Success against the extremist networks in the CENTCOM AOR - whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Lebanon, or elsewhere - requires all forces and means at our disposal employed in a strategic approach grounded in the principles of counterinsurgency. Our counter-terror efforts, which seek to dismantle the extremist networks and their leadership, often through the use of military force, are critical. However, it is also important to eliminate these networks’ sources of support. Often this support comes from sympathetic populations who provide financial support and physical safe haven or who simply turn a blind eye to extremist activities. At other times, support comes from populations directly subjected to extremist intimidation and extortion.

Eroding this support, eliminating these safe havens, and ultimately preventing networks from reconstituting themselves requires protecting populations, delegitimizing the terrorists’ methods and ideologies, addressing legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population, and promoting broad-based economic and governmental development. Defeating extremist groups thus requires the application of basic counter-insurgency concepts. We cannot be just “hard” or just “soft”—we must be both.

This does not imply, however, that US forces must conduct counter-insurgency operations everywhere in the AOR where there are extremist groups. Rather, this demands an approach in which the US primarily provides support to our partners in their own counter-terror and counter-insurgency efforts. We should help nations develop their own capacity to secure their people and to govern fairly and effectively, and we should build effective partnerships and engage with the people, leaders, and security forces in the AOR. Whichever forces are involved, ours or our partners’, their actions and operations must adhere to basic counter-insurgency principles, with the specifics of the operations tailored to the circumstances on the ground.