



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~  
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE—OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO AE 09306

IR-IO

1 MARCH 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Paul E. Funk II, Commander, CJTF-OIR, Appointing Authority

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Executive Summary – AR 15-6 Green on Blue Incident/Line of Duty – (b)(1)1.4a

1. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) BLUF. The following is the executive summary of the investigation conducted to ascertain the facts and circumstances surrounding a potential Green on Blue incident that occurred in the vicinity of the (b)(1)1.4a on 17 February 2018. My assessment is that this was an isolated incident. The Marine shot by the (b)(1)1.4d Guard, (b)(6) was in the line of duty, and the Marine who responded by shooting the (b)(1)1.4d Guard, (b)(6) acted appropriately and proportionately to the threat and situation. However, I cannot determine conclusively if (b)(6) was shot intentionally by the (b)(1)1.4d Guard, or if he was shot as the result of a negligent discharge. Regardless, I assess that (b)(6) believing himself in imminent danger, reacted appropriately based on the conditions and observed actions of the (b)(1)1.4d Guard. Furthermore, I assess that the (b)(1)1.4d and U.S. relationship/partnership at (b)(1)1.4a in the D-ISIS campaign will not be impacted by this incident – partner operations at (b)(1)1.4a returned to normal within 96 hours of the incident. While cause for concern, there is no evidence that the situation in (b)(1)1.4d was the motivation for this incident.

2. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Background. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

The two Marines involved in the shooting were (b)(6) one of the Sergeants of the Guard (SOG) and (b)(6) one of the Corporals of the Guard (COG) as part of the Marine SECFOR on (b)(1)1.4a. The (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) (b)(6) were off

their SOG/COG shifts and checking on Marines at their fighting positions. The (b)(1)1.4d Guard was on duty, and although not initially seen by the Marines, he was in vicinity of his assigned post.

3. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Summary of Incident. At approximately 1650z (b)(6)

(b)(6) approached the MRAP position. (b)(6) was on the

driver's side of the MRAP (west side) and (b)(6) approached the rear of the

vehicle when the (b)(1)1.4d Guard approached (b)(6) and offered him a cigarette.

(b)(6) greeted the (b)(1)1.4d Guard but declined the cigarette, and reports possibly

shaking the (b)(1)1.4d Guards hand before turning east and walking towards the MRAP. At

this point (b)(6) was

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shot in the back of his left leg by the (b)(1)1.4d Guard and immediately fell to the ground. (b)(6) (b)(6) heard the shots and turned to see the (b)(1)1.4d Guard's weapon (AK-47) in his shoulder and pointed towards (b)(6); he further reports that the (b)(1)1.4d Guard oriented the AK-47 on him. (b)(6) reported feeling threatened, believed (b)(6) (b)(6) was dead, and immediately engaged the (b)(1)1.4d Guard with two rounds to the chest from less than 15 feet away. The exchange happening in a matter of seconds. After engaging, (b)(6) immediately kicked away the (b)(1)1.4d Guard's weapon, confirmed he was no longer a threat, began treating (b)(6) injuries by apply a tourniquet, verbally directed the Marine Guard in the MRAP to radio in the situation, and then fireman-carried (b)(6) to the FST approximately 100 meters away.

4. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Key Facts. (b)(1)1.4d and U.S. personnel confirmed positive atmospherics between (b)(1)1.4d and U.S. personnel. The investigation revealed that there were no notable negative interactions between personnel prior to the incident, and that there were no expressed negative sentiments towards coalition presence in (b)(1)1.4d. The (b)(1)1.4d leadership claim that the (b)(1)1.4d Guard had a negligent discharge into the ground and that a ricochet caused the injuries to (b)(6), but no (b)(1)1.4d personnel were witnesses to the shooting. Additionally, the U.S. FST Surgeon reports two direct fire entry/exit wounds to (b)(6) left leg discrediting the (b)(1)1.4d ricochet theory. Per (b)(1)1.4d Policy, the (b)(1)1.4d Guard's weapon's status was in violation of their policy with a round in the chamber at the time of the shooting. The (b)(1)1.4d Guard's phone was recovered (b)(1)1.4c. Nothing discovered (b)(1)1.4c indicated there was a plot to commit an attack or a connection to ISIS influence. Both (b)(6) (b)(6) were in the prescribed uniform and weapons conditions conducting checks of fighting positions.

5. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Findings. After carefully considering the evidence, I find that (b)(6) was in the line of duty – touring Marine fighting positions, and in the uniform, and weapon status prescribed by the chain of command. Secondly, I find that (b)(6) actions were appropriate and proportionate to the threat. (b)(6) (b)(6) testified that after the (b)(1)1.4d Guard shot (b)(6), the (b)(1)1.4d Guard immediately oriented his weapon toward (b)(6). This caused (b)(6) to feel threatened and per the rules of engagement, he justifiably shot the (b)(1)1.4d Guard based on hostile act and intent displayed. Further, I find the (b)(1)1.4d Guard motive for shooting is inconclusive – a possible intentional shooting or negligent discharge. The most plausible explanation is an intentional shooting based on (b)(6) testimony. But, it is also possible the (b)(1)1.4d Guard spun towards (b)(6) after a negligent discharge without the intent to engage. Finally, I find that all applicable U.S. policies and procedures were adhered to in the course of events that unfolded on 17 February 2018.

6. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Recommendations. In view of the findings, I recommend that no further investigation is required, as it is unlikely that any further investigation will reveal the true motive of the deceased (b)(1)1.4d Guard's actions or contradict (b)(6) actions as justified or alter

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the (b)(1)1.4d perception of the incident. Secondly, I recommend (b)(6) be commended for his heroic actions. Within a matter of seconds he reacted to an immediate threat less than 15 feet away, maintained his composure in the face of danger, had the presence to immediately administer lifesaving aid, notify U.S. forces of other potential threats and carry (b)(6) to the FST. Next, I recommend (b)(6) be commended for his leadership in de-escalating the situation while continuing to support D-ISIS (b)(1)1.4d maneuver in the (b)(1)1.4a. Immediately following the incident (b)(6) ensured his team continued to provide support for (b)(1)1.4d maneuver while gathering enough information to conduct KLEs with the (b)(1)1.4d to de-escalate the situation. The (b)(1)1.4d recognized (b)(6) actions as the continued commitment to the partnered D-ISIS mission and believe it contributed to de-escalating the event. Finally, I recommend we continue to exercise vigilance against the potential for insider threats in all partnered force operations. While an isolated incident, it doesn't change the realities of operating with partners in a complex and hostile environment. As the conflict progresses, tensions and patience could deteriorate, therefore it is important that the leadership continue to reiterate vigilance, and the potential for future incidents. Doing so will yield similar responses like those of (b)(6)

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and by SVOIP at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Investigating Officer

# CJTF-OIR

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE- OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



## POSSIBLE GREEN ON BLUE 15-6 INVESTIGATION 11 MAR 18





# Outline

- Summary of the incident
- Key Facts
- Findings
- Recommendations
- Key Takeaways
- Back up Slides
  - Timeline of Investigation
  - Photos

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# Key Facts

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## Shooting:

- [redacted] (b)(6) are only living witnesses.
- [redacted] (b)(6) was shot from behind as he walked away from greeting the [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard.
- [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) leadership claims the shooting is a result of a negligent discharge from the [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard.
- [redacted] (b)(6) did not see [redacted] (b)(6) get shot, only heard the shots, turned and observed the [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard's weapon aimed at [redacted] (b)(6), and then observed the [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard sweep the weapon toward himself.

## Follow On Actions:

- Evidence recovered: 3x 5.56mm and 2x 7.62mm casings, cell phone from the deceased [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard.
- [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard weapon (AK-47) confirmed fired by [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) leadership. 2x 7.62mm rounds missing from magazine.
- [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4c, (b)(1)(1.4d)
- Follow on KLEs between [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4a) CDR and [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) leadership directly contributed to de-escalating the situation, allowing D-ISIS operations to continue immediately, and facilitated [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) and U.S. partnership on [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4a) to return to pre-incident conditions.

## Policies/Procedures:

- No U.S. Policy/procedural violations.
- [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard position on the night of the incident only manned by one person – normally 2-3 at night.
- [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard violated weapons policy. His weapon status—condition 1 – magazine in weapon round in chamber counter to [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) policy. [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Policy is for weapons status—condition 3—magazine inserted with no round in chamber.

## Atmosphere/Interactions:

- No negative U.S. sentiments from [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) personnel observed prior to incident.
- [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d, (b)(6)
- No reported negative interactions between parties involved in the incident – deceased [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4d) Guard, [redacted] (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(6) and U.S. Marine leadership reported a generally positive atmosphere between U.S. and [redacted] (b)(1)(1.4a, (b)(1)(1.4d)

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# Findings

(b)(6) was in the Line of Duty at the time of the incident.

- Touring Marine fighting positions after his Sergeant of the Guard (SOG) shift was authorized and encouraged.
- Was in authorized uniform, operating in pairs with (b)(6) and in appropriate weapons status.

(b)(6) actions were appropriate and proportional to the threat / situation.

- Testified hearing the shots, observing the (b)(1)1.4d Guard's weapon aimed at (b)(6), and fired on the (b)(1)1.4d Guard when the (b)(1)1.4d Guard swept his weapon towards himself.
- (b)(6) felt the threat to himself was imminent, and IAW SROE – right to self defense – engaged the (b)(1)1.4d Guard.
- (b)(6) used appropriate and proportionate force – 2 rounds to eliminate the threat.

**Motive for Shooting Inconclusive: Possibilities – Intentional or negligent discharge.**

- Most plausible explanation is an intentional shooting based on (b)(6) testimony. However, no reported arguments or negative interactions between (b)(1)1.4d and U.S. forces on (b)(1)1.4d
- (b)(1)1.4d leadership attest to (b)(1)1.4d Guard loyalty and claim a negligent discharge impacting into the ground and ricochets caused injuries to (b)(6). However, (b)(6) wounds do not support this – Surgeon confirmed two entry/exit wounds from 7.62mm rounds consistent with a direct impact.
- Although (b)(1)1.4d leadership claim the (b)(1)1.4d Guard had a negligent discharge, they also believe (b)(6) responded appropriately.
- No evidence of derogatory information, negative U.S. sentiments, or ISIS sympathy/support was found (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
- It is possible the (b)(1)1.4d Guard spun towards (b)(6) after a negligent discharge without the intent to engage. Regardless, (b)(6) responded appropriately – he perceived himself in danger.

**U.S. personnel adhered to policies and procedures.**

- (b)(6) adhered to CJCSI 3121.01b SROE – inherent right to self defense in response to hostile act or intent.
- No reports of previous incidents between either (b)(6) and deceased (b)(1)1.4d Guard.
- Weapons status and buddy team procedures briefed and adhered to by U.S. Marine SECFOR personnel.



# Recommendations.

## No further investigation is required.

- Based on the totality of the evidence available and the thorough investigation, it is unlikely that any further investigation will reveal the true motive of the deceased (b)(1)1.4d Guard's actions, contradict (b)(6) actions as justified, or alter the (b)(1)1.4d perception of the incident.

## (b)(6) be commended for his heroic actions on 17 February 2018.

- Within a matter of seconds (b)(6) reacted to an immediate threat, maintained his composure in the face of imminent danger, had the presence to immediately administer medical aid to his fellow Marine, and notify U.S. forces of other potential threats. The nature of the incident highlights (b)(6) professionalism and heroism.

## (b)(6) be commended for his leadership in de-escalating the situation while continuing to support D-ISIS (b)(1)1.4d

### maneuver in the (b)(1)1.4a

- (b)(6) immediately understood the importance of maintaining a safe environment for the U.S. service members under his charge and maintaining a vital relationship in our D-ISIS efforts. His efforts during the follow on KLEs highlighted the strong relationship he built with the (b)(1)1.4d leadership, his competence, and maturity.

## Continue training and education on ROE during pre-deployment and deployed sustainment training.

- (b)(6) actions are a direct result of his training and should be used as an example of what to do and the importance of pre-deployment situational training and deployed sustainment training.

## Continue to exercise vigilance against the potential for insider threats in all partnered force operations.

- While it appears this was an isolated incident, it doesn't change the realities of operating with partners in a complex and hostile environment. As the conflict progresses, tensions and patience could deteriorate, therefore it is important that the leadership continue to reiterate vigilance, and the potential for future incidents. Doing so will yield similar responses like those of (b)(6)

# CJTF-OIR

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE- OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



## BACK – UP SLIDES





# Summarized Timeline / Chain of Events

17 February 2018

Time (Z)	Event	Time (Z)	Event
1200	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) begin their SOG/COG duties/shifts.</li></ul>	1715	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) searches the deceased [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 Guard and seizes cell phone and recovers spent casings (2 x 7.62mm and 3 x 5.56mm).</li></ul>
1330	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) on their plan tour fighting positions after they conclude their tours.</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 Guard is brought to FST on litter.</li></ul>
1600	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) finish their SOG/COG shifts.</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 Guard pronounced dead on arrival by FST Surgeon.</li></ul>
1650	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) begin their tour of fighting positions.</li></ul>	1800	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) stabilized.</li></ul>
1650	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) is shot by the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 Guard.</li><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) engages and kills the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 Guard.</li><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) moves to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 Guard, kicks weapon away, then begins providing CLS aid to [REDACTED] (b)(6).</li></ul>	1820	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MEDEVAC 9 Line sent.</li></ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) calls for a Corpsman.</li><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) hear the gunshots, place U.S. personnel on the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 on a heightened alert posture.</li></ul>	1900	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MEDEVAC wheels down at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a</li></ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) to FST. He is met on the way by [REDACTED] (b)(6)</li></ul>	1910	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MEDEVAC wheels up.</li></ul>
1652	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• FST Surgeon initiates treatment of [REDACTED] (b)(6)</li></ul>		<div>Within 24 Hours of Incident</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a conducts 3X KLEs with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 Leadership.</li><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 Guard Force replaced.</li><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(6) relocated to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a</li><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a</li></ul>
			<div>Within 96 Hours of Incident</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d</li><li>• Return to normalcy at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a</li></ul>

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7 MARCH 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Paul E. Funk II, Commander, CJTF-OIR, Appointing Authority

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into – Green on Blue Incident – (b)(1)1.4a  
(b)(1)1.4a on 17 February 2018 – Report of Investigation

1. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) On 19 February 2018, you appointed me to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the Green on Blue incident that occurred in the vicinity of the (b)(1)1.4a on 17 February 2018. The suspense for my completed investigation and report is 11 March 2018.

2. (U) Chronological Narrative of the Events.

a. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Situation. (b)(6) U.S. Marine Corps (U.S.M.C.) and (b)(6) U.S.M.C., were on post as Sergeant of the Guard (SOG) and Corporal of the Guard (COG) from 1200 to 1600z<sup>1</sup> on 17 February 2018 at (b)(1)1.4a – no incidents were reported during this shift. At approximately 1330, (b)(6) briefed the Platoon Sergeant, (b)(6) (b)(6) U.S.M.C., that after they completed their duties they would tour the fighting positions to perform welfare checks on the Marines manning the positions. (b)(6) (b)(6) planned the first stop at the static Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle position, manned by (b)(6) U.S.M.C., providing over-watch of the (b)(1)1.4a manned western Entry Control Point (ECP). (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g  
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

b. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Shooting. At approximately 1650 (b)(6) moved towards the MRAP position, slightly staggered with (b)(6) ahead of (b)(6). Both (b)(6) noticed the (b)(1)1.4d LNO position southeast of (b)(6). The position was unmanned as they approached the MRAP. (b)(6) moved up to the west side of the MRAP and approached the door to turn the vehicle off. At this point, a previously unnoticed (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard appeared from the west of the position. (b)(6) remained on the south side of the MRAP and had a brief interaction with the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard that appeared. (b)(6) declined the cigarette offered to him by the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard, greeted him, and may have shaken his hand. As (b)(6) turned to walk towards the MRAP, he was shot twice from behind by the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard in the lower left leg above the knee. Upon hearing the shots, (b)(6) turned to see the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard's weapon aimed at (b)(6).

<sup>1</sup> All times referenced are in Zulu. Time at incident location is Zulu +2

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(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

on 17 February 2018 – Report of Investigation

before sweeping his weapon towards (b)(6). Upon recognizing this, (b)(6) immediately engaged the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard from approximately 15 feet striking him in the chest with a controlled pair of shots. (b)(6) does not recall firing a third shot. Once (b)(6) identified the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard no longer posed a threat, he moved towards the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard, kicked away his weapon, and immediately began to treat (b)(6) injuries. Upon securing a tourniquet, (b)(6) instructed (b)(6) to call for a Corpsman and evacuated (b)(6) to the Forward Surgical Team (FST). (b)(6) reported both shootings occurred within a manner of seconds.

c. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Immediate Reaction. (b)(6) heard the gun shots and reported shots fired and the need for a Corpsman at his position but reported not being able to see the incident because of his location on the MRAP. Between approximately 1650-1655 (b)(6) and senior U.S. service member at (b)(1)1.4a heard the gunshots from the direction of the ECP over-watch position, then immediately instructed U.S. personnel to assume a heightened alert status, and facilitated (b)(6) evacuation of (b)(6).

d. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Follow-on actions. The following are the series of events executed by U.S. and (b)(1)1.4d personnel and leadership following the shooting.

- 1652: (b)(6) arrives at the FST and is examined by (b)(6), FST Trauma Surgeon.
- 1700-1715: (b)(6) searches the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard, seizes his cell phone, and collects expended 5.56mm casings (3) and 7.62mm casings (2).
- (b)(6) pronounces the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard dead upon arrival at the FST.
- 1800: (b)(6) determines (b)(6) is in stable condition.
- 1820: 9 Line MEDEVAC request submitted via mIRC chat from the (b)(1)1.4a TOC.
- 1900-1910: Air MEDEVAC arrives and departs (b)(1)1.4a with (b)(6) to the Combat Surgical Hospital (CSH) at the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC).
- 17-18FEB18: (b)(1)1.4a leadership at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) conducts (3) KLEs with (b)(1)1.4d leadership to de-escalate the situation.
- 18FEB18: (b)(6) is transferred to (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4d leadership replaced the entire element of (b)(1)1.4d LNO guards at (b)(1)1.4a.
- 19FEB18: CJTF appoints the Green on Blue 15-6 investigation members.
- 20FEB18: 15-6 Investigation Team interviews (b)(6) at the CSH on BDSC.
- 21FEB18: Atmosphere at (b)(1)1.4a returns to normalcy based on assessment of (b)(1)1.4a leadership at (b)(1)1.4a.
- 21FEB18: (b)(6) evacuated to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC), Germany.
- 22-23 FEB18: 15-6 Investigation Team conducts interviews at (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a.



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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into – Green on Blue Incident –

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

on 17 February 2018 – Report of Investigation

e. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ U.S. and (b)(1)1.4d Actions. Within 24 hours of the incident, (b)(6) (b)(6) conducted (3) Key Leader Engagements with the (b)(1)1.4d leadership to discuss the situation, identify what transpired, and agree on a way forward. The (b)(1)1.4d immediately informed (b)(6) of the intent to conduct their own investigation and agreed to share their findings. (b)(6) reiterated the importance of their joint mission in the (b)(1)1.4a against ISIS and stressed the need to run any investigations in parallel with ongoing operations. He highlighted the continued strikes against ISIS as an example of the U.S. resolve towards this course of action. (b)(6) also informed the (b)(1)1.4d of an external investigation and that (b)(6) had been transferred. The (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) that their investigation revealed this to be an isolated incident as a result of a negligent discharge. However, they acknowledged (b)(6) (b)(6) was injured by the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard's weapon and fully accept (b)(6) reaction as appropriate and justified given the situation and conditions. Details from the KLEs can be found in Exhibit R. During an interview with the investigation team, (b)(6) acknowledged heightened tensions on (b)(1)1.4a immediately following the incident. However, that did not detract from D-ISIS operations in the (b)(1)1.4a and he reported the atmosphere at (b)(1)1.4a returned to normal – i.e. pre-incident conditions – within 96 hours.

### 3. (U) Answers to Questions from Appointment Orders.

a. (U) Determine what events transpired and then determine why the events transpired as they did. Include any information regarding negative interactions, if any, between the personnel involved in the incident or their units.

(1) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ A uniformed (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard engaged (b)(6) (b)(6) at or about 1650 on 17 February 2018 on (b)(1)1.4a firing two 7.62mm caliber rounds into his left leg above the knee. (b)(6) heard the shots, observed the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard postured to re-engage (b)(6) and subsequently engaged and killed the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard. There is insufficient evidence to determine why the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard engaged (b)(6) There is no evidence of previous negative interactions between coalition forces and (b)(1)1.4d personnel at (b)(1)1.4a See Exhibit A for greater detail.

(2) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Two unrelated interactions which are notable transpired; 1) there was an incident where a (b)(1)1.4d guard chambered a round and approached a Marine while on post, and, 2) on or about 15 February 2018 the (b)(1)1.4d outer cordon let a vehicle with wounded civilians enter the (b)(1)1.4a for treatment at the FST. Initially the (b)(1)1.4d LNOs did not want the vehicle to proceed, but U.S. forces interjected and allowed the civilians to be treated at the FST. (b)(6) (b)(6) stated he believed the (b)(1)1.4d might have taken issue with this event. Regarding the treatment of civilians, (b)(6) did not specifically describe this as a negative interaction between U.S. Forces and (b)(1)1.4d personnel. Regarding the round-chambering incident, the U.S. personnel involved related that this situation was deescalated quickly and was not a significant concern. The (b)(1)1.4d Soldier involved in this incident was not the same (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard killed on 17 February 2018. (Exhibits E-L).

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(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

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b. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Did the U.S. personnel involved have any previous interactions with any of the (b)(1)1.4d personnel involved? For example, did they work together on previous assignments or did this incident represent their first significant interaction? Generally, the Marines at (b)(1)1.4a had limited interactions with the (b)(1)1.4d. Though occurring daily, these interactions were limited in nature to exchanging greetings and seeing one another in passing. Specifically, (b)(6) had never seen or interacted with the deceased (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard before. It is possible that (b)(6) and the deceased (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard interacted at (b)(1)1.4d but (b)(6) does not recall seeing him before. (Exhibit C, J).

c. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Did any of the personnel involved express negative opinions or sentiments about the coalition presence (b)(1)1.4d? No. The investigation revealed that there were no expressed negative sentiments towards coalition presence (b)(1)1.4d. The Marines related the (b)(1)1.4d demeanor changed slightly after the situation in Afrin developed and that there was a period of familiarization between the Marines and the (b)(1)1.4d when a new group of (b)(1)1.4d LNO guards would rotate into (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits E-L)

d. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Determine the exact location of the incident and timeline of events. (b)(1)1.4a For a graphical timeline, see Exhibit A.

e. (U) Identify all U.S./Coalition Force personnel involved in the incident, their duties, and the relationship between units in the area.

(1) (U) The following U.S. personnel were involved:

(b)(6)

(2) (U) The following U.S. units were involved:

(b)(1)1.4a



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

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(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4a

f. (U) Identify all non-U.S./Coalition Force or Partner Force involved in the incident, including relevant descriptions of their uniforms, training, background, equipment, weapons, specific mission or duties at the time.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

g. (U) Determine if any evidence was collected by U.S. personnel, the (b)(1)1.4d or any other individuals or entities in the immediate aftermath of the incident.

(1) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ U.S. Personnel: One cell phone, 3X 5.56mm round casings, and 2X 7.62mm round casings were collected.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

Nothing discovered

(b)(1)1.4a

indicated there was a plot to commit an attack or a connection to ISIS

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

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(b)(1)1.4a

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influence. Second, round casings recovered at the scene are consistent with witness statements of the events that transpired. Finally, the (b)(1)1.4d Soldier was brought to the FST and, upon arrival, was pronounced dead by the FST Trauma Surgeon from two gunshot wounds to the chest. (Exhibits I, M, P, R).

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4d The AK47 weapon and magazine were recovered by the (b)(1)1.4d and they were shown to the (b)(6) to verify that the magazine was missing two rounds, and the weapon's barrel smelled of gunpowder. The (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard's body was recovered by the (b)(1)1.4d (Exhibit R).

(3) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The (b)(1)1.4d investigation: (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) believes that the deceased (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard had a negligent discharge and that the rounds hit the ground and ricocheted into (b)(6) leg. A ricochet is inconsistent with (b)(6) statement and the medical examination and treatment of (b)(6) wounds by the FST. (Exhibits O, R).

h. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Obtain copies of any collateral investigations or existing medical records. Medical records of (b)(6) were obtained. See Exhibit S. The FST Surgeon at (b)(1)1.4a examined the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard and pronounced him dead. Further, the FST Surgeon provided a written statement to the (b)(1)1.4a Commander outlining the injuries sustained by (b)(6) and the location of the gunshot wounds, to include entry and exit locations. This statement was translated by the (b)(1)1.4a interpreter, signed by the FST Surgeon and provided to the (b)(1)1.4d. The (b)(1)1.4d leadership personally informed the Investigating Officer of the outcome of their investigation. Copies of the (b)(1)1.4d investigation were requested through the (b)(1)1.4a commander, but to date, have not been provided by the (b)(1)1.4d (Exhibits I, N, R).

i. (U) Determine what, if any, procedures, policies, and regulations applied in the conduct of all the personnel involved in the incident and whether they were adhered to. All U.S. local policies, procedures and regulations were adhered to in this incident.

(1) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE): The investigation revealed (b)(6) actions were consistent with the SROE in this incident. The (b)(1)1.4a Commander did not limit any personnel's individual right to self-defense. (b)(6) perceived a hostile act and hostile intent from the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard and responded decisively. He ceased engaging the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard when the threat was eliminated. (Exhibits I, L).

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Local policies and guidance regarding post checks: Per the local guard procedures it is common practice for the off-duty SOG and COG to check Marine fighting positions. I find that these policies are permissible and reasonable and there were no violations. Marines brief the senior leadership, conduct their checks in buddy-pairs, maintain communications with the Operations Center and are in the appropriate weapons condition, which was weapons condition 1 (magazine inserted, round in the chamber). (Exhibits E, J, K).



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(3) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4d Policy: The (b)(1)1.4d LNO sentries are supposed to be in weapons condition 3 (magazine inserted, no round in the chamber). The (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard in this incident was not in the appropriate weapons condition. (Exhibits O, R).

j. (U) Make a determination as to whether the injuries sustained by U.S. service members involved were in the line of duty. There is no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that (b)(6) was in the line of duty.

4. (U) **Findings.** After carefully considering the evidence, I find that:

a. (U) (b)(6) was in the line of duty and his injuries were not due to the member's own misconduct. The investigation did not reveal any evidence to rebut his line of duty status; (b)(6) actions of touring Marine fighting positions after his SOG shift were appropriate and approved by his leadership. Additionally, there is no evidence (b)(6) had any previous altercations or a negative relationship with any (b)(1)1.4d member that would have provoked this incident.

b. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(6) actions were appropriate and proportionate to the threat presented by the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard. (b)(6) testified that after the (b)(1)1.4d LNO guard shot (b)(6) the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard immediately oriented his weapon toward (b)(6) (Exhibit L). This caused (b)(6) to feel threatened and per the rules of engagement, he justifiably shot the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard based on hostile act and intent displayed. Finally, (b)(6) responded proportionately based on the threat in that he fired rounds to eliminate the threat and nothing more – follow on examination of the deceased confirmed two fatal wounds to the chest. (Exhibit L). (b)(6) does not recall firing the third round but does acknowledge a third round was fired based on recovered casings and round counts of his magazine. (Exhibit L, N).

c. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ It is inconclusive as to why the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard shot (b)(6) (b)(6) There is both circumstantial and direct evidence that supports multiple possibilities for this incident and why/how it occurred.

(1) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ There is no overwhelming evidence that supports one possibility over another, even though the more plausible explanation, based on the testimony of (b)(6) is an intentional shooting. Regardless of the potential explanations for the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard's motivation or the proximate cause of the shooting, I find the evidence is ultimately inconclusive as to why (b)(6) was shot. Given the nature of the circumstances, I cannot, by a preponderance of the evidence, assess why (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard discharged his weapon.

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(b)(1)1.4a

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(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The (b)(1)1.4d leadership claim a negligent discharge from the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard initiated the incident. (Exhibit O). They further support this assessment with a lack of intelligence/indicators that the deceased (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard harbored negative sentiments towards U.S. service members or sympathetic views towards ISIS. (Exhibit R). Lack of derogatory information from the (b)(1)1.4a and a lack of negative interactions between the (b)(1)1.4d and U.S. forces supports this theory. (Exhibits C, E-L, T). However, (b)(6) testimony, and the circumstantial the fact the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard likely had a round chambered in violation of the weapons status policy for (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard personnel, contradict this potentiality. (Exhibits L, R). Furthermore, (b)(6) wounds are clearly indicative of direct entry of two 7.62mm rounds and not a ricochet as the (b)(1)1.4d claim (Exhibit S). Thus, while there is evidence that supports the possibility of a negligent discharge, there is also direct and circumstantial evidence that discredits that possibility.

(3) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The investigation also revealed evidence to support an intentional shooting. First, (b)(6) described the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard as postured to engage both (b)(6) and himself during the incident. (Exhibit L). Regarding a potential motive, there is always the potential that the deceased (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard harbored some resentment or assigned blame to the U.S. for the current conflict (b)(1)1.4d (Exhibit G, I). (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d However, similar to the analysis in paragraph 4.c.(2) above, there is also evidence that undercuts the theory that this was intentional. Statements from (b)(6) describe the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard being approximately 4 feet away from (b)(6), and the fact that (b)(6) was not wearing body armor. (Exhibits C, L). Had the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard intended to kill (b)(6), it would have been exceedingly easy for him to do so at that distance. It is also possible that the (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard did in fact have a negligent discharge and turned towards (b)(6) out of shock with his weapon in hand, which appeared to be aggressive in nature.

d. (U) All applicable U.S. policies and procedures were adhered to in the course of events that unfolded on 17 February 2018.

(1) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The ROE provides that military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. (b)(6) did not place any limits on individual self-defense, rather he directed the Marines at (b)(1)1.4a to eliminate any hostile act/intent due to the threat of ISIS infiltration. (Exhibit I). (b)(6) actions were in accordance with the SROE, for the reasons stated in paragraph 4.b.

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(6) adhered to established local policies and procedures. The U.S.M.C. and (b)(1)1.4a leadership all confirmed the uniform, weapons status policy – (b)(1)1.4a and authorization for SOG and COG personnel off shift to tour Marines manning fighting positions.



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(b)(1)1.4a

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(Exhibits I, J). Furthermore, (b)(6) were touring the fighting positions in a buddy team, which was also directed by the U.S.M.C. and (b)(1)1.4a leadership at (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits C, I, J, L).

(3) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(6) did not have any derogatory information in their personnel files nor had they presented any issues during the deployment that would preclude them from serving in a supervisory position of SOG or COG. (Exhibit X).

e. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(6) rapidly deescalated the situation following the Green on Blue Shooting while simultaneously ensuring the protection of U.S./Coalition personnel, and the defense of (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibit I, J). Immediately following the shooting, (b)(6) ensured all U.S. personnel assumed a heightened alert posture to protect against a possible attack from ISIS or protect against retribution from (b)(1)1.4d personnel for the deceased (b)(1)1.4d LNO Guard. (Exhibit I, J). (b)(6) also ensured his personnel continued to support maneuver with kinetic strikes while he gained situational awareness of the shooting incident to prepare for his KLEs with the (b)(1)1.4d leadership. (Exhibits I, J, R). These KLEs were instrumental in gathering the facts, de-escalating the situation, and ensuring D-ISIS operations in the (b)(1)1.4a were not disrupted. The (b)(1)1.4d leadership at (b)(1)1.4a recognized his resolve towards supporting (b)(1)1.4d maneuver and contributed those actions towards de-escalating the situation. Finally, (b)(6) ensured evidence was properly collected and pushed to his higher headquarters to facilitate the future investigation. (Exhibits I, P).

**5. (U) Recommendations.** In view of the above findings, I recommend:

a. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) That no further investigation is required. Based on the totality of the evidence available and the thorough investigation, it is unlikely that any further investigation is going to reveal the true motive of the deceased (b)(1)1.4d LNO guard's actions, contradict (b)(6) (b)(6) actions as justified, or alter the (b)(1)1.4d perception of the incident.

b. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(6) be commended for his heroic actions on 17 February 2018. Within a matter of seconds (b)(6) reacted to an immediate threat, maintained his composure in the face of imminent danger, had the presence to immediately administer medical aid to his fellow Marine, and notify U.S. forces of other potential threats. The nature of the incident highlights (b)(6) professionalism and heroism.

c. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(6) be commended for his leadership on 17 February 2018 in deescalating the situation while continuing to support (b)(1)1.4d maneuver in the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(6) immediately understood the importance of maintaining a safe environment for the service members under his charge and maintaining a vital relationship in our D-ISIS efforts. His efforts during the follow on KLEs highlighted the strong relationship he built with the (b)(1)1.4d leadership, his competence, and maturity.

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d. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Continued training and education on Rules of Engagement during pre-deployment and deployed sustainment training. (b)(6) actions are a direct result of his training and should be used as an example of what to do and the importance of pre-deployment situational training and sustainment training while deployed.

e. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Continue to exercise vigilance against the potential for insider threats in all partnered force operations. While it appears this was an isolated incident, it doesn't change the realities of operating with partners in a complex and hostile environment. As the conflict progresses, tensions and patience will deteriorate, therefore it is important that the leadership continue to reiterate vigilance, and the potential for future incidents. Doing so will yield responses similar to those of (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Encls

United States Marine Corps  
Investigating Officer

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~





~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE—OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO AE 09306

S: 11 March 2018

ICRG

19 February 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(6) Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09306

SUBJECT: Appointment as Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer (IO) and Line of Duty – Green on Blue Incident – (b)(1)1.4a on 17 February 2018

1. Pursuant to AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, I hereby appoint you as an Investigating officer to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the Green on Blue incident in the vicinity of the (b)(1)1.4a on 17 February 2018. Additionally, you will conduct a formal line of duty (LOD) investigation IAW Chapter II of JAGINST 5800.7F *Manual of the Judge Advocate General* (JAGMAN) into the same. (b)(6) will serve as assistant IOs to provide special technical knowledge, assist with conducting interviews and performing investigative tasks.

2. You will conduct these investigations in accordance with AR 15-6, Chapters 3 and 5 and JAGMAN, Chapter 2. You may rely on, but are not limited to, the following methods to obtain information required to complete this investigation: examination of relevant documents; visiting relevant locations; evaluating procedures; conducting inventories; taking pictures; and interviewing witnesses.

3. This investigation is your primary mission and takes precedence over all other duties and responsibilities until I approve your final report. Your legal advisor will be

(b)(6) Before beginning your investigation you must contact (b)(6)

to receive a legal briefing. You must submit your completed report with all enclosures, and provide it to your legal advisor, no later than the suspense date. Requests for extension will only be granted on a limited basis and requires a detailed justification. Submit requests for an extension in writing through your legal advisor.

4. It is crucial that you begin your investigation immediately in order to complete it by the suspense.

5. You must interview or arrange for sworn statements from individuals, military or civilian, with first-hand knowledge of facts relevant to this

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

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SUBJECT: Appointment as Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer (IO) and Line of Duty – Green on Blue Incident – (b)(1)1.4a, on 17 February 2018

investigation.

a. Witness statements will be in writing and sworn on a DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, whenever possible. Your authority to administer oaths is set forth in Article 136 (b)(4) of the Code of Uniform Military Justice (UCMJ). If you cannot obtain a written sworn statement from a witness, you will swear to the accuracy of any transcription or summary of their testimony, or memorialize the witness's statements in a detailed memorandum for record. If you do not use DA Form 2823, complete a Privacy Act statement before you elicit any personal information.

b. Interviews will be conducted in person whenever possible. If witnesses are unavailable for in person interviews, telephonic or VTC interviews are authorized and should be sworn. Do not discuss witness statements with other witnesses in the investigation.

c. During the investigation, if you discover that your duties require you to examine the conduct or duty performance of a person senior to you, stop and report this fact to your legal advisor.

d. If, during the course of your investigation, you wish to interview non-U.S. Coalition members, then you should coordinate with your legal advisor to contact the Coalition member's Senior National Representative (SNR) prior to scheduling an interview.

6. Whenever it is necessary to advise a witness or respondent of their rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 31b, you should consult with your legal advisor before questioning that individual. If it is determined that there was a violation of the UCMJ, consider notifying CID.

7. The scope of your investigation will be as broad as necessary to answer the questions provided and address any other relevant matters you deem necessary to give the appointing authority a full understanding of the situation. At a minimum, you will determine the following:

a. Determine what events transpired and then determine why the events transpired as they did. Include any information regarding negative interactions, if any, between the personnel involved in the incident or their units.



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SUBJECT: Appointment as Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer (IO) and Line of Duty – Green on Blue Incident – [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, on 17 February 2018

- (1) Did the US personnel involved have any previous interactions with any of the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d personnel involved? For example, did they work together on previous assignments or did this incident represent their first significant interaction?
- (2) Did any of the personnel involved express negative opinions or sentiments about the Coalition presence [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d?
- b. Determine the exact location of the incident and a timeline of events.
- c. Identify all U.S./Coalition Force personnel involved in the incident, their duties, and the relationships between units in the area.
- d. Identify all non-U.S./Coalition Force or Partner Force involved in the incident, including relevant descriptions of their uniforms, training, background, equipment, weapons, specific mission or duties at the time.
- e. Determine if any evidence was collected by US Personnel, the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d or any other individuals or entities in the immediate aftermath of the incident. Obtain copies of any collateral investigations and existing medical records.
- f. Determine what, if any, procedures, policies, and regulations applied in the conduct of the duties of all the personnel involved in the incident and whether they were adhered to.
- g. Make a determination as to whether the injuries sustained by US Servicemembers involved should be characterized as in the line of duty.
8. Ensure that you address all of the requirements and questions posed in this memorandum. Your findings and recommendations memorandum must comply with AR 25-50 formatting. Do not use document protectors. Include in your report all documentary evidence, sworn statements, photos, and other information or evidence you considered. Assemble them in the following order:
  - a. A completed DA Form 1574-1;
  - b. A Table of Contents;
  - c. An Executive Summary;

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SUBJECT: Appointment as Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer (IO) and Line of Duty – Green on Blue Incident – (b)(1)1.4a, on 17 February 2018

d. A memorandum containing a detailed, chronological narrative of events, answers to the questions posed in this memorandum, your findings supported by the evidence, and recommendations based on your findings;

e. This appointment memorandum;

f. A timeline of your investigative activity;

g. A detailed power point slide presentation outlining lessons learned.

9. You are highly encouraged to include a diagram, storyboard, or other demonstrative evidence describing the incident and factual findings based on the evidence collected. Include these items as exhibits, if included.

10. Classification. IAW CJTF CG Policy Letter #2, dated 16 December 2017, this investigation should be created at the lowest possible classification level possible and with the widest range of releasability. For classified material, consider using a Classified Annex. Prior to submitting your investigation for final review, you must consult your servicing SSO for a security classification review. You must properly classify each paragraph of your findings and recommendations. Additionally, within your completed investigation report, you must properly mark each page and all exhibits. Notwithstanding the overall classification, you will digitally submit your report to your legal advisor via SIPRNet when you are complete as well as furnish a bound, hardcopy of the final report.

11. This appointment authorizes priority 1 travel status throughout the AOR in order to conduct the investigation.

12. I authorize the Staff Judge Advocate, CJTF-OIR, to approve extensions up to 30 calendar days from the original suspense for this investigation. I withhold approval of any extension requests beyond that timeframe.

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SUBJECT: Appointment as Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer (IO) and  
Line of Duty – Green on Blue Incident – (b)(1)1.4a, on 17  
February 2018

13. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(6)

(b)(6)	(b)(6)
(b)(6)	(b)(6)



PAUL E. FUNK, II  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Commanding



**REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER**

Note. Completed forms may contain personally identifiable information and require handling as set forth in AR 340-21.  
For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

**SECTION I - APPOINTMENT**

Appointed by LTG Paul E. Funk II, Commander, CJTF-OIR

(Appointing authority)

on 20180219 (Date) (Attach enclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6)

**SECTION II - TIMELINE**

1. The (investigation) commenced at Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, Iraq at 1600  
(Place) (Time)

on 20180220  
(Date)

2. The (investigating officer) finished gathering/hearing evidence a 1630 on 20180223 and completed  
(Time) (Date)  
findings and recommendations at 1030 on 20180302  
(Time) (Date)

**SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS**

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES		YES	NO <sup>1/</sup>	NA <sup>2/</sup>
1. Enclosures (para 3-13, AR 15-6)				
Are the following enclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)				
a. The memorandum of appointment?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Explanation by the investigating officer of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
e. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. An Executive Summary, Index of Exhibits, Chronology of the Investigation and lists of all persons interviewed and evidence gathered. (Complex, serious and/or high profile cases)?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Exhibits (para 3-14, AR 15-6)				
a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer attached before the first exhibit?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer (Appendix C-3, AR 15-6)?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded?		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

FOOTNOTES: <sup>1/</sup> Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.

<sup>2/</sup> Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation.



**SECTION IV - FINDINGS** (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer), having carefully considered the evidence, finds: [Each paragraph should be one conclusion based on the evidence gathered during the investigation. These findings should provide answers to each question posed by the appointing authority in the appointment memorandum. The evidence that supports each finding must be cited.]

See attached findings and recommendations memorandum.

**SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS** (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) recommends: *[Each paragraph should be one recommendation based on the findings in Section IV. Address what actions, if any, should be taken with regard to the individuals involved, the unit leadership, and any steps that can be taken to prevent the occurrence in the future. Recommendations do not need to be adverse or punitive. For example, the investigation results can be used as a training tool.]*

See attached findings and recommendations memorandum.

**SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION** (para 3-15, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE

(b)(6)

United States Marines Corps

(Investigating Officer)

(b)(6)

**SECTION VII - ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY** (para 2-8, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) are:

a) Approved.

b) Approved with the following modifications:

(1) The following findings of fact are added/deleted:

(2) The following findings of fact are modified as follows:

(3) The following recommendations are added/deleted:

(4) The following recommendations are modified as follows:

(5) The action recommended in recommendation \_\_\_\_\_ has been accomplished by \_\_\_\_\_

(6) Recommendation(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is not appropriate for action by this command; however, a copy of this investigation is being furnished to \_\_\_\_\_ for such action as deemed appropriate.

c) Disapproved.

d) The report is (incomplete), (ambiguous), (erroneous) and/or (specify deficiency) with respect to \_\_\_\_\_

It is, therefore, hereby returned to the IO for corrective action as follows \_\_\_\_\_



**Continuation Sheet for DA Form 1574-1** in reference to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6  
Investigation into Facts and Circumstance of Green on Blue Incident – (b)(1)1.4a  
(b)(1)1.4a, 17 February 2018

**ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:**

1. I approve the factual findings of the AR 15-6 Investigation in to the facts and circumstances of the Green on Blue Incident in the (b)(1)1.4a on 17 February 2018.

2. The report of investigation contains 5 recommendations. Specifically, the Investigating Officer recommends the following:

a. ~~(SEC//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ That no further investigation is required. Based on the totality of the evidence available and the thorough investigation, it is unlikely that any further investigation is going to reveal the true motive of the deceased (b)(1)1.4d LNO guard's actions, contradict (b)(6) actions as justified, or alter the (b)(1)1.4d perception of the incident.

b. ~~(SEC//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(6) be commended for his heroic actions on 17 February 2018. Within a matter of seconds (b)(6) reacted to an immediate threat, maintained his composure in the face of imminent danger, had the presence to immediately administer medical aid to his fellow Marine, and notify U.S. forces of other potential threats. The nature of the incident highlights (b)(6) professionalism and heroism.

c. ~~(SEC//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(6) be commended for his leadership on 17 February 2018 in deescalating the situation while continuing to support (b)(1)1.4d maneuver in the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(6) immediately understood the importance of maintaining a safe environment for the service members under his charge and maintaining a vital relationship in our D-ISIS efforts. His efforts during the follow on KLEs highlighted the strong relationship he built with the (b)(1)1.4d leadership, his competence, and maturity.

d. ~~(SEC//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Continued training and education on Rules of Engagement during pre-deployment and deployed sustainment training. (b)(6) actions are a direct result of his training and should be used as an example of what to do and the importance of pre-deployment situational training and sustainment training while deployed.

e. ~~(SEC//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Continue to exercise vigilance against the potential for insider threats in all partnered force operations. While it appears this was an isolated incident, it doesn't change the realities of operating with partners in a complex and hostile environment. As the conflict progresses, tensions and patience will deteriorate, therefore it is important that the leadership continue to reiterate vigilance,

and the potential for future incidents. Doing so will yield responses similar to those of

(b)(6)

3. The following constitutes my actions on the recommendations:

a. I approve recommendation 2a.

b. Recommendation 2b is not appropriate for action by this command; however, I direct that a copy of this AR 15-6 be forwarded to


(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

c. Recommendation 2c and 2e are not appropriate for action by this command; however, I direct that a copy of this AR 15-6 be forwarded to Commander,

(b)(1)1.4a

d. I take recommendation 2d under advisement.



PAUL E. FUNK II

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

Commanding