I. Introduction

A Command at War: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) oversees operations alongside our allies, partners, and friends in a critically important region of the world. CENTCOM is engaged throughout the greater Middle East and South Central Asia across the full spectrum of warfare, standing against violent aggression and the tyranny of militant extremists, while contributing to the broader conditions for peace, stability, and prosperity. 

Recognizing our Troops, Civilians, and Partners: Our troops and their families carry the brunt of physical and emotional burdens in this tenth year of war. Today, over 200,000 American troops and tens of thousands of civilians are deployed to the CENTCOM AOR. These men and women – all volunteers, no less – defend our freedoms with great courage in the face of a murderous enemy on harsh terrain. And our troops stand together with tens of thousands of our international partners, conducting coalition operations from the waters off Somalia to the mountains of Afghanistan, where the largest war-fighting coalition in recent history is engaged. 

Operating in a Dynamic Region: The CENTCOM AOR is more dynamic than I have seen it since first serving there in 1979. Across our theater, we are required to maintain a degree of military flexibility such as we have seldom seen before. At the same time, given the financial realities in Washington, we require ourselves to exercise the utmost degree of stewardship over every penny we spend. To operate in this context successfully, we seek to build strong military-to-military relationships with our partners, recognizing that CENTCOM’s actions represent a tangible signal of America’s continued, long-term commitment to the security and prosperity of this area.

Throughout the region, we see institutions of government responding to the aspirations of youthful populations. As the people in the region have made their voices heard, regional militaries have so far demonstrated their professionalism, exercising a capability that did not arise by accident or overnight. The strong security relationship between the U.S. and our partners is decades in the making and has helped them become the professional forces they are today – and in the process made our forces better as well. While we seek to understand the unique circumstances that our partners confront, CENTCOM remains committed to supporting the efforts of our military counterparts and to strengthening the security partnerships that have proven critical during this period of political unrest. We do this first by listening, learning, and understanding, and continue by engaging with our partners based on mutual respect and shared interests.

Our Mission: Overall, amidst these conditions, we remain committed to carry out our mission:

With our national and international partners, CENTCOM promotes security cooperation among nations; responds to crises; deters or defeats state and non-state aggression; supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity.

Snapshot of Operations: Our main effort is Afghanistan – and progress there is indisputable, even if some of our success is fragile and reversible. We and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coalition partners are conducting a comprehensive yet focused counterinsurgency campaign to ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for transnational extremists. Our forces are part of a 49-nation international coalition, led by the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and united behind President Karzai’s goal of transitioning the lead of security tasks from the international community to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. In full partnership with the Afghan government, we are inflicting unprecedented damage on al-Qaeda (AQ) and associated extremist groups – a reality recently affirmed by President Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review. Moreover, we confound our enemies by demonstrating our unambiguous commitment to our long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, we continue supporting Pakistan’s military efforts against extremists operating from and threatening that country and Afghanistan, while contributing to the broader U.S. goal of growing our strategic partnership with Islamabad. The recent U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue and a number of development assistance programs sponsored by the Department of State are good examples of how the U.S. is attempting to build trust with the Pakistani people and government.

In Iraq, following seven years of hard fought gains, we are drawing down our troops as we transition full security responsibilities to our Iraqi partners. The enemy in Iraq is capable of dramatic attacks but has proven unable to muster a significant threat to the Iraqi government. In coordination with the U.S. Department of State, CENTCOM is standing up the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq to conduct sustained security assistance and cooperation activities with the government of Iraq. We are planning an organization manned and positioned to support the long-term U.S. objectives in Iraq as determined by the Iraqi and American governments, in order to best advance our civilian-led relationship for the future.

In the broader CENTCOM region, our forces are conducting a theater-wide campaign alongside our partners in pursuit of AQ and its extremist allies. Meanwhile, we remain continuously poised and postured to respond to crises and to conduct contingency operations, while continuing to forge partnerships in the region and increase the security capacity of our partners. We continue to rely on our capable and flexible amphibious forces. For example, over a 36 hour period last September, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit delivered aid to the flood-ravaged people of Pakistan, provided close air support from the skies over Afghanistan, and rescued pirated crews in the Gulf of Aden. Three months later, two-thirds of our Marines Expeditionary Unit deployed to Afghanistan on three day’s notice.

II. Overview of the CENTCOM AOR

A. Nature of the AOR

The CENTCOM AOR is comprised of 20 countries spanning over four million square miles in three diverse sub-regions from Egypt and the Levant, to the Arabian Peninsula (including the Gulf nations), and Central and South Asia. These regions are home to a half-billion people practicing all of the world’s major religions and speaking more than 18 major languages. Several countries with economic challenges have burgeoning populations – 184 million people in Pakistan, 80 million in Egypt, and 77 million in Iran. In 12 of the 20 countries in the region, 30 or more percent of the population is between the ages of 15 and 24 (at 39 percent, Yemen ranks at the top in this category). In most of those countries, another 30 percent of the overall population is under 15. This youth bulge represents tomorrow’s future leadership and the region’s greatest challenge in terms of education, employment and expectations.

The CENTCOM AOR is a region of rich history, distinct culture, and great potential, encompassing the proud traditions of a wide variety of ethnic groups, including: Arab, Azeri, Baluch, Gilaki, Hazara, Kurd, Lur, Mazandarani, Qashqai, Pashtun, Persian, Talysh, Turkmen, and Uzbek, among others. The AOR contains more than half of the world’s proven oil reserves and nearly half of its natural gas. As a result, the region contains some of the world’s busiest trading routes linking Europe, Africa, and East Asia to the Gulf. This trade is essential to continued global economic prosperity and growth. The region’s trading routes contain three of the world’s major maritime choke points, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Bab al Mandeb Strait joining the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. But while the region contains abundant energy resources, supplies of water and the availability of arable land are limited and increasingly scarce.

B. External Influences on the CENTCOM AOR

The region retains its historical tradition as a social, economic, and cultural crossroads, attracting nations and non-state actors seeking to advance their interests and influence regional events. Among a host of external influences on the CENTCOM AOR, the most significant include:

• Middle East Peace: Lack of progress in achieving comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. and CENTCOM security interests in the region. It is one of many issues that is exploited by our adversaries in the region and is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups. The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners and creates political challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing moderate voices in the region. As Secretary Gates noted in July 2010, “the lack of progress in the peace process has provided political ammunition to our adversaries in the Middle East and in the region, and…progress in this arena will enable us not only to perhaps get others to support the peace process, but also support us in our efforts to try and impose effective sanctions against Iran.” In December 2010, Secretary Clinton observed “the conflict between Israel and Palestine and between Israel and its Arab neighbors is a source of tension and an obstacle to prosperity and opportunity for all of the people in the region.” By contrast, substantive progress on Middle East peace would improve CENTCOM’s opportunities to work with our regional partners and support multilateral security efforts. Speaking about the need for Middle East peace at the Manama Dialogue in December 2010, King Abdullah of Jordan observed “Our region will not enjoy security and stability unless we solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Arabs and Israelis find peace. The stakes are high. As a solution continues to elude us, faith in negotiations, as the only path to peace and justice, is eroding. And if hope is killed, radical forces will prevail. The region will sink into more vicious warfare and instability…threatening security far beyond the borders of the Middle East.”

• Bordering Powers. China, Russia, Turkey, and India – each of which lie outside but border the CENTCOM region – represent four great gravitational forces influencing various countries in the AOR. China pursues its many energy-related interests throughout the region, extending influence from its traditional partnership with Pakistan, to a $3.5B investment in Afghanistan’s Aynak Copper Mine, to building pipelines for oil and gas from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan. Chinese activities in the region may begin to compete with the regional interests of Russia, which maintains a network of security, economic, and social ties with Central Asian nations and beyond. India’s influence impacts the strategic calculations of Pakistan and, to some extent, virtually every other country in the CENTCOM AOR. Turkey increasingly asserts its interests in the region in keeping with its emergence as a considerable force within the international community. All four of these nations have unique relations with Iran, affecting the international approach to the Iranian situation. We remain attentive to these dynamics as we seek to ensure that we work effectively across U.S. government and Combatant Command seams to improve our unity of effort.

• Somalia. State failure in Somalia has enabled extremist and criminal elements to proliferate and spread northward into the Horn of Africa and Yemen and other areas of the CENTCOM AOR. At the same time, widespread poverty in Somalia creates incentives for young men to pursue the lucrative enterprise of piracy. Additionally, lack of governance permits extremists to freely migrate to Yemen, providing opportunities to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In the past year, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab successfully maintained control of most of southern Somalia and radicalized factions of this group have sought alignment with AQ in the Arabian Peninsula and in Pakistan.

C. U.S. Interests in the Region

Given the centrality and volatility of the CENTCOM AOR, the U.S. and nations around the world retain significant interests in the region. Among others, significant U.S. interests in the region include:

• Security of U.S. citizens and the U.S. homeland

• Regional stability

• Promotion of effective and legitimate governance, human rights, the rule of law, and sustained economic growth and opportunity, and

• Free flow of commerce and trade within the region, through strategic maritime chokepoints, and via land-based trade routes to international markets

D. Threats to U.S. Interests in the Region

Violence, instability, and underdevelopment represent the primary threats to U.S. interests in the region. Some areas face uneven or even dismal economic development, often coupled with endemic corruption. Social and economic friction have led to or exacerbated a number of deep-rooted and long-standing disputes over territory, resources, and power, many of which remain unresolved due to a lack of adequate security arrangements on the local or national level. Some areas will face increasing competition for food, water, mineral deposits, oil, and other natural resources. The region is also defined by tensions and sectarian rivalries between many ethnic, tribal, and religious groups. Such conditions create the potential for broader violence, particularly in the absence of effective governance and indigenous security forces, ultimately giving rise to violent extremist organizations that have attacked us and our friends. We have seen the dangers present within a security vacuum, where institutions fail to facilitate mediation, partnership-building, and open dialogue between feuding groups, or to put down violent extremists.

E. Connecting Our Strategic Challenges

The challenges of the CENTCOM AOR are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing – and thus cannot be treated separately. We have seen a symbiosis, for example, between extremist groups and other factions that, in aggregate, tend to strengthen each other and which, if left unchecked, tend to threaten wider areas of territory and the stability of civilian governments. Areas in the CENTCOM region, especially those with a rapidly expanding population of youth, are left vulnerable to (and often become the victim of) a worsening spiral of conditions, whereby young people forego meager, but legitimate opportunities for employment and turn, instead, to a range of criminal activities, including piracy, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and narcotics – fueling violent extremist organizations bent on destroying the lives of innocent people. State and non-state actors operating with malign intent can readily exploit such conditions, with the most dangerous scenarios involving a mix of insufficient governance, weapons proliferation – especially Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – the influence of hostile states, and the free flow of extremist elements across national borders as well as free range in cyberspace. In some cases, disenchantment with globalization’s efforts coupled with a desire to belong to a movement with a clarion call of purpose can provide the excitement for young men (and increasingly women) to take on a violent role in an extremist organization.

III. Principal Tasks

In light of these many challenges, we continuously assess our strategic and operational approaches in order to achieve our desired national interests of security, stability, and prosperity in the CENTCOM AOR. CENTCOM is focused on the following tasks:

• Supporting the Mission in Afghanistan

• Partnering with Pakistan

• Countering the Destabilizing Activities of Iran

• Enabling Transition in Iraq

• Strengthening Partnerships in Central Asia

• Building Partner Capacity and Pursuing Cooperative Activities

• Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations

• Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

• Countering Piracy

Supporting the Mission in Afghanistan

Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, connected by a porous border region historically providing free movement and safe haven to groups traversing the Durand Line. The senior leadership of AQ and associated extremists groups – groups that are intent on carrying out attacks on innocent civilians worldwide – plan, prepare, and direct operations from this region, making it of critical interest to the security of the U.S. and our allies. Currently AQ in the border region is under the most intense pressure they have experienced since 2001.

A Clear Objective and a Sound Strategy: With our NATO and coalition partners, we are working to achieve our core goal of preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and associated transnational extremist groups. President Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review affirmed the core elements of our strategy in Afghanistan, the first imperative of which is to improve the overall security environment and to reduce violence levels in Afghanistan. After regaining the initiative from the enemy, our forces act as a bulwark behind which the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the roots of Afghan governance can grow.

Aiming Toward a Common Strategic Vision: Our military objectives and strategy in Afghanistan support the developing strategic vision between the political leadership of the U.S. and Afghanistan, as reflected in Vice President Biden’s comments alongside President Karzai in January: "It is not our intention to govern or to nation-build. As President Karzai often points out, this is the responsibility of the Afghan people, and they are fully capable of it. We stand ready to help you in that effort. And we will continue to stand ready to help you in that effort after 2014.” Success in Afghanistan is an Afghan security force able to protect the people with a government that meets the needs of the people and prevents safe haven for international terrorists.

The Campaign Plan: We have increased efforts in virtually every facet of the comprehensive yet focused civil-military campaign in Afghanistan. As one part of that effort, we have executed an unprecedented pace of counterterrorist operations to capture or kill insurgents using enhanced intelligence largely enabled by conventional ground forces. Our efforts range from major combat operations (in Helmand and elsewhere, for example), special mission unit operations allowing no safe haven to the enemy, and concurrent bottom-up and top-down initiatives (exemplified by expanding village stability operations).

The breadth of our current operations squelches the enemy’s ability to recuperate and threaten the Afghan people. Our forces have partnered with the Afghan security forces to increase their capabilities; to expand border security; to conduct robust detainee operations and rule of law activities; to address and counter corruption by working with the Afghan government to target criminal patronage networks; and to interdict the flow of illegal weapons and narcotics to deny criminals and insurgent groups a critical source of their operational revenue. We are capitalizing on our expanded security footprint in the winter months to retain the initiative, suffocate the enemy, and increase momentum into the start of the traditional fighting season. Ultimately, we are working to create an Afghanistan that is hostile to our enemies and denies them the support of the population, making it untenable for insurgents to return from their winter safe havens. This is the essence of counterinsurgency operations. While we will face tough fighting this spring, the enemy’s situation continues to worsen day-by-day.

The Right Inputs: The overall international effort in Afghanistan has transformed from an economy of force mission 3 years ago to a focused and reinforced civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, largely assuming its full strength in September of 2010. U.S., Coalition, and partner nations have worked hard to apply the right mix of organizations, approach, and resources in Afghanistan. Last year at this time, we had less than 270,000 American, coalition and Afghan forces on the ground in Afghanistan. This year, we have more than 370,000 total security forces (American, coalition and Afghan) in the fight, and 109,000 Afghan security forces are projected to be added by this time next year. Beyond the additional organizations put in place on the ground in Afghanistan, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell and CENTCOM’s Afghanistan Pakistan Center of Excellence are better organizing our resources at home and providing mission-critical reach-back support to deployed forces. The CENTCOM Center of Excellence will provide the cadre of regional experts for the long haul as we transfer to Afghan lead in 2014 and commit to a long-term partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Enemy Violence and Coalition Progress: Despite the enemy’s efforts to disrupt progress in Afghanistan, we have achieved the major military objectives we set out to accomplish in 2010 and made considerable progress with respect to governance and development. As Secretary Gates noted after his December 2010 trip to Afghanistan: “The bottom line is that in the last 12 months, we have come a long way. Frankly, progress—even in the last few months—has exceeded my expectations.” We recognize, however, that progress and violence coexist in this type of war. Our enemies continue to conduct attacks heavily focused on non-combatants and to intimidate the population and maintain relevancy, albeit decreasing, in newly-cleared areas. And enemy-initiated violence is increasingly localized. From November 2010 until 31 January 2011, 57 percent of the violence in Afghanistan has been concentrated in 12 of 401 districts. Notably, the key districts of Maiwand in Kandahar Province and Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province – which are critical to our efforts to link the Helmand and Kandahar security bubbles – are no longer among the top-12 most violent districts. The elevated levels of violence is less a reflection of increased insurgent capability and more the result of increased Afghan and ISAF operations in areas previously considered insurgent strongholds. The enemy is not adapting well to this development. While we make progress, our enemies continue to make grievous mistakes, to include: purposefully killing innocent Afghans; leaders fleeing into Pakistan and leaving subordinates to fight; and killing nearly 5,000 Afghans in the first ten months of 2010 (more than three quarters of all civilian casualties in that period). We highlight the ruthless actions of the enemy, and in recent months Afghan leaders and human rights groups have stepped forward to condemn insurgent-initiated violence.

Road to Transition in 2014: We and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other Coalition and ANSF partners are improving security for the Afghan population, increasing the size and quality of the ANSF, and supporting efforts to improve governance and development throughout Afghanistan. At last November’s NATO Summit in Lisbon, we undercut a key pillar of the Taliban’s strategy by affirming the long-term resolve of the U.S. and international community to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. We are united in support of President Karzai’s goal of Afghan forces assuming security responsibilities from the international community by the end of 2014. In partnership with the Afghan government, we are working toward President Obama’s goal of beginning a drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan beginning in July of this year at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. The process for identifying, assessing, and transitioning areas of Afghanistan is based on recommendations from the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal (Transition) Board (JANIB) to the Government of Afghanistan. ISAF is working closely with JANIB as we begin the process of transition and methodically move forward in our campaign.

ANSF Support: Most importantly in the security arena, our investment in the ANSF is working and the growth of the force is on track. The remarkable quantity growth of ANSF (rising by an unprecedented 70,000 personnel while facing a determined enemy) is now being matched by quality improvements in the force. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan is supporting the efforts of the Afghan government to build leaders at all levels, to increase literacy, and to improve capability and training capacity. Combined, these programs increase the quality of the force, ultimately helping to reduce attrition, enhance recruitment, and contribute to sustainability. Meanwhile, we are helping the ANSF to overcome remaining challenges in the recruitment of medical staff and other enablers, as well as increasing the participation of females and recruiting more southern Pashtuns. In league with Admiral Stavridis (Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe), we are trying to reduce our shortage of trainers.

ANSF in the Lead: The ANSF is increasingly in the lead of operations in many areas of Afghanistan. In southern Afghanistan, the ANSF took the lead in mid-2010 for an operation in Malajat, Kandahar City – with support from ISAF for additional combat power, close air support and other enablers – resulting in the capture or killing of several dozen insurgents and the establishment of a new model for Afghan-led operations. The ANSF also provided well over half of the combat power for the latter phases of Operation Hamkari, clearing the insurgency’s most vital safe havens in southern Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, Afghan National Army and Police conducted joint operations throughout December 2010 with ISAF forces in northern Balkh Province, and Afghan National Police have demonstrated considerable capacity by capturing insurgents and discovering caches of weapons in U.S.-Afghan partnered operations in Kunduz Province. Additionally, ANSF now leads security efforts in 14 of 15 of Kabul’s districts, and have executed coordinated security plans for several events, including the June Consultative Peace Jirga, the July Kabul conference, August Independence Day events and the January seating of the Parliament all without incident, at odds with the insurgents’ claims that it would seek to disrupt them.

Local Security Initiatives: Beyond national level security efforts, the Afghan government has steadily expanded the local security initiatives designed to squeeze extremist elements from their traditional safe havens and cut off their lines of communication. Clearing operations in key terrain districts have shifted operational-level momentum and altered village-level calculus in remote areas. Local elders in dozens of villages throughout Afghanistan have conducted jirgas to assume increased responsibility for their own security, and U.S. and coalition forces have supported the Ministry of Interior’s efforts to fortify Afghan villages. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) program represents one of the most promising endeavors to wrest local areas from insurgent influence. The ALP and other Village Stability Operation initiatives work from the bottom-up and the top-down, connecting the support of local communities with the capacity of the central government and coalition partnerships. The Taliban has revealed their concerns that the ALP represents a direct threat to their existence and operational ability. Today, there are a total of 63 ALP sites – 24 of which the Ministry of Interior has site validated – and approximately 4,000 ALP are now assigned. These local efforts buttress security in areas with limited ANSF presence, complementing the progress made elsewhere (and in ALP locations) by conventional ISAF and ANSF. Given the initial success of the ALP program, the Ministry of Interior wants to increase the program beyond the current projected number of 10,000 with our reinforced special operations forces providing oversight and mentoring.

Popular Support: Since 2003, AQ and the Taliban have tried with some success to expand their strength and influence in much of the country. In 2010, coalition and Afghan forces applied additional resources in all aspects of the campaign to change the security landscape in much of the country. As security improves in key areas and we are better able to protect the people, Afghanistan’s population has increasingly supported efforts to bring development and basic services to their areas. In recent months, in particular, Afghan security forces have assumed more of the load in the fight, village elders have encouraged young men to join the Afghan police, and insurgents in several areas have begun to put down their weapons and integrate into society. Reintegration efforts are bearing fruit due to the concerted effort of the Afghan government both at the local and national level and the support of coalition forces (aided, of course, by the momentum in our campaign). In terms of reconciliation, the process is led by Afghans, with ISAF partnering with ANSF to set security conditions and dash the enemy’s hopes of victory. These are progressive steps toward building irreversible momentum in our overall campaign.

Rule of Law Progress: Unlike our enemies, we continue to support the legitimate efforts of the Afghan government to improve the Rule of Law for Afghanistan’s more than 29 million inhabitants. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan’s Joint Task Force / Combined Interagency Task Force 435 and our Afghan partners have achieved considerable progress in the last year: transferring detainees to the state-of-the-art detention facility in Parwan; implementing transparent and robust internment processes; strengthening judicial guarantees for detainees; and expanding robust reintegration programs that include literacy and vocational training. Moreover, we have established robust efforts to combat corruption at all levels, even as we implement best practices to reduce the challenge of corruption in contracting and in every aspect of our campaign.

Infrastructure Initiatives: We are also pursuing infrastructure initiatives – for example, building roads, rail, and installing electrical grids and transmission lines – to capitalize on Afghanistan’s potential as a Central Asian economic hub. A regional transport network facilitates the creation of private sector jobs and provides additional incentives for reconcilable elements of the insurgency to abandon the fight. Ultimately, such economic development reduces the need for U.S. forces and underpins long-term transition activities and is fundamental to a sound counterinsurgency campaign.

Congressional Support: Congressional leadership continues to play a critical role in enabling our efforts in Afghanistan, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the authorization of an infrastructure program, and the Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP). Above all, we rely on the ASFF to enable the eventual full transition of security tasks to a robust, trained ANSF capable of preventing the resurgence of insurgent safe havens in Afghanistan. In terms of the CERP, our Commanders on the ground continually comment that the CERP funds are invaluable in carrying out operations toward our strategic objectives in Afghanistan, undercutting the enemy’s information operations and legitimacy. In 2010, CERP funded more than 8,300 projects, including, for example, transportation initiatives to improve freedom of movement throughout Afghanistan; agriculture production across Afghanistan involving the repair and improvement of irrigation canals and wells and providing farmers with higher-quality seeds and fertilizers; education projects such as the services of more than 200 local Afghan education outreach coordinators; and water and sanitation projects to install three high-production groundwater wells that will increase the accessibility of potable water to over 850,000 Afghans in Kandahar City. Apart from CERP, the new Afghanistan infrastructure program enables us to work together with the U.S. State Department to undertake high-priority infrastructure projects to address critical needs for Afghan security, governance, and development. The Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund will be the vehicle for the Defense Department's contribution to this integrated program. To enable our reintegration efforts, we continue to execute the ARP using funds in support for the government of Afghanistan’s Peace and Reintegration Program.

Challenges Ahead: Much work remains to achieve our goals in Afghanistan. We face a resilient and determined enemy. The U.S. and the international community are positioned to favorably influence reform and synchronize Rule of Law development to counter corruption within the Afghan government. Despite considerable progress in many areas in 2010, we recognize that there will be hard work ahead as we continue to fight along with our Afghan partners. But, by progressively and steadily executing our sound and validated strategy, I believe we can set the conditions to succeed in Afghanistan.

Partnering with Pakistan

Strategic Partnership: We recognize, of course, that any solution in Afghanistan must address the regional context. CENTCOM supports President Obama’s goal of strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership through nascent yet improving military-to-military cooperation with Pakistan. And as Secretary Clinton and other leadership has noted, we must concentrate on the efforts Pakistan is taking. They have made very significant moves for going after the terrorist within their own country.

Over the past year, CENTCOM has strengthened and deepened our security cooperation with Pakistan by supporting our counterparts through CENTCOM’s Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan (ODRP). ODRP is focused on assisting Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts and this past year, led the U.S. interagency effort to provide disaster relief and Humanitarian Assistance to areas affected by the flooding. Additionally, in support of our long-term partnership with Pakistan, the CENTCOM Center of Excellence continues to deploy subject matter experts and provide unique reach-back support to ODRP and Special Operations Command-Pakistan (Forward) in order to deepen analysis and to provide greater interagency fidelity on critical issues.

Threats in Pakistan: The potential for instability in Pakistan and the free movement of extremists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region continue to pose a serious threat to regional and global security. Pakistan’s tribal areas remain the principal sanctuary for al-Qaeda and a safe haven for other extremist groups, enabling them to threaten the population and coalition forces in Afghanistan, the people and government in Pakistan, and US and Western interests globally. The Afghanistan-Pakistan region also faces significant humanitarian concerns, including refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from decades of conflict. Additionally, roughly three million Afghan refugees still live in Pakistan, having been displaced by the Russian invasion into Afghanistan thirty years ago.

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance: Last summer’s historic flooding in Pakistan was devastating – effectively equivalent in scope to flooding the entire East Coast of the United States. The U.S. responded to the floods by providing historic levels of Humanitarian Assistance. In all, U.S. rotary and fixed wing aircraft transported more than 40,000 displaced persons and delivered more than 26 million pounds of aid supplies to the people of Pakistan. U.S. helicopters flew more than 5,000 flight hours during the relief operation. The U.S. government provided Zodiac boat kits to the Pakistan Military for use in rescue operations, and provided eight 50 meter bridges to replace bridges swept away by the floods.

U.S. Support to Pakistan Military: On the security front, continued U.S. assistance is critical to enabling Pakistan to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. Our forces carry out important partnership and engagement activities in support of the Pakistan military’s improving counterinsurgency capabilities. As one important example, ODRP supports Pakistan’s Frontier Scouts by providing training support and enabling further counterinsurgency operations. U.S. personnel also assist in the procurement of materials and equipment needed to build infrastructure in support of education, power, and food.

Pakistan Operations and Sacrifice: Pakistan’s military has made impressive strides in combating militants in the FATA, while dealing with the effects of large-scale flooding that devastated much of the country. Over the last year, the enemy has lost battlespace to the Pakistan military’s sustained efforts to move against the enemy strongholds. Pakistan’s military has suffered more than 2,500 casualties (enduring more than 500 personnel killed in action and more than 2000 wounded in action) since the start of offensive operations against extremist elements in the KPk and the FATA. Since June 2009, the Pakistan Military has been involved in nearly continuous operations against militants in the KPk and the FATA. In total, the Pakistan Military has deployed upwards of 140,000 troops along Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan, a significant portion of which were drawn from Pakistan’s border with India.

Regional Context: Our efforts to support Pakistan fit well within the broader regional context. We recognize that Pakistan’s long-standing tensions with India are an important part of Pakistan’s strategic decision-making calculus and military force posture. However, the presence of extremist sanctuaries in Pakistan significantly impacts our progress in Afghanistan, and with the Pakistan military’s help we are taking important steps to improve cross-border operations. To address existing challenges along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, coordination between ISAF, Afghan security forces, and the Pakistan Military continues to improve, especially in the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). In Regional Command East, we are planning coordinated operations with the Pakistan Military. The Pakistan Military recently began clearing insurgent safe havens in Mohmand Agency across the border from Kunar Province – where insurgents have initiated a number of attacks to undermine recent security gains in Afghanistan. While Pakistan’s operations are acting as the “hammer” on their side of the border, combined Afghan and ISAF forces are poised to defeat displaced insurgents, acting as the “anvil.” Afghan Border Police and other combined security forces are manning outposts along the border and armed drones and close combat aviation are monitoring previously-identified mountain passes that insurgents will likely use as they seek sanctuary in Afghanistan.

Congressional Support: Multi-year security assistance is critical to our efforts in Pakistan. We appreciate continued Congressional support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, which serves as a key enabler of the Pakistan’s military operations against extremists. The fund also provides for a range of partnership activities with potentially transformational long-term effects on our relationship with Pakistan if they can be sustained.

Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities

Iran’s Destabilizing Activities: In view of Iran’s destabilizing behavior and its persistent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, the Iranian regime’s current stance represents the greatest long-term threat to the region. Iran continues to rebuff efforts for engagement, further alienating and isolating itself from much of the rest of the region and from much of the international community. The actions of Iran’s leadership squander the potential of its own educated populace and sacrifice the free exchange of ideas for the short-sighted interest of preserving an increasingly harsh and oppressive regime. Recently, Tehran equated the Egyptian protests to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, making a fanciful and wholly false connection.

The Iranian regime relies on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to extend influence and create instability across the region through persuasion, coercion, aggression, and targeted messaging. In fact, Iran continues to fund, arm, train, and equip a network of agents, surrogates, and proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Afghanistan and elsewhere across the region. In the pivotal region of the Levant, Iran seeks to expand its influence, in part by enabling Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas in order to weaken legitimate governance, limit economic development, and undermine security partnerships. Additionally, Iran delivers weapons and provides military training to surrogates in an effort to target Israel (a nation Iran’s leadership have vowed to destroy) and undercut the Middle East Peace Process. Of urgent concern, the IRGC-QF continues to equip militants in Iraq and Afghanistan that attack U.S. and coalition forces and undermine stability and governance in each of these countries. The recent January 2011 large caliber improvised rocket assisted mortar (IRAM) attack against U.S. forces in Iraq demonstrated Iran’s malicious intent, and ability to escalate violence when they desire.

Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Weapons: In spite of a fourth round of United Nations sponsored sanctions, Iran appears determined to mature its nuclear weapons program – an ambition that could lead to the proliferation of illicit nuclear materials and spark a nuclear arms race in the region. Admiral Mullen reinforced this point in December 2010, observing: “I see Iran continuing on this path to develop nuclear weapons, and I believe that developing and achieving that goal would be very destabilizing to the region.” Iran also continues to expand and improve its arsenal of over 2,200 ballistic missiles and long-range rockets, and of approximately 225 fixed and mobile launchers, making it the largest ballistic missile and long-range rocket force in the Middle East. Iran can use these ballistic missiles and rockets, combined with increasing naval capabilities, to threaten global commerce.

Countering Destabilizing Iranian Activities and Keeping Peace with our Partners: Firmly nested within the broader approach of the U. S. government toward Iran, CENTCOM is committed to countering Iran’s destabilizing and coercive activities by building confidence with our partners in the region. As one example, we are working together with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners and other nations to advance Integrated Air and Missile Defense. We also conduct activities to reassure our friends in the region that we are with them, preclude conflict, and deter Iran’s destabilizing activities, while at the same time standing ready to conduct contingency operations.

Enabling Transition in Iraq

Looking Ahead in Iraq: The year ahead in Iraq presents a significant opportunity for the U.S. to solidify our long-term support to this keystone of regional stability. Our continued investment in Iraq is critical at this juncture, especially given the significant commitment we have made in lives and treasure. Now is not the time to be penny wise and pound foolish with respect to our mission in Iraq. Nested firmly inside the State Department’s vision for an enduring U.S.-Iraq strategic partnership, CENTCOM is setting conditions to build on the shared sacrifices between our countries.

The Situation in Iraq: Iraq faces lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions between political parties, and strained governmental capacity to provide basic services. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) remains committed to undermining the Iraqi government and is capable of carrying out orchestrated, high profile attacks. Likewise, Iranian-inspired and equipped proxies continue to be a threat to Iraqi security and governance. While the security situation in Iraq is vastly improved since the peak of sectarian violence there in mid-2007 (violence is currently at all-time lowest levels since 2003), Iraq continues to face significant political, economic, and security challenges. Over the coming year, several factors will determine Iraq’s strategic direction, including the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the effectiveness of the nascent governing coalition, and the degree to which the country is influenced by Iran and threatened by AQI and Shi’a militia elements.

United States Forces-Iraq: From now until the end of this year, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is continuing to partner with ISF during this historic period of transition. USF-I is undertaking a range of activities, foremost among these strengthening the ISF, transitioning security-related activities to Iraq and the U.S. interagency, and contributing to border management and ministerial development.

Establishing OSC-I: Through USF-I and in partnership with the Embassy country team, we are planning the initial stand-up of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) in June of this year and expect it to be fully operational by this October. OSC-I is the cornerstone of our long-term mission to build partner capacity with the ISF. Additionally, the OSC-I will ensure the continuation of the military-to-military relationships that advise, train, and assist Iraqi Security Forces.

Iraq’s Regional Integration: Iraq is now at a crossroads, poised to emerge as a positive force for the region after posing security challenges for its neighbors in past decades. Baghdad’s selection as the location to host the Arab League Summit is a significant testament to Iraq’s re-emergence in the region. Iraq also accepted Egypt’s invitation to participate as an observer in CENTCOM’s largest exercise, BRIGHT STAR. Jordan has also exerted considerable positive influence in Iraq, training over 1,500 Iraqi Army officers, a number of Iraqi Air Force pilots, and posting a Jordanian defense attaché in Baghdad, in addition to hosting a program to provide extensive training to Iraqi police. Additionally, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have aided the economic reintegration of Iraq into commercial activity and regularly scheduled transportation networks. Finally, the United Arab Emirates have trained Iraqi police officers in a joint program with Japan and Germany. Iraq’s constructive integration into the region will also help blunt destabilizing Iranian influence. If left vulnerable to Tehran’s meddling, Iraq’s sovereign future would be imperiled. At the same time that Iran reconstructs shrines, provides electrical power, and constructs schools and clinics in Iraq, Iran also undermines Iraqi political processes, facilitates violence against innocent Iraqi civilians, and provides lethal support to extremist groups targeting U.S. forces. For the U.S. and the international community, a sovereign Iraq under a stable and inclusive government is fundamental to regional stability.

Congressional Support: The support of Congress is critical to facilitating an effective transition in Iraq and in setting the conditions for an enduring U.S.-Iraq partnership. We seek Congressional support in obtaining the appropriate authorities in FY11 to begin immediate facility and site work for the OSC-I to reach full operating capability by October 2011. This is an area of critical need as we work to meet our aggressive timelines. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund critically enables Iraq to set a foundation for its internal and external defense capabilities and provides Iraqi Minister of Interior police forces the training and equipment necessary to maintain internal security without assistance from the Ministry of Defense. Additionally, the ISFF enables Iraqi Army counterinsurgency capabilities and enhances cooperation between the government of Iraq and Kurdish police forces to ensure the consistency of police training and equipment standards throughout Iraq.

Strengthening Central Asian Partnerships

In Central Asia, CENTCOM is committed to strengthening relationships based on those shared interests and goals that we have in common with the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While our nations seek to improve broader economic conditions, CENTCOM is working with our partners to address the migration of extremists in certain areas of Central Asia and to counter the trade of illicit narcotics and human trafficking. Often these activities are interrelated.

Northern Distribution Network: Over the past two years, the development of a robust transportation network has been the most expansive area of cooperation with our Central Asian partners. Our collective agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan together constitute a logistical system termed the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) used to supply coalition operations in Afghanistan and taking pressure off the Pakistan lines of supply. This diverse network supports the transit of about half of all sustainment cargo to Afghanistan using a variety of sea, air, and land routes. The remaining supplies are flown directly into Afghanistan, trans-shipped from sealift to airlift, or arrive via surface routes through Pakistan. Ultimately, the development and expansion of the NDN and its associated infrastructure will facilitate long-term economic growth in the region, representing a new opportunity for export of Central and South Asia raw materials and exchange of goods in the international marketplace.

Enhancing the Northern Distribution Network: Future NDN efforts are centered on partnering with certain countries to permit two-way flow of all types of wheeled vehicles and associated repair parts, and to increase shipment of cargo already permitted on the NDN (such as building materials). In terms of airlift, Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan is a key Central Asian location that supports aerial refueling and passenger transit missions.

Building Partner Capacity and Pursuing Cooperative Activities

Cooperation Based on Shared Interests: The investment we make in our military-to-military engagement to build the capabilities of our partner nation’ security forces is a critical component of the whole-of-government efforts in the region. These cost-effective efforts properly place security responsibilities in the hands of other sovereign governments and help to prevent conflicts and instability. With a long-term perspective, CENTCOM carries out partnership activities designed to build strong security capacity and relationships with our friends in the region.

Training: CENTCOM’s training and exchanges with our partners are critical to our regional cooperation. CENTCOM has spearheaded the establishment of several Training Centers of Excellence hosted in partner nations, providing world-class mission-specific training for our allies and partners. Existing Centers of Excellence include an Air Warfare Center and an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center in the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center in Jordan; a NATO Partnership for Peace Combat Engineering and INTERPOL Counter Narcotics Center hosted in Kazakhstan; and an extensive array of associations with the other countries’ Professional Military Education programs. Developing Centers include a NAVCENT Maritime Center hosted in Bahrain; a new Explosives Ordinance Disposal school with future Center of Excellence in Saudi Arabia; a proposed Near East South Asia (NESA) branch Center of Excellence in Bahrain; and the Gulf Region Communications, Computer, Command, and Control (C4) Center of Excellence hosted by the Bahraini Minister of Communications.

Exchanges: CENTCOM manages and conducts focused engagement programs with specific partner nations located throughout the AOR in support of the CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan. The objective is to understand our friend’s views and to strengthen relationships and regional organizations to defeat violent extremist networks or situations that threaten the security interests of the region and the U.S. This includes capacity building. Additionally, CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, FL is host to over 193 coalition partners from 58 allied nations who make significant contributions to our efforts, and receive invaluable experience interacting with both US forces and our allies.

Equipping: We also provide equipment and security assistance to our regional partners. These activities are among the most important practical steps we can take to demonstrate CENTCOM’s enduring commitment to our partners – and to enable interoperable forces in the fight. I ask for continued congressional support of these efforts, including Global Train and Equip, as well as the many security assistance programs managed by the Department of State, including Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and IMET program. As Admiral Mullen noted in his testimony, our security assistance authorities are inflexible, and process are too cumbersome to effectively address today’s security challenges in a timely manner. We encourage ongoing efforts to streamline the Foreign Military Financing process in order to cement training and sustainment relations with our critical partners. Accomplishing our mission at CENTCOM requires that we demonstrate our responsiveness to the requests of our partners when we alone should not carry the increasing costs of defending the international order.

Exercises: The final pillar of CENTCOM’s partnership activities is our military exercise program. Exercises bolster interoperability between our forces and those of our partners. Each year, our Component Commands conducts more than 50 exercises with our partner nations in the region, including five overseen by CENTCOM Component Commands.

The Long-Term Value of our Exercise Program: The Combatant Commanders Exercise and Engagement program provides critical support to CENTCOM joint training support, exercise and engagement requirements in support of national-level strategic priorities, readiness, and building partnerships within the AOR. Since the beginning of our operations in Afghanistan in 2001, CENTCOM has seen reductions in our exercise program due to ongoing combat operations within the AOR. As combat operations are completed or reduced, restoring sufficient funding levels is critical to support engagement activities with our partners. Without restored funding levels, CENTCOM could lose the advantages gained from a robust exercise engagement program, affecting future access and presence within the AOR and our Theater Security Cooperation Plan. In the interim, we will work imaginatively to make the best use of our exercise budget.

Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations across the Region

Terrorists in False Religious Garb: The CENTCOM AOR is home to numerous violent extremist organizations (VEOs) comprising a network that, in its own right, represents a considerable threat to the U.S. homeland, U.S. and Western interests, and our allies in the region. The most significant of these is AQ. AQ seeks to impose its morally bankrupt ideology worldwide, and has regional affiliates across the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq, the Maghreb, and in Somalia (al-Shabaab), with associates including Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghanistan Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). The growing cross-organizational cooperation between VEOs replicates mafia syndicates. The organizational success of VEOs is frequently abetted by operating with near impunity in cyberspace.

Attacking VEOs: Along with our interagency and regional partners, CENTCOM continues to develop and implement theater-wide responses in the cyber and physical domains to disrupt and degrade militant networks. Over the past year, interagency efforts have resulted in designating al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and TTP as foreign terrorist organizations, obtaining a number of Treasury designations, Justice Department arrest warrants, Interpol notices, and placing over 100 individuals and entities on the U.S. Department of Commerce Denial List. Thanks to Congressional funding, the Defense Department Rewards Program has been used by commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan in Fiscal Year 2010 to capture more than 700 high-value individuals, insurgents and terrorists.

Preventing Security Vacuums: In the long-term, CENTCOM is working as a part of an integrated civil-military effort to prevent security vacuums that foment extremism and provide sanctuary to VEOs.

In Yemen, we have forged a tight bond between CENTCOM and our Embassy team in Sana’a to address the heightened threat of AQAP through long-term counterterrorism capacity-building. AQAP cemented its role as a viable and enduring threat to the U.S. Homeland by following-up the failed attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines flight 253 on 25 December 2009 with the “printer cartridge” parcel bomb plot in late October 2010. Radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi publicly spearheads AQAP’s campaign against the West, most notably by creating Inspire magazine in an effort to encourage Western-based Muslims and enable “lone wolf” style attacks.

In Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has had to navigate a challenging environment in which it does not yet have the monopoly of violence in much of the country. Our assistance has had substantive impact on the ground to include helping the LAF deploy four brigades to the south since 2006 in support of UNHCR 1701 – taking up space where Hezbollah had been. Additionally we have increased the capacity of the LAF Special Operations Forces that won a hard fought battle in 2007 against the al-Qaeda affiliated Fatah al-Islam movement in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon. The LAF sustained almost 200 killed and 2000 wounded in this operation. We value our close relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces officer corps based on mutual respect and confidence. We continue to monitor the government formation process in Lebanon and will need to examine the final composition, policies, and behaviors of the next government before making any decisions regarding our relationship, including security assistance, while recognizing that continued engagement with the LAF is an important step in securing its status as an apolitical, non-sectarian, and professional organization.

In Syria, the regime’s continuing support for terrorist organizations prevents CENTCOM from developing a military-to-military relationship and limits the scope of U.S. engagement. Consequently, we view the recent return of a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus as a vital piece of our regional security architecture. We stand ready to support Ambassador Ford’s diplomatic efforts to produce a more constructive relationship with Syria however we can, and we urge the Senate to confirm his nomination so that he may continue his important work beyond 2011.

Across the region, Theater Security Cooperation activities work against the ability of Iran and extremist elements to destabilize the region. Absent these programs, there is an increasing potential for security vacuums to arise and open the door to greater influence from Iran or violent actors. Our cooperative efforts with regional partners are essential to the long-term effort to address these threats.

Countering the Enemy’s Use of the Information Environment: Our enemies are using every available lever of the information environment to promulgate and reinforce their ideology – and, in league with our interagency partners, CENTCOM is committed to countering the efforts of our adversaries. Our enemies operate within cyberspace (and its associated relevant physical infrastructure) to plan, coordinate, recruit, train, equip, execute and garner support for operations against the U.S., its allies and interests. The recruitment of Umar Farouk Abdullmutallab, the unsuccessful Christmas Day Bomber, demonstrates our adversaries’ ability to reach across borders, promote their narrative, and defy traditional military constructs to achieve their objectives. Clearly, in the information age, our military must adapt to this new domain of warfare. We ask for the support of Congress to fund our programs that attempt to counter the enemy in the information domain, just as we need funding to disrupt violent extremists in the physical domain.

CENTCOM Activities in the Information Environment: Consistent with the guidance provided by Secretary Gates last December, we conduct Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which synchronizes and oversees all of our Information Operations activities. OEV seeks to disrupt recruitment and training of suicide bombers; deny safe havens for our adversaries; and counter extremist ideology and propaganda. Full funding of OEV supports all activities associated with degrading the enemy narrative, including web engagement and web-based product distribution capabilities. The effective engagement of our enemies in cyberspace requires the ability for us to conduct a full-spectrum of traditional military activities against them in that domain, including all aspects of Information Operations and Strategic Communication. We coordinate with the Joint Staff, the Interagency, the Intelligence Community, and our coalition partners to examine the adversary’s use of cyberspace and identify techniques, tactics and procedures we can use to counter the adversary in the cyber domain.

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Risk of WMD: At CENTCOM, we recognize the serious risk and potentially devastating ramifications of a terrorist group, violent extremist organization, or state actor acquiring, proliferating, or using WMD. The nexus between extremist groups, malign state actors, and WMD remains a critical concern throughout the AOR and presents a clear danger to our partners, allies, and the U.S. homeland. CENTCOM remains vigilant in executing the nonproliferation, counter proliferation, and foreign consequence management pillars of America’s National Strategy for Combating WMD.

Countering Proliferation and Combating WMD: Countering the proliferation of WMD-related material is a fundamental aspect of CENTCOM’s overall efforts to combat WMD. In concert with our regional partners, CENTCOM is involved with the interagency effort to curtail the ability of adversaries to finance the acquisition of WMD-related items and to deny malign actors the ability to transport suspect dual-use materials across national borders. To this end, CENTCOM plays a key role in containing Iran’s evident drive for nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty by actively enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions that sanction the Iranian regime. CENTCOM also supports the interdiction and counter proliferation framework under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). CENTCOM’s mainstay program for Combating WMD engagement is the Cooperative Defense Program (CDP). The CDP provides a series of bilateral and multilateral engagement activities to improve U.S. and partner nation interoperability while strengthening partner nations’ combating WMD capabilities.

Countering Piracy

The Real and Growing Threat of Piracy: Somali-based pirates continue to prey upon international shipping in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and on the high seas well into the Indian Ocean. Pirates are using previously captured vessels as mother ships to conduct successful attacks as far as 1400 nautical miles from the Somali coast. The number of successful pirate attacks has risen from 42 in 2008, to 51 in 2009, to 68 in 2010. Pirates now hold nearly 700 hostages for ransom. Multi-million dollar per ship ransoms ensure piracy remains a lucrative for pirates and others involved in this criminal enterprise.

A Model for International Cooperation: CENTCOM works with international partners to help patrol the region and to work with interagency partners to gain the prosecution of captured pirates (though we currently lack an international legal framework to detain and prosecute pirates). Piracy is a threat to all, and has promoted international military cooperation that serves as a model for cooperation in other areas. We acknowledge, however, that military action is only one part of the solution, but an essential element nonetheless. NAVCENT coordinates the efforts of over 25 contributing nations to combat piracy at sea and coordinates with European Union Task Force ATALANTA and NATO Standing Naval Maritime Group in Operation OCEAN SHIELD. Pakistan is currently in command of Combined Task Force 151, the international coalition to combat piracy. NAVCENT also hosts a monthly Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) conference in Bahrain to foster multi-national cooperation and to encourage maritime industry to adopt best practices to defend vessels against piracy. In addition to Coalition, NATO, and EU representation, the conferences also include civilian maritime organizations, and delegates from China, Russia, Japan, and India.

IV. Strategic Approach

Many of our challenges are interconnected and require comprehensive long-term solutions, prompting us to adopt an overall approach that is cooperative, integrated, and enduring. As we undertake a diverse range of operations and activities, three principles guide our efforts:

Adopting Cooperative Approaches by Partnering Based on Shared Interests: First, we must adopt cooperative approaches to solving shared challenges. America’s strength and security depends on our ability to help our friends in the region defend themselves, underscoring the importance of CENTCOM’s initiatives to build partner capacity and pursue bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Starting from our shared interests, we must capitalize on the comparative advantages of all participating nations – for instance, by taking advantage of unique geography or specialized capability. Ideally, such efforts would combine the political, economic, and security spheres of those who choose to participate, strengthening the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts. Our efforts to develop effective solutions for Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Gulf Region represent a significant example of the kind of cooperative efforts that are necessary to deter and defeat our common threats. As mentioned above, the international coalition to counter piracy in the Somali Basin is a model for multilateral cooperation in the region that not only addresses piracy but also offers opportunities for engagement in other areas.

Our ability to cooperate with our partners depends to a great extent on trust. As a consequence of the confidential diplomatic and military reporting made public by Wikileaks, we must patiently strengthen trust with our partners over time. We are up front with our partners about this episode – which has informed our enemies about supportive leaders as well as our tactics, techniques, and procedures. We remain committed, as ever, to forthright communication in pursuit of our shared objectives. We are reinforcing our efforts to ensure the security of our communications and focusing on enhancing mutually reinforcing objectives with allies and partners.

Integrating Our Efforts by Implementing Civil-Military Solutions: Second, the wars we are fighting today require intensively integrated, comprehensive approaches from the highest to the lowest levels, embracing diplomatic, information, military and economics in an interwoven effort that builds synergy. Promoting security and stability in the CENTCOM AOR cannot be achieved through military means alone. We must therefore look beyond just the traditional application of military power and integrate all elements of national power to address our many challenges. CENTCOM’s experience has shown that military might alone is not sufficient to deal with the challenges we confront along with our partners. Diplomacy and Development are just as vital as Defense in securing our national interests. CENTCOM support efforts to address the underlying conditions of instability that fuel current conflicts. Successful application of these instruments of national power, in turn, depends on our ability to achieve harmony within our civil-military relationships. As such, it is a security concern for us when diplomatic posts go unfilled in the region.

The overlapping forces at work in the CENTCOM AOR – those originating from within and outside the region – require exceptional cross-Combatant Command cooperation and coordination. We have achieved progress across AOR geographic seams, exemplified by cooperation with PACOM on matters dealing with China and India and cooperation with EUCOM on Russia, Turkey, and the MEPP. CENTCOM and PACOM regularly synchronize efforts to combat mutual challenges such as piracy, proliferation of WMD, and support to countering violent extremist organizations. Additionally, we continue to work closely with AFRICOM to address the state-failure in Somalia, as well as share critical assets to meet time-critical force requirements. Together we have established a counter-piracy Joint Operating Area in the Somali Basin. We team with U.S. Cyber Command to support global relationships in cyberspace and U.S. Northern Command to protect U.S. borders and domestic security. In all, the cross-Combatant Command effort is going very well.

Supporting Enduring Solutions by Demonstrating Long-term Commitment: Finally, our approach to the region must be enduring. Following through with our long-term commitments in the AOR improves the depth, breadth and quality of our relationships in the region and increases the likelihood of cooperation at the outset. In this region of the world, we are judged by our actions, not words. Individual instances of demonstrated trustworthiness on our part resonate throughout the region for decades. Enduring solutions to the problems that we face also depend on stability, steady economic growth and development in governance. To that end, CENTCOM supports our partners’ long-term efforts to grow economically and to develop effective and legitimate institutions of government.

V. Resourcing the Fight

Beyond the critical funding authorities highlighted above, accomplishing our mission requires that we fully and efficiently resource the following critical enablers. We appreciate Congressional support to provide our warfighters on the battlefront with the tools they need to accomplish their challenging missions. As we adapt to a thinking adversary, we recognize the need to accelerate our acquisition processes to enable us to out-maneuver our enemies. We also recognize the obligation to be good stewards of our nation’s monetary resources. CENTCOM has established stringent control mechanisms to execute our fiscal authorities and to apply the most effective oversight possible of all of our programs.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

An Indispensable Tool: There is a considerable and justifiable appetite for ISR capabilities in the CENTCOM AOR. In Afghanistan, persistent ISR capabilities represent one of the most important and effective force multipliers and contribute directly to protecting our troops from the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices through ISR. In cooperation with the ISR Task Force, we have augmented ISAF forces with a greatly increased capability to counter the Taliban and understand the environment in which we operate. Additionally, as we drawdown our forces from Iraq, we are adjusting the apportionment of ISR in a measured way to ensure that we retain adequate capability to support our force in Iraq while we provide the necessary resources to Afghanistan and elsewhere. We continue to refine our ability to fully integrate U.S. and coalition ISR to deny transnational extremist organizations safe haven, training bases, or staging areas to conduct attacks.

Enhancing ISR Capabilities: We greatly appreciate the support of Congress and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology in meeting the ongoing demand for more rapidly delivered ISR collection, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. Interrelated with our ISR needs, we recognize a need to further enhance integration and synergy between aviation and ground elements that is critical to Combat Air Support and counterinsurgency doctrine. We support a limited objective experiment to refine the requirement for a manned, armed ISR asset attuned to the unique challenges of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Continued investments in ISR technology, infrastructure, architecture, tools, and personnel (particularly trained ISR managers) help us to build on the significant gains we have achieved in the CENTCOM AOR – and enable us to use the arsenal of ISR capabilities currently in the field.

Critical Intelligence Capabilities: Human intelligence and counterintelligence are just as important as technical solutions to remotely gather intelligence, especially in the conduct of operations in wars among the people. Such intelligence activities are inherently government functions that require a long lead time to develop. CENTCOM is posturing for sustained application of our human intelligence capabilities to afford us insights into adversary plans and intentions. CENTCOM is posturing for sustained application of our human intelligence capabilities to afford us insights into adversary plans and intentions. We are also reshaping our counterintelligence forces to face threats from hostile foreign intelligence services and VEOs that employ sophisticated cyber techniques and trusted insiders to penetrate our networks and compromise our operations.

Improving Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

The Enemy’s Weapon of Choice: Now and for the foreseeable future, the enemy is using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to kill and maim our troops. These devices remain the greatest risk facing U.S. and Coalition forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility. In Afghanistan, IED attacks account for more than 60 percent of the U.S. and Coalition force casualties, though IED casualties have steadily decreased over the past six months. The flow of lethal aid, migration of IED technology and materials, and development of new tactics techniques and procedures represents a global threat. Homemade explosives, which now account for an estimated 85% of all IEDs, coupled with the proliferation of commercially available IED materials and commercial grade explosives make them relatively cheap and easy to build and employ.

Ongoing Interagency C-IED Efforts: CENTCOM counters the threat of IEDs by working together with all Services and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The Services continue to equip U.S. and coalition forces with the latest technology to mitigate and defeat IEDs. Thanks to Congress and the Department of Defense, CENTCOM and our national and international partners have delivered and fielded an unprecedented number of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected family of vehicles throughout Afghanistan. These vehicles have proven critical to safeguarding the tactical mobility of our warriors in harm’s way. CENTCOM, in conjunction with the C-IED Senior Integration Group, and JIEDDO have recently fielded a variety of C-IED enablers that have proven to save lives on the battlefield. As a result, we are finding and clearing more IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan – at a rate above 60 percent for the last 12 months and 70 percent over the last quarter of 2010. These improvements are due in part to more tips from the population, better tactics, and additional enablers, including the effective use of additional ISR provided by the Services to counter this threat.

Attacking the Network: We are going after the entire IED network and insurgent supply lines. Many of our recent successes have come in the use of persistent systems emplaced throughout significant threat areas to help develop insights into the local area. We are concurrently protecting the force using trained dogs, mine rollers, jammers, and handheld devices; the Marines in southern Afghanistan now employ nearly one dog per squad, and soon we will have more than 600 working dogs in Afghanistan. Along with the Services, JIEDDO, and academia we will continue to do everything in our power to ensure our service members and coalition partners have the best technology and training available to defeat the IED threat.

Supporting Additional C-IED Efforts: We continue to call on the defense industry to provide innovative solutions to counter the threat of IEDs. Critical airlift and airdrop sorties dramatically reduce the number of service members exposed to the IED threat. In fact, the number of pounds of supplies airdropped in Afghanistan has doubled every year since 2005, with an astonishing recovery rate of better than 98 percent. Not all critical movements can be completed by air however. We ask that Congress continue to fund those organizations that provide research and development for the evolution of new and existing counter-IED systems and technologies, especially in areas of pre-detonation, IED stand-off detection, and non-lethal weapons to deny the enemy the ability to deliver or emplace IEDs. We also ask that Congress provide the flexibility to rapidly and proactively counter new, emerging, and future threats that are either present on the battle field or potential threats that represent vulnerability and would be difficult to counter.

Unity of Command and Control of C5 Networks

Coalition, Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C5) networks that meet the challenging demands of our troops in theater are essential to CENTCOM. Currently, the command and control of networks available to our deployed forces is divided among Services, Agencies and Combatant Commands, resulting in degraded and delayed actions that have allowed our adversaries to exploit this fundamental cyber shortfall for too long. One bright network spot, however, is the Afghan Mission Network, which enables US and Coalition forces and civilians to remain connected and synchronized on the battlefield and linked to supporting assets throughout the world. We seek Congressional support to enable effective integration and extension of networks to wherever we fight, from maritime environments to the aerial layer and over rugged mountainous terrain.

VI. Conclusion

In closing, we greatly appreciate the support of Congress on behalf of America’s military personnel serving in the CENTCOM region. The stalwart Americans in today’s force have been fighting two wars for nearly ten years in the CENTCOM AOR. With remarkable spirit, they look beyond the ambiguity and longevity of today’s complex, demanding operations and answer their country’s call. Their courage, character and commitment in the face of repeated deployments are inspiring. As their Commander, I am proud to serve alongside them. Thank you very much for your unflagging support of our troops in harm’s way and their families here at home.

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