 433 00:17:22,270 --> 00:17:24,290 And I think I said in my testimony, 434 00:17:24,290 --> 00:17:26,688 that the illusion of normality is just that, 435 00:17:26,688 --> 00:17:28,010 is the illusion of normality. 436 00:17:28,010 --> 00:17:29,550 The stress and the pressure is there. 437 00:17:29,550 --> 00:17:30,980 It's very real. 438 00:17:30,980 --> 00:17:34,290 Perhaps coronavirus even increases that in him. 439 00:17:34,290 --> 00:17:37,380 Because they have really, I think, first of all, 440 00:17:37,380 --> 00:17:39,810 the depth of the infection in Iran is under-reported. 441 00:17:39,810 --> 00:17:41,490 That is our judgment. 442 00:17:41,490 --> 00:17:43,590 It has affected senior leaders, 443 00:17:43,590 --> 00:17:45,970 so that produces an effect on decision making, 444 00:17:45,970 --> 00:17:48,250 and in authoritarian states, 445 00:17:48,250 --> 00:17:50,610 they can react in internal crisis by one of two ways, 446 00:17:50,610 --> 00:17:52,620 they can turn inward, or they can turn outward. 447 00:17:52,620 --> 00:17:55,090 History typically tells us authoritarian states 448 00:17:55,090 --> 00:17:56,930 turn outward in order to martial the people 449 00:17:56,930 --> 00:17:59,120 behind them against a common foe, 450 00:17:59,120 --> 00:18:01,100 external, either manufactured or real. 451 00:18:01,100 --> 00:18:03,320 So I think it's very possible that 452 00:18:03,320 --> 00:18:04,600 that's what we're seeing right now. 453 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:06,370 So the bottom line is, I think the tension 454 00:18:06,370 --> 00:18:07,203 is still very high. 455 00:18:07,203 --> 00:18:09,560 I think the risk is still significant in the theater, 456 00:18:09,560 --> 00:18:11,960 and even though we may go days or a period of time 457 00:18:11,960 --> 00:18:13,190 without anything happening, 458 00:18:13,190 --> 00:18:16,030 I think we're still at a period of significant risk. 459 00:18:16,030 --> 00:18:17,758 So the second part of your questions was 460 00:18:17,758 --> 00:18:19,530 what about moving? 461 00:18:19,530 --> 00:18:22,940 We are moving patriots into Iraq now. 462 00:18:22,940 --> 00:18:26,330 We have begun, we have put the preparatory material in place 463 00:18:26,330 --> 00:18:28,630 that will allow us to establish patriot positions 464 00:18:28,630 --> 00:18:30,710 inside Iraq in terms of CRAM 465 00:18:30,710 --> 00:18:32,410 and other close in weapons systems 466 00:18:32,410 --> 00:18:34,760 that are used to defend those systems as they come in. 467 00:18:34,760 --> 00:18:37,670 We're still some days away from those systems being ready. 468 00:18:37,670 --> 00:18:39,210 The one thing I would point out, 469 00:18:39,210 --> 00:18:41,010 and I know that you realize this Courtney, 470 00:18:41,010 --> 00:18:42,730 is the patriot does not protect 471 00:18:43,579 --> 00:18:45,064 against a 107 millimeter rocket. 472 00:18:45,064 --> 00:18:45,897 We should be very clear on that. 473 00:18:45,897 --> 00:18:47,030 The patriot is something that you would use 474 00:18:47,030 --> 00:18:49,240 against the types of rockets that Iran used 475 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:51,750 on their state on state attack in early January 476 00:18:51,750 --> 00:18:53,109 when they struck outside. 477 00:18:53,109 --> 00:18:54,557 - The CRAMS could protect it right? 478 00:18:54,557 --> 00:18:57,600 - The CRAMS can, but they are not a panacea. 479 00:18:57,600 --> 00:18:59,160 And the CRAMS are actually linked 480 00:18:59,160 --> 00:19:00,820 to protection of the patriots. 481 00:19:00,820 --> 00:19:02,240 Because most of the patriots come in, 482 00:19:02,240 --> 00:19:04,110 they become a very high-value target. 483 00:19:04,110 --> 00:19:05,980 Without the ability to defend themselves. 484 00:19:05,980 --> 00:19:08,335 So typically we associate CRAMs 485 00:19:08,335 --> 00:19:10,460 and the close in protective weapons systems with the ability 486 00:19:10,460 --> 00:19:11,904 to protect the patriots. 487 00:19:11,904 --> 00:19:12,737 - [Reporter] Thanks. 488 00:19:12,737 --> 00:19:13,570 - Sure. 489 00:19:14,450 --> 00:19:17,340 - So just one clarification on Courtney's question. 490 00:19:17,340 --> 00:19:20,360 So why did we not have CRAMS in place 491 00:19:20,360 --> 00:19:22,510 to protect against this kind of attack? 492 00:19:22,510 --> 00:19:23,343 That's my first question. 493 00:19:23,343 --> 00:19:24,850 And then my second question is that 494 00:19:24,850 --> 00:19:28,225 there's been reporting that you're sending some troops home, 495 00:19:28,225 --> 00:19:29,210 from Kuwait. 496 00:19:29,210 --> 00:19:32,023 Are these orders on hold now? 497 00:19:33,020 --> 00:19:35,938 Are you reevaluating in light of this decision? 498 00:19:35,938 --> 00:19:38,350 Are the guys who were already sent home, 499 00:19:38,350 --> 00:19:40,120 going to have to turn around and come back? 500 00:19:40,120 --> 00:19:41,250 - So the fact of the matter is, 501 00:19:41,250 --> 00:19:44,370 we have more locations in the theater, 502 00:19:44,370 --> 00:19:46,830 where we have soldiers, sailors, Airmen, and Marines 503 00:19:46,830 --> 00:19:48,840 than we have the ability to protect. 504 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:51,310 So we have to ruthlessly prioritize. 505 00:19:51,310 --> 00:19:53,990 And we can't have CRAM everywhere we want it, 506 00:19:53,990 --> 00:19:55,450 everywhere we want it to be. 507 00:19:55,450 --> 00:19:57,010 And that's just, that's just a fact. 508 00:19:57,010 --> 00:19:58,880 It's an unpleasant fact, but it's one we deal with 509 00:19:58,880 --> 00:19:59,713 all the time. 510 00:19:59,713 --> 00:20:01,330 I'm typically the person in concert 511 00:20:01,330 --> 00:20:03,810 with my three-star subordinate commanders, 512 00:20:03,810 --> 00:20:05,710 who makes the decisions about where to put, 513 00:20:05,710 --> 00:20:07,890 where to put close on and protective defensive systems. 514 00:20:07,890 --> 00:20:09,360 They just can't be everywhere. 515 00:20:09,360 --> 00:20:12,380 That's the reason that there wasn't one at Taji. 516 00:20:12,380 --> 00:20:15,560 And we continually evaluate the tactical situation, 517 00:20:15,560 --> 00:20:18,810 but if I were, for example, to put one at Taji, 518 00:20:18,810 --> 00:20:21,240 it would have to come from another defended location. 519 00:20:21,240 --> 00:20:23,750 A defended location that we made a conscious decision 520 00:20:23,750 --> 00:20:25,400 was important enough to be defended. 521 00:20:25,400 --> 00:20:26,370 So that's just a constant, 522 00:20:26,370 --> 00:20:27,500 it's a zero sum game, 523 00:20:27,500 --> 00:20:31,460 we balance that all the time as we take a look at that. 524 00:20:31,460 --> 00:20:33,630 So in terms of forces flowing in and out of the theater, 525 00:20:33,630 --> 00:20:35,173 it occurs all the time. 526 00:20:36,267 --> 00:20:38,430 We brought some of the 82nd forward, 527 00:20:38,430 --> 00:20:40,040 we sent some of it home. 528 00:20:40,040 --> 00:20:41,740 We've retained some of it in the theater. 529 00:20:41,740 --> 00:20:45,100 I'm actually not aware of any particular move 530 00:20:45,100 --> 00:20:46,560 because I don't track those closely 531 00:20:46,560 --> 00:20:48,570 unless there's something significant about it. 532 00:20:48,570 --> 00:20:52,939 So I'm really not tracking anything large fixing to happen. 533 00:20:52,939 --> 00:20:55,810 - Are you evaluating a new package of forces 534 00:20:55,810 --> 00:20:58,770 to come forward, now that this has happened? 535 00:20:58,770 --> 00:21:00,800 - I'm in constant dialogue with the Secretary of Defense 536 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:02,400 about the situation in the theater. 537 00:21:02,400 --> 00:21:04,450 I can give you an example where the Secretary I think, 538 00:21:04,450 --> 00:21:06,930 made a very good call, he allowed me to keep 539 00:21:06,930 --> 00:21:08,317 a second carrier for a period of time. 540 00:21:08,317 --> 00:21:11,380 That's an example of me talking to the chairman, 541 00:21:11,380 --> 00:21:13,677 and the chairman's secretary weighing it 542 00:21:13,677 --> 00:21:15,477 and the Secretary making a decision. 543 00:21:16,359 --> 00:21:20,290 One final thing, I'm keenly aware of how valuable 544 00:21:20,290 --> 00:21:21,660 aircraft carriers are, 545 00:21:21,660 --> 00:21:24,132 they do great things in other parts of the world. 546 00:21:24,132 --> 00:21:27,060 I did not spend my whole life in CENTCOM, 547 00:21:27,060 --> 00:21:29,240 I was up here in the joint staff in a prior life 548 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:30,560 and I know the cost we pay 549 00:21:30,560 --> 00:21:32,913 when we keep two carriers in the CENTCOM AOR. 550 00:21:35,570 --> 00:21:38,820 - The Iraqis said that at civilian airport, 551 00:21:38,820 --> 00:21:42,010 do you know anything about that accusation? 552 00:21:42,010 --> 00:21:45,010 And, do you expect, I mean, obviously there was 553 00:21:45,010 --> 00:21:46,450 a British soldier killed as well, 554 00:21:46,450 --> 00:21:49,487 do you expect to be working with your colleagues in Britain 555 00:21:49,487 --> 00:21:52,410 on any kind of follow-on action after this, 556 00:21:52,410 --> 00:21:54,370 and is this it? 557 00:21:54,370 --> 00:21:56,220 Is this the response in its entirety 558 00:21:56,220 --> 00:21:58,420 for the attack that killed (unintelligible). 559 00:21:59,840 --> 00:22:01,990 - So there was a structure near the Kabala airfield 560 00:22:01,990 --> 00:22:03,900 where weapons were being stored. 561 00:22:03,900 --> 00:22:04,900 You can look on the graphic, 562 00:22:04,900 --> 00:22:06,800 it's actually a pretty good. 563 00:22:06,800 --> 00:22:07,633 I think it's, 564 00:22:12,155 --> 00:22:13,760 it's over there. 565 00:22:13,760 --> 00:22:15,291 And you can take a look at it. 566 00:22:15,291 --> 00:22:16,938 The fact of the matter is, 567 00:22:16,938 --> 00:22:20,290 that was a clear target. 568 00:22:20,290 --> 00:22:21,360 It may have been on the airfield. 569 00:22:21,360 --> 00:22:22,570 I can't tell you what else was in there. 570 00:22:22,570 --> 00:22:24,030 But I know it was being used for purposes 571 00:22:24,030 --> 00:22:24,990 of targeting us. 572 00:22:24,990 --> 00:22:26,470 So that's the reason that we struck it. 573 00:22:26,470 --> 00:22:29,010 As so whether this is over, 574 00:22:29,010 --> 00:22:30,050 I'll just leave that one alone. 575 00:22:30,050 --> 00:22:32,330 We'll continue to evaluate the situation going forward 576 00:22:32,330 --> 00:22:35,610 without making a judgment one way or another on that. 577 00:22:35,610 --> 00:22:38,970 I know the British took a casualty in this. 578 00:22:38,970 --> 00:22:41,320 We continue to work with them on a way forward. 579 00:22:43,270 --> 00:22:46,920 - [Reporter] Sir, I think you described this as being, 580 00:22:46,920 --> 00:22:48,396 restoring deterrence, 581 00:22:48,396 --> 00:22:52,208 and (unintelligible), but how would you describe the impact 582 00:22:52,208 --> 00:22:55,060 of these strikes? 583 00:22:55,060 --> 00:22:56,303 Are they significant? 584 00:22:58,120 --> 00:23:01,060 Are they going to reduce their capability 585 00:23:01,060 --> 00:23:03,160 to launch these kinds of strikes in the future? 586 00:23:03,160 --> 00:23:05,300 And what exactly do you think is the universe 587 00:23:05,300 --> 00:23:09,293 of the capability of 107 missile, 588 00:23:09,293 --> 00:23:11,240 and other kinds of rockets they've used in the past? 589 00:23:11,240 --> 00:23:13,170 - Sometimes it's hard to establish deterrence 590 00:23:13,170 --> 00:23:14,630 with a non-state entity. 591 00:23:14,630 --> 00:23:16,140 A better way to phrase it might be, 592 00:23:16,140 --> 00:23:17,770 they know there's gonna be a significant cost 593 00:23:17,770 --> 00:23:19,860 if they persist in this behavior in the future. 594 00:23:19,860 --> 00:23:22,590 And we're prepared to make them pay that cost, 595 00:23:22,590 --> 00:23:25,090 and it should be very obvious to them as a result of that. 596 00:23:25,090 --> 00:23:26,880 You know, any time we conduct these operations, 597 00:23:26,880 --> 00:23:28,460 we're very careful to balance 598 00:23:28,460 --> 00:23:30,270 what we do to Kata'ib Hezbollah 599 00:23:30,270 --> 00:23:32,120 against the potential collateral effects 600 00:23:32,120 --> 00:23:34,270 of what we do to the wider Iraqi community. 601 00:23:35,133 --> 00:23:36,610 The weaponeers look very hard at these targets, 602 00:23:36,610 --> 00:23:39,440 and we try to do our very best to achieve precise effects 603 00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:40,930 against those that we want to go against. 604 00:23:40,930 --> 00:23:45,210 Look the 107 is an old tried and trusted weapon. 605 00:23:45,210 --> 00:23:46,760 They're a lot of them in Iraq. 606 00:23:46,760 --> 00:23:50,200 There are better and more precise weapons in Iraq as well. 607 00:23:50,200 --> 00:23:52,160 There's a broad universe of choices. 608 00:23:52,160 --> 00:23:54,010 But what should now be obvious to everyone 609 00:23:54,010 --> 00:23:56,060 is you're not gonna be able to fire those 610 00:23:56,060 --> 00:23:57,790 at a US or coalition base, 611 00:23:57,790 --> 00:24:00,630 hurt or kill our people, and escape unscathed. 612 00:24:00,630 --> 00:24:01,927 - [Reporter] So do you think this is 613 00:24:01,927 --> 00:24:03,180 the breadth of their capability? 614 00:24:03,180 --> 00:24:05,433 Or is it much larger, and this is such a prick? 615 00:24:05,433 --> 00:24:08,400 - I think Kata'ib Hezbollah is an organization 616 00:24:08,400 --> 00:24:10,480 that from its patron Iran, 617 00:24:10,480 --> 00:24:12,990 has received a lot of advanced conventional weapons. 618 00:24:12,990 --> 00:24:14,740 And this is only one element of it. 619 00:24:17,770 --> 00:24:19,410 - Hi sir, Tara Kopp with McClatchy. 620 00:24:19,410 --> 00:24:20,243 - Sure. 621 00:24:21,170 --> 00:24:23,790 - These five sites, do you assess that there are other 622 00:24:23,790 --> 00:24:27,730 Kata'ib Hezbollah weapons storage facilities around the area 623 00:24:27,730 --> 00:24:29,900 that should be targeted or could be targeted 624 00:24:29,900 --> 00:24:32,600 and could be a threat to US forces? 625 00:24:32,600 --> 00:24:34,700 - Yes, there are a variety of other sites. 626 00:24:35,690 --> 00:24:38,280 - So why choose just these five, I guess. 627 00:24:38,280 --> 00:24:39,529 - Restraint. 628 00:24:39,529 --> 00:24:40,362 - [Tara] Restraint? 629 00:24:40,362 --> 00:24:43,700 - Restraint attempting to send a strong enough message. 630 00:24:43,700 --> 00:24:46,530 If it doesn't work, we got plenty more places 631 00:24:46,530 --> 00:24:47,530 we can go and go to work. 632 00:24:47,530 --> 00:24:49,340 And I'm confident we'll do that. 633 00:24:49,340 --> 00:24:50,750 - To the extent that you can, 634 00:24:50,750 --> 00:24:52,140 can you quantify plenty? 635 00:24:52,140 --> 00:24:56,260 Is it dozens, is it hundreds of weapons storage sites 636 00:24:56,260 --> 00:24:57,840 throughout the country? 637 00:24:57,840 --> 00:24:59,690 - There are a lot of storage sites around the country. 638 00:24:59,690 --> 00:25:01,970 We think we know where most of them are. 639 00:25:01,970 --> 00:25:02,803 - [Tara] Thank you. 640 00:25:04,090 --> 00:25:06,030 - Hi General, Carla Babb with Voice of America. 641 00:25:06,030 --> 00:25:07,750 I just wanted to follow up really quickly. 642 00:25:07,750 --> 00:25:09,210 You had said that the fact of the matter 643 00:25:09,210 --> 00:25:11,020 is the US has more locations 644 00:25:11,020 --> 00:25:13,970 in theater than we have the ability to protect. 645 00:25:13,970 --> 00:25:15,460 Isn't that kind of an argument 646 00:25:15,460 --> 00:25:17,920 for less troops in the region? 647 00:25:17,920 --> 00:25:20,819 And then I wanted to follow up on your testimony 648 00:25:20,819 --> 00:25:21,990 on Capitol Hill. 649 00:25:21,990 --> 00:25:23,610 You said, you really have to look to Iran 650 00:25:23,610 --> 00:25:25,570 because Iran needs to understand 651 00:25:25,570 --> 00:25:27,650 that we hold them ultimately accountable 652 00:25:27,650 --> 00:25:29,700 for these Shia militia group attacks. 653 00:25:29,700 --> 00:25:33,710 So how is attacking these sites on KH 654 00:25:33,710 --> 00:25:36,130 ultimately getting Iran to understand 655 00:25:36,130 --> 00:25:37,590 that they're accountable? 656 00:25:37,590 --> 00:25:39,810 - Sure, so, you know the logical, 657 00:25:39,810 --> 00:25:43,600 if an object were to allow no one to come at risk, 658 00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:46,140 we should bring everybody back to the United States. 659 00:25:46,140 --> 00:25:48,100 The fact of the matter is, we have national objectives 660 00:25:48,100 --> 00:25:50,010 in the region that require us to be there. 661 00:25:50,010 --> 00:25:52,700 So we're probably not gonna be able to bring people out 662 00:25:52,700 --> 00:25:54,430 or collapse the basic structure. 663 00:25:54,430 --> 00:25:56,440 The basic structure that we have is designed 664 00:25:56,440 --> 00:25:59,020 to allow us to go after our objectives in the region. 665 00:25:59,020 --> 00:26:01,030 And so as we lay that out 666 00:26:01,030 --> 00:26:03,410 and we look at the defensive capabilities that we have, 667 00:26:03,410 --> 00:26:06,306 we constantly balance those to put defensive capabilities 668 00:26:06,306 --> 00:26:09,120 where we feel we're most threatened. 669 00:26:09,120 --> 00:26:10,900 That evolves as you would expect, 670 00:26:10,900 --> 00:26:12,620 as the threat evolves as well. 671 00:26:12,620 --> 00:26:15,780 So there are always gonna be more locations 672 00:26:15,780 --> 00:26:17,950 than we're gonna have the capability to protect. 673 00:26:17,950 --> 00:26:20,400 In a perfect world, we'd be able to protect everybody. 674 00:26:20,400 --> 00:26:22,130 We just can't do that all the time. 675 00:26:22,130 --> 00:26:23,440 But we're very careful, 676 00:26:23,440 --> 00:26:25,700 and we have a very good intelligence process 677 00:26:25,700 --> 00:26:28,310 to put resources where we think we're the most threatened. 678 00:26:28,310 --> 00:26:30,006 Now, the second half of your question. 679 00:26:30,006 --> 00:26:34,840 We do believe that behind Kata'ib Hezbollah ultimately 680 00:26:34,840 --> 00:26:36,250 is the state of Iran. 681 00:26:36,250 --> 00:26:38,300 And the state of Iran is very much aware 682 00:26:38,300 --> 00:26:39,890 that we hold them responsible 683 00:26:39,890 --> 00:26:41,850 for what Kata'ib Hezbollah does. 684 00:26:41,850 --> 00:26:44,550 And I would just leave that at that level right there. 685 00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:46,620 - But how does it, 686 00:26:46,620 --> 00:26:50,530 how does the strikes on KH ultimately pressure Iran? 687 00:26:50,530 --> 00:26:53,010 - So I think, in this case, 688 00:26:53,010 --> 00:26:54,960 we went after the approximate entity 689 00:26:54,960 --> 00:26:57,170 that conducted the attack. 690 00:26:57,170 --> 00:26:58,003 I would not give you an opinion 691 00:26:58,003 --> 00:27:00,273 about what we might or might not do in the future. 692 00:27:03,970 --> 00:27:05,580 - Can I have a follow up just to go back 693 00:27:05,580 --> 00:27:07,750 to what several of us have asked? 694 00:27:07,750 --> 00:27:10,200 So you know there's other sites out there. 695 00:27:10,200 --> 00:27:11,760 There's other Kata'ib Hezbollah sites 696 00:27:11,760 --> 00:27:15,180 that you know is a threat to US forces. 697 00:27:15,180 --> 00:27:19,700 And you describe this as restraint if the message is sent. 698 00:27:19,700 --> 00:27:21,942 But my two questions, I still don't get it. 699 00:27:21,942 --> 00:27:24,610 Is when it came to ISIS, 700 00:27:24,610 --> 00:27:27,980 there was no question of not attacking ISIS targets. 701 00:27:27,980 --> 00:27:30,210 You went after everything I think you saw 702 00:27:30,210 --> 00:27:32,440 that you could find that you could prosecute. 703 00:27:32,440 --> 00:27:36,240 Why restrain, why wait, if you know there's sites 704 00:27:36,240 --> 00:27:40,061 where people want to attack and kill US troops? 705 00:27:40,061 --> 00:27:44,367 And is that something that is being put upon you 706 00:27:44,367 --> 00:27:46,580 from other levels? 707 00:27:46,580 --> 00:27:49,630 From the Secretary of Defense, or the White House? 708 00:27:49,630 --> 00:27:52,790 Do you have a different view about how you would do this 709 00:27:52,790 --> 00:27:57,130 if you, if you were able to solely 710 00:27:57,130 --> 00:27:58,770 make that decision yourself? 711 00:27:58,770 --> 00:28:01,820 It's not clear to me, why if you know there're sites 712 00:28:01,820 --> 00:28:03,630 out there trying to kill American troops, 713 00:28:03,630 --> 00:28:05,423 you wouldn't go after them. 714 00:28:05,423 --> 00:28:07,420 - True, so, first of all, 715 00:28:07,420 --> 00:28:09,890 we work with the government of Iraq to go after 716 00:28:09,890 --> 00:28:11,163 these sites all the time, 717 00:28:12,283 --> 00:28:13,116 with varying degrees of success. 718 00:28:13,116 --> 00:28:14,350 If we have information on a site, 719 00:28:14,350 --> 00:28:16,290 we share it with our Iraqi partners, 720 00:28:16,290 --> 00:28:17,770 and they'll go after those sites. 721 00:28:17,770 --> 00:28:20,520 Sometimes effectively, sometimes not effectively. 722 00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:22,270 I'm not gonna say that it always works, 723 00:28:22,270 --> 00:28:23,620 but it's their country, 724 00:28:23,620 --> 00:28:25,360 we need to give them the opportunity to do it. 725 00:28:25,360 --> 00:28:27,620 The second point is, when we look at sites, 726 00:28:27,620 --> 00:28:30,470 often, they're co-mingled with civilian activities, 727 00:28:30,470 --> 00:28:32,640 and there's a very high probability of civilian damage 728 00:28:32,640 --> 00:28:33,880 if we strike those sites. 729 00:28:33,880 --> 00:28:35,920 The United States is not going to do that. 730 00:28:35,920 --> 00:28:37,170 If we strike a site, 731 00:28:37,170 --> 00:28:39,400 we're gonna find a site that provides 732 00:28:39,400 --> 00:28:42,150 collateral damage consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, 733 00:28:42,150 --> 00:28:43,230 and our values. 734 00:28:43,230 --> 00:28:45,150 So there are a lot of sites I could strike, 735 00:28:45,150 --> 00:28:47,340 but I would kill a lot of innocent people if we did that. 736 00:28:47,340 --> 00:28:48,830 We're just gonna take that risk 737 00:28:48,830 --> 00:28:50,140 because that's the way we fight, 738 00:28:50,140 --> 00:28:51,384 and we're not prepared to go out there 739 00:28:51,384 --> 00:28:52,870 and do it that way. 740 00:28:52,870 --> 00:28:55,270 Even if that places a higher degree of risk on us. 741 00:28:55,270 --> 00:28:58,051 And the last point is, nobody puts any pressure on me 742 00:28:58,051 --> 00:29:01,180 to modify this, or do it one way or another. 743 00:29:01,180 --> 00:29:03,690 I have a very good direct exchange with the chairman 744 00:29:03,690 --> 00:29:05,340 and with the Secretary of Defense on this. 745 00:29:05,340 --> 00:29:08,596 We are completely aligned in the way we look at the problem. 746 00:29:08,596 --> 00:29:09,640 - [Reporter] You think there's prosecutable sites 747 00:29:09,640 --> 00:29:10,890 out there today? 748 00:29:10,890 --> 00:29:14,550 Again, minimum civilian casualty, minimum other problems. 749 00:29:14,550 --> 00:29:17,470 Are there prosecutable targets out there today? 750 00:29:17,470 --> 00:29:19,860 - There are always prosecutable targets out there. 751 00:29:19,860 --> 00:29:23,100 But we balance what we do in prosecuting these targets 752 00:29:23,100 --> 00:29:25,100 against our respect for the government of Iraq 753 00:29:25,100 --> 00:29:26,380 and their sovereignty. 754 00:29:26,380 --> 00:29:29,510 As always, it's a multi-variable problem. 755 00:29:29,510 --> 00:29:32,380 So, there might be targets that I would strike. 756 00:29:32,380 --> 00:29:34,320 The cost of doing that with the government of Iraq 757 00:29:34,320 --> 00:29:35,280 is very high. 758 00:29:35,280 --> 00:29:38,135 And I have to respect, we have to respect to some degree 759 00:29:38,135 --> 00:29:39,640 the government of Iraq's wishes. 760 00:29:39,640 --> 00:29:41,150 It is after all, their country, 761 00:29:41,150 --> 00:29:42,730 we are there at their request. 762 00:29:42,730 --> 00:29:46,980 And so, if we do that, I would expect them to do more 763 00:29:46,980 --> 00:29:48,140 to help us as well. 764 00:29:48,140 --> 00:29:50,460 So in the middle of that, that is an ongoing negotiation 765 00:29:50,460 --> 00:29:52,297 and we're in the middle of it right now. 766 00:29:52,297 --> 00:29:53,130 - [Reporter] Thank you. 767 00:29:53,130 --> 00:29:53,963 - Sure. 768 00:29:54,990 --> 00:29:56,990 - Sir, I wonder if you could expand a little bit more 769 00:29:56,990 --> 00:30:00,219 on the post-Soleimani world in the region? 770 00:30:00,219 --> 00:30:03,270 Because on one hand, I think you're saying Soleimani, 771 00:30:03,270 --> 00:30:07,303 I think I said, but the rest remain significant. 772 00:30:09,366 --> 00:30:12,530 In, what's the net result, do you think, 773 00:30:12,530 --> 00:30:17,530 where you sit now, in removing General Suleimani in terms 774 00:30:17,540 --> 00:30:21,220 of lowering the risk of danger level? 775 00:30:21,220 --> 00:30:23,390 - So I think Soleimani was an effective, 776 00:30:23,390 --> 00:30:25,520 able, terrorist commander. 777 00:30:25,520 --> 00:30:27,780 I think he had been at the game for a long time. 778 00:30:27,780 --> 00:30:29,860 I think he drew all the threads together. 779 00:30:29,860 --> 00:30:31,690 There's a danger when you do that, 780 00:30:31,690 --> 00:30:34,450 because if you go away, nobody can step in. 781 00:30:34,450 --> 00:30:37,030 So I think the malign aspirations 782 00:30:37,030 --> 00:30:39,440 that lie with Iran to eject the United States 783 00:30:39,440 --> 00:30:43,040 from the theater, to assert its brand of theology 784 00:30:43,040 --> 00:30:43,873 elsewhere in the theater, 785 00:30:43,873 --> 00:30:45,020 all of those remain alive. 786 00:30:45,020 --> 00:30:47,870 What is different now in the wake of Soleimani is 787 00:30:47,870 --> 00:30:49,320 he's not there. 788 00:30:49,320 --> 00:30:50,710 And they miss him. 789 00:30:50,710 --> 00:30:53,720 Their ability to exercise effective command and control 790 00:30:53,720 --> 00:30:55,530 has been damaged because of that. 791 00:30:55,530 --> 00:30:56,780 The intent is still there. 792 00:30:56,780 --> 00:30:59,400 They're just not as good as carrying out as they were 793 00:30:59,400 --> 00:31:01,228 while he was still alive. 794 00:31:01,228 --> 00:31:04,480 So someone has replaced him. 795 00:31:04,480 --> 00:31:06,050 I don't think that someone is gonna be as good 796 00:31:06,050 --> 00:31:06,960 as him in the short term. 797 00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:08,830 We'll see how it turns out in the long term. 798 00:31:08,830 --> 00:31:10,600 But the principal think I would draw 799 00:31:10,600 --> 00:31:12,900 from the wake of his death, 800 00:31:12,900 --> 00:31:15,730 is it's harder for them to make effective decisions, 801 00:31:15,730 --> 00:31:17,970 it's harder sometimes for them to convey their will 802 00:31:17,970 --> 00:31:19,250 to their proxies. 803 00:31:19,250 --> 00:31:22,954 And so that coupled with the shoot down 804 00:31:22,954 --> 00:31:25,930 of the jetliner over Tehran, 805 00:31:25,930 --> 00:31:28,898 has induced singular pressure on Iranian leadership 806 00:31:28,898 --> 00:31:31,550 and we're still seeing that manifested right now. 807 00:31:31,550 --> 00:31:33,380 None of their core objectives have changed. 808 00:31:33,380 --> 00:31:34,590 None of that has changed. 809 00:31:34,590 --> 00:31:36,620 It's merely their ability to execute 810 00:31:36,620 --> 00:31:38,430 and their ability to make decisions within their 811 00:31:38,430 --> 00:31:41,000 national defense security making process. 812 00:31:41,000 --> 00:31:42,830 - Good, but if I could just clarify. 813 00:31:42,830 --> 00:31:46,951 Of the danger, and the peril, and the threat posed by 814 00:31:46,951 --> 00:31:50,820 Tehran to the US within the region, 815 00:31:50,820 --> 00:31:54,869 how much of it do you assess is potential retaliatory 816 00:31:54,869 --> 00:31:59,869 actions by Tehran because of the Soleimani strike? 817 00:32:00,129 --> 00:32:01,653 - It's hard to know, hard to know Gordon, 818 00:32:01,653 --> 00:32:02,810 just how much. 819 00:32:02,810 --> 00:32:06,380 I think they feel his loss very keenly. 820 00:32:06,380 --> 00:32:09,450 I don't know if they're finished with it yet. 821 00:32:09,450 --> 00:32:12,640 A theory would be the attack on (unintelligible) 822 00:32:12,640 --> 00:32:13,950 you know, finished that. 823 00:32:13,950 --> 00:32:16,330 I'm not sure we would agree completely 824 00:32:16,330 --> 00:32:17,360 that that's the case, 825 00:32:17,360 --> 00:32:18,830 I think it's still too soon to tell, 826 00:32:18,830 --> 00:32:20,180 to be very candid with you. 827 00:32:21,530 --> 00:32:22,363 Sure. 828 00:32:24,063 --> 00:32:26,680 - Sir, a couple of questions on the rocket strike. 829 00:32:26,680 --> 00:32:29,770 You said KH had lost about a dozen 830 00:32:29,770 --> 00:32:30,850 of the last several months, 831 00:32:30,850 --> 00:32:34,140 how did this one compare in size and scope 832 00:32:34,140 --> 00:32:35,153 beyond casualties? 833 00:32:36,743 --> 00:32:39,313 And, second, you captured the vehicle, 834 00:32:40,230 --> 00:32:41,520 how were you able to catch, 835 00:32:41,520 --> 00:32:44,080 did you capture any KH members 836 00:32:44,080 --> 00:32:45,400 or anything like that as well? 837 00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:49,513 - So we assessed, the intent was to fire 33 rockets. 838 00:32:50,350 --> 00:32:51,453 They fired 30. 839 00:32:51,453 --> 00:32:53,510 3 were left in the vehicle and failed to ignite. 840 00:32:53,510 --> 00:32:55,360 Of the 30 that were fired, 841 00:32:55,360 --> 00:32:59,740 between 8 and 12, or 8 and 15 landed in Taji. 842 00:32:59,740 --> 00:33:01,340 That's a large strike. 843 00:33:01,340 --> 00:33:04,603 I mean, that's an intent to produce a lot of casualties. 844 00:33:06,060 --> 00:33:06,893 We're certain of that. 845 00:33:06,893 --> 00:33:07,726 We're certain of the data. 846 00:33:07,726 --> 00:33:10,860 We also get very good point of origin data 847 00:33:10,860 --> 00:33:13,020 that we're able to look at from our radars, 848 00:33:13,020 --> 00:33:15,440 and the Iraqis actually went out and got the vehicle for us 849 00:33:15,440 --> 00:33:17,560 which was very much appreciated. 850 00:33:17,560 --> 00:33:20,690 But as usual, typically the vehicle is left with a timer, 851 00:33:20,690 --> 00:33:22,800 there's nobody there when the rockets were fired, 852 00:33:22,800 --> 00:33:24,230 which is why the remaining three probably 853 00:33:24,230 --> 00:33:25,070 couldn't be ignited, 854 00:33:25,070 --> 00:33:28,020 because they set a timer on it and ran away. 855 00:33:28,020 --> 00:33:30,716 A particularly cowardly way to fight, but there you go. 856 00:33:30,716 --> 00:33:33,140 So that's how we get to that. 857 00:33:33,140 --> 00:33:34,930 You know, we're processing that vehicle. 858 00:33:34,930 --> 00:33:36,800 We'll process the three remaining rockets, 859 00:33:36,800 --> 00:33:38,290 and we'll gain a lot of, 860 00:33:38,290 --> 00:33:39,690 we'll gain a lot of information out of that 861 00:33:39,690 --> 00:33:42,390 that will allow us to further particularize 862 00:33:42,390 --> 00:33:44,433 and work on the origins of this attack. 863 00:33:46,288 --> 00:33:47,930 - Just a follow up. 864 00:33:47,930 --> 00:33:52,580 Why weren't you able to see these missiles in advance? 865 00:33:52,580 --> 00:33:54,530 If you know where the warehouses where, 866 00:33:55,390 --> 00:33:57,220 why weren't you able to track them and see 867 00:33:57,220 --> 00:33:58,724 before they were fired? 868 00:33:58,724 --> 00:34:01,260 - Sure, so, vehicles, rockets are loaded 869 00:34:01,260 --> 00:34:02,390 into these trucks, 870 00:34:02,390 --> 00:34:04,994 that truck may have moved around for a month 871 00:34:04,994 --> 00:34:05,827 before it was taken to the, 872 00:34:05,827 --> 00:34:07,290 'cause they know we're looking. 873 00:34:07,290 --> 00:34:09,930 And actually I don't have enough ISR 874 00:34:09,930 --> 00:34:11,170 to be everywhere all the time. 875 00:34:11,170 --> 00:34:12,790 You know, it's a common misconception 876 00:34:12,790 --> 00:34:13,890 that we see everything. 877 00:34:13,890 --> 00:34:15,490 We see some things really well, 878 00:34:15,490 --> 00:34:17,500 but when we see some things really well, 879 00:34:17,500 --> 00:34:19,310 that means we pay an opportunity cost, 880 00:34:19,310 --> 00:34:22,490 and I see nowhere, I see nothing somewhere else. 881 00:34:22,490 --> 00:34:23,480 Just the nature of the business, 882 00:34:23,480 --> 00:34:24,940 we juggle it all the time. 883 00:34:24,940 --> 00:34:27,080 So possibly this truck was loaded. 884 00:34:27,080 --> 00:34:28,110 It may have been hidden around. 885 00:34:28,110 --> 00:34:29,020 It was moved around. 886 00:34:29,020 --> 00:34:30,400 They are very good at doing this 887 00:34:30,400 --> 00:34:32,270 because they know. 888 00:34:32,270 --> 00:34:34,140 For example, had we seen that truck, 889 00:34:34,140 --> 00:34:35,430 we would have taken action. 890 00:34:35,430 --> 00:34:37,040 That's an earlier question about, 891 00:34:37,040 --> 00:34:38,260 do you have to wait to be hit? 892 00:34:38,260 --> 00:34:39,580 No, if we see the truck, 893 00:34:39,580 --> 00:34:41,410 we'll take that truck out immediately. 894 00:34:41,410 --> 00:34:43,590 They know that as well, so they're very cautious. 895 00:34:43,590 --> 00:34:45,870 The truck was probably covered until seconds 896 00:34:45,870 --> 00:34:47,710 before they set the timer and ran away. 897 00:34:47,710 --> 00:34:49,700 So you've got a very limited period of time 898 00:34:49,700 --> 00:34:52,083 when it appears as a missile loaded truck. 899 00:34:55,866 --> 00:34:57,310 - [Reporter] Since we have you here, can you just give us 900 00:34:57,310 --> 00:34:58,460 an update on Afghanistan, 901 00:34:58,460 --> 00:35:00,517 and where things are at the beginning of the inter-Afghan 902 00:35:00,517 --> 00:35:02,900 dialogue and talks and the prisoner exchange? 903 00:35:02,900 --> 00:35:03,733 Anything you can share? 904 00:35:03,733 --> 00:35:06,500 - Sure, I did a lot of testimony on that this week. 905 00:35:06,500 --> 00:35:08,200 So I'll just sort of draw on that. 906 00:35:09,540 --> 00:35:11,110 And I'm gonna talk really the military line, 907 00:35:11,110 --> 00:35:12,790 because that's what I know the best. 908 00:35:12,790 --> 00:35:14,950 Taliban attacks are still too high. 909 00:35:14,950 --> 00:35:18,030 Taliban attacks are not occurring against coalition forces. 910 00:35:18,030 --> 00:35:19,970 They're not typically occurring in the cities, 911 00:35:19,970 --> 00:35:23,140 and they're not occurring against bases. 912 00:35:23,140 --> 00:35:25,761 They're occurring against checkpoints 913 00:35:25,761 --> 00:35:28,180 and isolated locations across Afghanistan. 914 00:35:28,180 --> 00:35:29,830 But the level of attacks in my judgment 915 00:35:29,830 --> 00:35:31,950 is not consistent with a group that wants to pursue 916 00:35:31,950 --> 00:35:34,870 and be a, be a fair and fateful partner going forward. 917 00:35:34,870 --> 00:35:36,403 So those attacks are too high. 918 00:35:37,240 --> 00:35:40,840 And we have noted, I've seen what the Afghans have said, 919 00:35:40,840 --> 00:35:42,630 if they don't knock them off here in another 920 00:35:42,630 --> 00:35:44,840 two or three days, they're gonna begin to respond. 921 00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:47,110 So I think actually, the Afghan government has been 922 00:35:47,110 --> 00:35:51,080 remarkably restrained in responding to the Taliban attacks. 923 00:35:51,080 --> 00:35:53,900 So the question is, do the Taliban attacks represent 924 00:35:53,900 --> 00:35:55,510 a core strategy of the group, 925 00:35:55,510 --> 00:35:56,890 they're gonna continue the attacks? 926 00:35:56,890 --> 00:35:58,150 Or is it a splinter of the group 927 00:35:58,150 --> 00:35:59,580 and are they not monolithic? 928 00:35:59,580 --> 00:36:00,950 We're still assessing that. 929 00:36:00,950 --> 00:36:02,590 If it's directed from the top, 930 00:36:02,590 --> 00:36:03,880 then obviously that's not a good thing, 931 00:36:03,880 --> 00:36:07,440 because it shows that they're not acting in good faith. 932 00:36:07,440 --> 00:36:09,070 We're in the process of drawing down 933 00:36:09,070 --> 00:36:10,570 to a level of 8,600. 934 00:36:10,570 --> 00:36:13,190 I anticipate that we'll arrive at that level 935 00:36:13,190 --> 00:36:15,140 by the middle of the summer. 936 00:36:15,140 --> 00:36:17,950 We believe that any further, as we go beyond that, 937 00:36:17,950 --> 00:36:19,680 it's gonna be a conditions-based approach. 938 00:36:19,680 --> 00:36:23,380 We have an aspiration to go to a zero level in Afghanistan, 939 00:36:23,380 --> 00:36:27,140 but that is very clearly gonna be conditions-driven. 940 00:36:27,140 --> 00:36:29,640 We'll have an opportunity to take a look at conditions 941 00:36:29,640 --> 00:36:31,140 as we go forward. 942 00:36:31,140 --> 00:36:33,760 And my job and General Mill's job will be to evaluate 943 00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:35,420 the military component of that. 944 00:36:35,420 --> 00:36:37,660 The inter-Afghan dialogue as an observer, 945 00:36:37,660 --> 00:36:39,160 clearly that has to happen. 946 00:36:39,160 --> 00:36:42,124 Clearly our ability to go down below that level 947 00:36:42,124 --> 00:36:45,610 balanced against our commitment to our key interests 948 00:36:45,610 --> 00:36:49,150 in the region, which is preventing the generation of attacks 949 00:36:49,150 --> 00:36:52,180 from ISIS and Al-Qaeda against the United States homeland 950 00:36:52,180 --> 00:36:54,140 and the homelands of our allies and partners, 951 00:36:54,140 --> 00:36:55,650 that's what drives our decision 952 00:36:55,650 --> 00:36:57,350 on what that force level needs to be. 953 00:36:57,350 --> 00:37:00,440 If you have a permissive environment in Afghanistan, 954 00:37:00,440 --> 00:37:02,270 you can go much lower. 955 00:37:02,270 --> 00:37:04,010 If you have a non-permissive environment, 956 00:37:04,010 --> 00:37:06,380 where the Taliban is actively pursuing operations 957 00:37:06,380 --> 00:37:09,840 against at least the Afghans and possibly us, 958 00:37:09,840 --> 00:37:11,960 then you're gonna need to recommend 959 00:37:11,960 --> 00:37:13,160 a larger force structure. 960 00:37:13,160 --> 00:37:15,160 I'll have an opportunity to make that recommendation 961 00:37:15,160 --> 00:37:16,540 as the process goes forward. 962 00:37:16,540 --> 00:37:18,770 Ultimately it's not a military decision. 963 00:37:18,770 --> 00:37:20,920 - [Reporter] Can I follow up Courtney's question? 964 00:37:20,920 --> 00:37:22,950 - [Man Off-screen] Last one. 965 00:37:22,950 --> 00:37:26,160 - Sir, you said that coronavirus had some impact 966 00:37:26,160 --> 00:37:27,450 on senior leadership, 967 00:37:27,450 --> 00:37:29,180 potentially made them more aggressive. 968 00:37:29,180 --> 00:37:30,560 I'm curious if you can characterize 969 00:37:30,560 --> 00:37:31,950 how permanent that might be, 970 00:37:31,950 --> 00:37:33,776 and just what impact you've seen 971 00:37:33,776 --> 00:37:35,713 and if you could provide more details. 972 00:37:35,713 --> 00:37:37,381 - Sure, of course, death is permanent, 973 00:37:37,381 --> 00:37:38,770 and the number of people who have died 974 00:37:38,770 --> 00:37:42,030 as a result of that in the Iranian senior leadership. 975 00:37:42,030 --> 00:37:45,690 So I think it's gonna have, in the short term, 976 00:37:45,690 --> 00:37:48,260 it's gonna make it a lot harder to make decisions. 977 00:37:48,260 --> 00:37:51,060 People are separated, they're distrustful. 978 00:37:51,060 --> 00:37:52,740 And then there's a lot of, 979 00:37:52,740 --> 00:37:54,990 I think there's a lot of public anger in Afghanistan, 980 00:37:54,990 --> 00:37:57,120 about the mishandling of the coronavirus 981 00:37:57,120 --> 00:37:58,610 coming on the hills of the shoot down 982 00:37:58,610 --> 00:37:59,650 of the jet liner. 983 00:37:59,650 --> 00:38:01,970 So I think those all represent pressures 984 00:38:01,970 --> 00:38:04,570 that act on Iranian leadership right now, 985 00:38:04,570 --> 00:38:07,470 and that's gonna be presumably passing. 986 00:38:07,470 --> 00:38:10,450 But again, leaders have died 987 00:38:10,450 --> 00:38:11,790 and those leaders are not gonna come back 988 00:38:11,790 --> 00:38:12,623 as a result of that. 989 00:38:12,623 --> 00:38:14,450 So it's a combination of the two. 990 00:38:14,450 --> 00:38:19,110 I think the net effect of the coronavirus and COVID-19 991 00:38:20,060 --> 00:38:23,020 is that it has increased pressure on Iran's 992 00:38:23,020 --> 00:38:24,730 strategic decision makers. 993 00:38:24,730 --> 00:38:25,740 Thanks very much. 994 00:38:25,740 --> 00:38:26,730 Thank you. 995 00:38:26,730 --> 00:38:28,478 (Reporter mumbling question) 996 00:38:28,478 --> 00:38:31,145 (cameras click)